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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
.Statement of the Problem 
The phenomenon of surrogate parenting through artificial insemi-
nation has disclosed a new arena to the counseling profession through 
the psychological, medical, moral, and legal controversies which accom-
pany it. Coming to prominence in the late 1970 l s as a viable and per-
sonal alternative to adoption for childless couples, surrogate parent-
ing is now becoming a growing concern for those who believe in the dig-
nity of man. Psychologists and medical doctors are researching the 
various medical and emotional effects which surrogate parenting has had 
and will continue to have upon the adults involved and the offspring. 1 
Theologians and various religious spokesmen have begun to investigate 
the morality and religious criteria, both pro and con, of the phenom-
enon. Attorneys and legislators are looking into the legality of the 
lOr. Philip Parker, a psychiatrist at Wayne State University, 
conducted an interview with sixty applicants for surrogate mothering. 
The results of his research showed that most applicants have not con-
sidered the problem of the loss of the baby at term or thought of how 
they would explain the loss of the baby to their own young children 
and to colleagues at work. Some replied that they would lie, saying 
the baby had died. 
His research found that some prospective parents plan to tell 
their prospective children the steps leading to their birth as soon as 
they are old enough to understand the concepts involved; while others 
insist that they will keep the child from learning these facts. 
David Sobel, The New York Times: "Style", Monday, June 29,1981. 
1 
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procedure as it pertains to the surrogate, the adoptive parents, and 
the infant, and its effect upon public policy. Dr. Parker has taken 
this into consideration: 
People react strongly, often totally negatively, to 
the mere mention of surrogate motherhood. It seems to 
trigger their fantasies about baby-buying, slavery and 
black marketeering. (Dr. Parker) said he wanted to pro-
vide a real data base so that any social action to pro-
hibit or regulate surrogate motherhood could be founded 
on information instead of gut feelings or prejudice. 2 
Although many of these professional people sincerely have the best 
interests of all concerned under consideration, several do not. For 
these few professionals it has become big business and big money, thus 
compounding the legal and moral aspects. 3 This new-found venture for 
entrepreneurs has brought surrogate parenting and artificial insemina-
tion out of the laboratories and into the Want Ad sections of newspa-
pers, extracting the emotions of greed or compassion from the respon-
dents. IIFees for services or expenses no rma 1 average $5,000 to 
$10,000, but they can go as high as $20,000 ... 114 
The desire to satisfy these emotions, both of the potential sur-
rogate parent and the potential adoptive couple, often supercedes 
their awareness of the need for proper medical advice and assistance: 
Doris and Jack Kent (after a surrogate mother had 
been secured) said, IIWe were so excited, all we wanted to 
2Ibid. 
3Dave Lindorff. liThe Bus i ness of Surrogate Births II, Venture: 
The Magazine for Entrepreneurs. (September, 1981): 56. 
4Katy Brophy, Louisville, Ky., attorney who operates Surrogate 
Family Services, as quoted in The National Law Journal, (April 9, 
1981): 4,33. 
3 
do was find a doctor willing to help us get on our way to 
becoming parents. We made an appointment with our family 
doctor, but he couldn't help us, nor could the colleague 
he recommended. Our need to consummate our hopes and 
dreams was so intense that we decided to perform the arti-
ficial insemination ourselves. And we did." 
Interestingly, it was the wife, in each case, who 
performed the artificial insemination ... 5 
Counselors are going to be overwhelmed with multitudes of ques-
tions concerning surrogate parenting as the phenomenon becomes more and 
more disclosed to the public. Childless couples from all walks of life 
will be seeking advice and counsellors will need to be well versed with 
regard to the legal, medical, psychological, and moral aspects in order 
to answer their questions. 
Statement of Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to present an investigation of the 
legal, moral, medical and psychological interests which bear upon sur-
rogate parenting. Within this framework, an analysis of the presently 
available studies and opinions will be presented. The paper will also 
present and analyze the motivational aspects of the potential surrogate 
mother, potential adoptive parents, and those professional persons who 
arrange the operation. 
Surrogate motherhood is a phenomenon that many find 
difficult to understand ... Elizabeth Kane says she became 
a surrogate because of her great sympathy for women who 
are unable to have children ... Dana acted out of friend-
ship ... In fact, money was a motivating factor for a ma-
jority of surrogate applicants studied by Dr. Philip Parker. 6 
5Karol White. What To Do When You Think You Can't Have A Baby 
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1981), p. 129. 
6Elaine Markoutsas. "Women Who Have Babies for Other Women," 
Reader's Digest (August 1981): 70-74. 
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Counselors will have in hand, within this finished thesis, a guide 
which will aid them in counseling in this matter. 
Statement of Importance of the Problem 
The importance of the problem of the phenomenon of surrogate par-
enting lies in the fact that no one at this time has a definite grasp 
on the totality of the implications. 
There is one key point. There are no laws pertaining 
to surrogate mothers .. For the truth is that artificial 
insemination, the primary medical contribution to surrogate 
mothering, is relatively simple ... We do not know, and will 
not know for some time, what the long range psychological 
consequences of the surrogate mother are ... The question: 
By promoting the surrogate mother, are we doing good? Are 
we on the side of the angels (in promoting life) or the 
devils (in violating traditional moral taboos)?7 
These implications can and do coincide with those of 
the in vitro fertilization process, i.e., genetic manipu-
lation, embryonic experimentation, selective breeding, and 
the quest for a super-human race. 
The selective breeding and the quest for a super-
human race have become a reality. With the establishment of 
numerous "sperm banks" throughout the nation it is possibl e 
to select a particular father for the potential child. It 
has been reported that these certifiable intelligent women 
have been impregnated by semen from Nobel laureate donors.8 
At this juncture, "everyone is doing what is right in his own 
eyes." There is clearly a need for a thorough investigation of the 
reality of surrogate parenting, bringing in those arguments for and 
against the process. No indepth analysis of its effects upon the 
family structure have been presented from a psychological or Biblical 
7Noel P. Keane with Dennis L. Breo. The Surrogate Mother (New 
York: Everest House Publishers, 1981), pp. 233,240,246,255. 
8Matt Clark with Jonathan Kirsch. "Recipe for Genius: First, 
Get Sperm ... ," Newsweek Vol. XCV, No. 10 (Mar. 10,1980): 85. 
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point of view. Questions which have not been answered, as yet, bear 
upon all four of the areas mentioned in this thesis. 
1. Med i ca 1 
a. Is this procedure really bringing joy and fulfillment 
to the childless parents? 
b. Is science being represented at its best in serving 
human beings by assisting nature when nature cannot 
do its job? 
c. Is it expanding our knowledge about conception and 
fetal growth? 
Clearly these technologies (surrogate mothering, arti-
ficial insemination, in vitro fertilization) bring joy and 
fulfillment to parents who long for children and cannot have 
them in the ordinary way. This is the strongest argument 
in favor of such procedures. They represent science at its 
best, serving human beings by assisting nature. 
This research, too, is vastly expanding our knowledge 
about human conception and fetal growth. This serves the 
quality of human life ... 9 
This thesis will illustrate that the medical profession contends 
that the surrogate parenting process is greatly enhancing their know-
ledge of human embryology. However, it will be demonstrated that those 
involved do have concerns about the moral and ethical value of their 
studies. 
2. Moral 
a. Is the introduction of a third party into a marriage 
harmful to the union? 
b. Is the offspring a commodity offered to only those 
who can afforci it? 
c. Are the surrogate mother and the infant without dignity? 
9Edward Stevens. Making Moral Decisions (New York/Ramsey: 
Paulist Press, 1981), p. 53. 
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d. Is the artificial insemination moral? 
e. If donor semen is used, who is the "real" father? 
More than any other aspect, the moral implications of surrogate paren-
ting have contributed to its lack of popularity. Artificial insemina-
tion is not a new solution to an old problem. Writings in the Talmud 
mention its use as far back as 300 B.C.I0 In the fourteenth century 
an enemy injected some fine Arab mares with the sperm of an inferior 
breed. This method has been around for centuries but is now coming 
out of the closet. 
Noel Keane, a Detroit attorney, cites the following in the Intro-
duction to his book, The Surrogate Mother: 
Once, perhaps, she might have adopted. But the 
pill and abortion have changed that. There are very 
few babies to adopt ... 
The ability to help people like Tom and Jane is 
what sustains me when the going gets rough -- when 
the peopl e in my pari sh tell me, "What you're doi ng 
is immoral," or when the editori a 1 writers scoff, 
"Rent-a-womb."ll 
The moral issues have provoked a verbal war between the religious 
spokesmen and scientists. 
Science is not the highest value. We must consider 
the implicit danger to man's right to life of discoveries 
in the field of artificial insemination, birth and fertil-
ity control, and genetic engineering. 
- Pope John Paul, II, speaking to an audience of Italian 
physicians, October 27, 1980.12 
10Martin Gallin and Philip Newman. "Whose Child Is This," 
Rights. Vol. 8, No.2 (Summer 1979): 140. 
IINoel P. Keane, The Surrogate Mother. p. 13. 
12Ibid., p. 2. 
Human 
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Science cannot stop while ethics catch up. 
-Elvin Stackman, speaking as president of the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science, January 
9, 1950. 13 
There are those in the religious circles who contend that no moral 
violation has occured . 
... if the goal is to provide an infertile couple 
with children, surrogate motherhood is morally unob-
jectionable. 14 
Although Rabbi Seymo~ Siegel sees nothing objectionable in the moral 
issues of surrogate parenting, there are age-old Jewish beliefs which 
would contradict his statement. 
Surrogate parenting - surrogate mothers and AID - is causing con-
cern for morality among scientists: 
Laboratory control of human reproduction is fraught 
with danger and uncertainty. Once scientist, Martin Curie-
Cohen, Ph.D., University of Wisconsin, raises certain valid 
concerns: 
Inadequate genetic screening of donors. 
Lack of control of multiple use of donors, 
leading to inbreeding. 
Inadequate record keeping. 
Lack of uniform policies responsible for the 
practice of AID.15 
The greatest concerns are being expressed by certain professional 
organizations within the medical profession itself. One such organi-
zation is the Ciba Foundation. Founded primarily for the promotion of 
13Ibid., p. 2. 
14Rabbi Seymour Siegel, Jewish Theological Seminary of America in 
New York City, as quoted by Elaine Markoutsas. "Women Who Have Babies 
for Other Women," Reader ' s Digest (August 1981): 70-74. 
15White, p. 124. 
8 
international cooperation in medical and chemical research, it is a 
scientific and educational charity established by CIBA Limited, now 
CIBA-GEIGY Limited, of Basle and operates independently in London un-
der English trust law. 
The sum of all this is that moralism compromises 
truth: a judgement that the act ought not to be done, 
while it continues to be done, gives rise to an accum-
ulating deceit upon society, both in records and in 
rel ati onshi ps ... 
It is therefore, a matter of serious concern that 
a new medical practice, grounded upon scientific re-
search and so upon the high value put on truth, should 
in fact result in, and to some extent require, deceit 
and uncertainty. The secrecy involved in A.I.D. obliges 
the practitioner, the husband and wife, and the donor 
(surrogate mother) to conspire together to deceive the 
child and society as to the child's true parentage, his 
genetic identity. Truth is violated, credibility is 
undermined, and this is a serious ethical matter.16 
As demonstrated here, the moral/ethical issues loom as legend. However, 
it is not the intent of this thesis to attempt a resolution of all that 
is involved. It is intended to enlighten the reader to those various 
moral/ethical issues which will need to be addressed in counseling 
sessions with prospective surrogate parents. 
3. Legal 
Another aspect of surrogate parenting which is quickly becoming 
of greater concern than the medical or moral issues is that of the 
legality of the process. The relative newness of the phenomenon has 
exposed the legal system as inadequate to deal with the issue at this 
time. Many states are hurriedly and perhaps haphazzardly struggling 
to initiate legislation to cover A.I.D. and surrogate mothering. 
16G. R. Dunstan. "Moral and Social Issues Arising from A.LD." 
Law and Ethics of A.I.D. and Embryo Transfer, Ciba Foundation Sympos-
ium 17 (New York: Associated Scientific Publishers, 1973), p. 48. 
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Some questions which have been raised are: 
What is the rational legislative reason why a single 
woman cannot be an adoptive parent? 
How is the validity of the Agreement affected if there 
is a dis pute whether pregnancy occurred by natural i n-
semination rather than artificial insemination? 
Does the Agreement only permit wealthier adoptive par-
ents? Can single fathers enter into surrogate agree-
ments? 
How will the family "unit" be defined and applied? 
Could it be a conflict of interest for the physician 
who artificially inseminated the surrogate mother to 
be able to recommend abortion? 
Will Agreement terms which contradict provisions re-
quired by the Act to be included in an Agreement be 
enforceab1 e?17 
Questions have arisen in another state, Kentucky: 
Whether such a contract (surrogate mother and adop-
tive parents) is legal in Kentucky. 
Whether ordinary custody rules would apply in the 
event one or more of the parties to the agreement 
changed their minds while the pregnancy was in 
progress. 
Whether surrogate transactions can be regulated by 
the state. 
Whether the couple or the doctor could be held liable 
if the surrogate died or had her health impaired by 
the pregnancy.18 
The state of California has been faced with cases which have required 
I7Ra1ph Mawds1ey, Ph.D., Attorney at Law, upon reviewing House 
Bill No. 5184 introduced by Rep. Fitzpatrick to the Michigan State 
House, October 26,1981. 
I8Steven L. Beshear, Attorney General, Commonwealth of Kentucky, 
response to a letter from Mr. Joe Ward, Editor, Courier Journal-
Louisville Times, Louisville, Kentucky (January 26, 1981). 
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the intervention of the Supreme Court of that state. This particular 
case illustrates the ways in which the issues complicate the lives of 
the participants in this eternal human drama. 
The State of New York has also been involved in numerous cases 
dealing with A.I.D. The earliest dates to 1948 in the case of Strand 
v; Strand. In these cases, II Adul teryll seemed to be the prevel ant 
issue. 19 
Although the courts will be the deciding factor as in the issues 
of abortion and euthenasia, a big question to be resolved is: Can 
legislation pertaining to surrogate parenting be considered legisla-
ting morality? As in abortion, many will ask, Ills the surrogate mo-
ther not able to do with her body and its products (egg, embryo) as 
she pleases?1I Ills not the donor of sperm permitted to dispose of his 
bodily products (sperm) as he pleases?1I 
These are legitimate questions and the courts will have to re-
solve them in the formulation of public policy. Noel Keane proclaims: 
The solution to this controversy is very simple. We 
need legislation from the states to clarify the issues 
and we need regulation by the states to control those in-
volved. Court decisions can only point the way. The real 
answer is to be found in legislation. 20 
This thesis will present an analysis of the existing legislation 
in the above mentioned states. It will also provide the reader with 
19Martin Gall in and Philip Newman. IIWhose Child Is This ll Human 
Rights Vol. 8, No.2 (Summer 1979): 17. 
20Keane, p. 233. 
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a summary of those opinions and articles which have been complied by 
the legal profession dealing with surrogate parenting. 
4. Psychological 
The psychological aspect of surrogate parenting is probably as 
weak in research as the legal area is in legislation. Psychologists 
have attempted and are presently conducting studies to provide infor-
mation concerning the donor parents, adoptive parents and the off-
spring. At this present time, information regarding the long range 
effect upon the offspring is extremely limited. There are a few 
cases which have surfaced and the available information on these will 
be investigated. Some of the questions being asked are: 
What are the long-range psychological consequences of 
surrogate parenting? 
What are the motivations of a surrogate parent? 
What psychological consequences will there be for society? 
What type of person will be a surrogate parent? 
What are the psychological effects upon the family members 
of one who is a surrogate parent, i.e., husband, wife, son, 
daughter, mother, father, sister, brother? 
At the time of this writing, two psychiatrists are conducting re-
search into the motivations for surrogate parenting and are beginning a 
study of its effects upon the parties concerned. Philip Parker, M.D., 
Psychiatry, has done a preliminary study on the surrogate mother's mo-
tivation. He finds: 
However, most women did not admit that any feelings of 
loss would occur and denied that the baby would be theirs. 
They said such things as: 
IIIl m only an incubator.1I 
IIIld be nestwatching. 1I 
IIIt won't be my husband's and mine. 1I 
II I I 11 thi nk of doi ng it for the money for my 
12 
children; like an illness, Illl think, lIn 
four months, I I 11 be better. I II 
"Illl be doing it for someone else." 
"Ild be doing it for the woman: lid be closer 
to the wife. II 
"Illl attach myself in a different way - hoping 
it Ish ea lt hy . II 21 
With responses like these, it is clearly evident that there is a great 
deal of psychological manipulation on the part of those involved. Al-
though only in preliminary stages, the studies do provide an abundance 
of insight into the "person" of those who seek to be surrogate parents. 
Dr. Darrell D. Franks has also investigated the psychological as-
pect of surrogate parenting. His results showed: 
Most viewed this process somewhat like that of an unwed 
mother placing her child for adoption but these women felt 
assured that the background and characteristics of the family 
who would be rearing the child were good. Almost all wished to 
see the infant one time to assure themselves that the child was 
normal. 22 
It is the intent of this thesis to provide the reader with the available 
information at this writing which is pertinent to the psychological im-
plications of surrogate parenting. 
Statement of Position on the Problem 
The position taken by this thesis in relation to the surrogate 
parenting issue is that it is morally and psychologically wrong. Also, 
since the legal entanglements presently seem insurmountable, the emo-
21Philip Parker, M.D., Clinical Instructor, Dept. of Psychiatry, 
Wayne State University School of Medicine, "Surrogate Mother l s Motiva-
tion - Initial Findings," paper presented at the annual meeting of 
American Psychiatric Association, New Orleans, May 12, 1981. p. 5. 
22Darrel D. Franks, M.D., "Psychiatric Evaluation of Women in a 
Surrogate Mother Program" American Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. 138 
No. 10 (October 1981): 1378. 
13 
tional injustices are incalculable. Since the artificial insemination 
process involves masturbation, the introduction of a third parw into the 
marital arrangement, and the possibility of incest between the offspring, 
it will be proven that surrogate parenting is unbiblical. 
With the negligence of the parties concerned to seek proper medi-
cal advice and assistance, it will be proven from a medical point of 
view that it is potentially hazardous to the surrogate mothers and the 
offspring. In additon, it will be shown that in the A.I.D. process 
there is a potential danger of disease being transmitted to the surro-
gate mother or the A.I.D. recipient. These illnesses may range from 
a minor infection to venereal disease. 
However, I have found that the transmission of disease 
to be more of a problem than these authors suggest. This 
seems to be especially true in the case of mycoplasma infec-
tion from the donor, and may possibly account for the recent 
increase in spontaneous abortion in my "successful" patients. 23 
The ultimate question to be answered is, "Is surrogate parenting con-
trary to God's plan for the human family unit?" and the answer will be 
res 0 un d 1 i n g 1 y, "Yes!" 
Limitations 
The limitations confronting this project lie in the area of re-
search. Since this is a relatively new issue, written material dealing 
specifically and extensively with the subject is sparse. While numerous 
articles are available, it has been dealt with only as an alternative 
to childlessness in various books and pamphlets on the subjects of 
23Herbert W. Horne, Jr., "Artificial Insemination, Donor: An 
Issue of Ethical and Moral Values." New England Journal of Medicine 
Vol. 293, No. 17 (October 23,1975): 873. 
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Infertility, Human Reproduction, Pregnancy, Genetic Engineering, 
Gynecology, Morals, Ethics, Adoption, Sterility, and Cloning. 
The study itself is limited in that the thrust of this thesis is 
surrogate parenting as it relates to married couples and the family 
structure. Single parenthood through surrogate parenting, although a 
very real concern and one which stands in need of further investiga-
tion, will not be considered as an issue to be confronted within this 
paper. However, in presenting pertinent material for the topic it will 
be necessary to make reference to those areas in which there is a cor-
relation. 
Also, it is not the intent of this thesis to discuss at great length 
the in vitro fertilization issue. But, as with single parenthood, it 
will behoove the text to discuss those areas of concern which are common 
to both. 
A side issue which is rapidly developing within the medico/science 
realm is embryo transfer/fetal adoption. This will be discussed because 
it is a direct surrogate parenting result in its truist definition. 
The woman who donates the ovum to be fertilized and 
the woman into whom the zygote is transplanted do not need 
to be the same woman. Indeed, women who are unable to 
carry a child to term may desire to hire a IIsurrogate 
mother" who would carry the child. 24 
Another issue springing from the surrogate parenting procedure is 
24This method of surrogate motherhood produces a child which is 
the biological issue of both parents, rather than a child of the wife 
alone, as in A.I.D., or husband alone, as in a surrogate mother. Paula 
Diane Turner, "Love's Labor Lost: Legal and Ethical Implications In 
Artificial Human Procreation." University of Detroit Journal of Urban 
Law, Vol. 58, No.3 (Spring 1981): 471. 
15 
the ability of homosexual men and women to become parents. Many 
doctors report that if they are aware that a woman or man is homo-
sexual, they will refuse to perform artificial insemination. 
The greatest fear of the surrogate parenting phenomenon for those 
professional institutions involved is that it opens a new "Pandora's 
Box" of impl ications. This thesis will deal only with those impl ica-
tions which involve the husband/wife relationship. 
Research Methods 
This thesis will be a combination of library research, a des-
criptive study of existing data and analyses, and it will involve 
some questionnaire/interview situations with local gynecologists. An 
interview with potential adoptive parents is currently being pursued 
but is not confirmed. There will be correspondence with medical 
doctors, attorneys, psychiatrists, and institutions which are pres-
ently working with surrogate parenting. At the time of this writing, 
forty-one organizations dealing with surrogate parenting have been 
contacted. 
The questionnaire will be brief and with yes/no answers. They 
will deal with motivation, justification, method, moral implications 
and medical views. 25 
The basic research is library research. There will be no test 
25These interviews and questionnaires may not be used 
upon the quantity of such tests found within the research. 
be used, it would be restricted to Liberty Baptist College 
personnel and perhaps the other local college students and 
depending 
Should they 
students and 
personnel. 
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conducted which relates to the cultural attitudes by this writer. How-
ever, material currently being compiled by other professionals will be 
analyzed within the thesis. 
Proposal for Chapter Division 
Chapter I: INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will give to the reader an overview of the 
content of the thesis and bring an awareness of the necessity for re-
search in this area. It provides brief discussions of the implications 
projected by the surrogate parenting procedure. Chapter I also pre-
sents a detailed listing of various definitions of terminology which 
will provide a better understanding of the overall subject. 
Chapter II: INTERESTS FURTHERED BY SURROGATE PARENTHOOD 
This chapter provides the reader with the genesis of 
surrogate parenting and will serve as a catalyst for the development 
of the thesis. The intent of this chapter is to make the reader aware 
of the potential benefits and dangers of the act of procreation through 
artificial means. 
Chapter III: CURRENT EFFORTS PRO~OTI~G I~TEREST IN 
SURROGATE PARENTING 
Chapter III will present the excesses and abuses of the 
surrogate parenting IIbusinessll. The material presented here will pro-
vide an insight into sequential results of the actions discussed in 
Chapter II. It will also review some of the legislation which is be-
ing proposed to regulate the surrogate parenting business. 
17 
Chapter IV: PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF SURROGATE PARENTHOOD 
Surrogate parenting at present is governed by no moral, 
legal, or medical guidelines. Material presented here will discuss 
the various court cases which have stemmed from issues raised about 
surrogate parenting. The varying views of religious sects will also 
be reviewed as well as the moral/ethic, legal, medical, and psycholog-
ical professions. 
Chapter V: CONCLUSION 
The content of this chapter will summarize the presented 
material, analyze it and state the position of the writer on each as-
pect. 
Proposed Summary of Each Chapter 
Chapter I: INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will discuss those problems which present 
a limitation to this study, i.e., relative newness of the problem, 
the lack of extensive research and writing from the various fields 
encompassed by surrogate parenthood. It will provide an overview of 
the various books, articles, magazines, and opinions of professional 
agencies, i.e., The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 
The American Academy of Psychiatry and Law, American Medical Associa-
tion, American Psychiatric Association, American Fertility Society, 
and the Attorney Generals of Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, and Califor-
nia. The chapter will also present definitions of the various medical, 
Psychological, and legal terminology which will be used throughout the 
18 
thesis. This will expose various issues which provide the structure 
for the thesis. 
Chapter II: INTERESTS FURTHERED BY SURROGATE PARENTING 
Those interests which se~ingly have profited from sur-
rogate parenting, adoptive parents, medical research, and the surrogates 
themselves, will be discussed. The chapter provides information from 
recent studies of surrogate parenthood candidates concentrating on their 
motivations. The medical research which has been furthered, genetic 
manipulation, and in vitro fertilization, is also presented. 
Chapter III: CURRENT EFFORTS PROMOTING INTEREST IN 
SURROGATE PARENTHOOD 
Presented here is an overview of those organizations 
which are currently publicizing the positive results of surrogate par-
enting and their motivations for doing so. This chapter presents an 
insight into the excesses and abuses of the human reproduction process. 
Chapter IV: PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF SURROGATE PARENTHOOD 
Basic to this chapter will be the pursuit of answers to 
various questions which have been raised: 
"The practice is morally unjustifiable, because a 
third party is introduced into the marriage of two who 
have become one flesh ... 11, Richard McCormick, Professor, 
Georgetown University. 
"I know of no court that would be sympathetic to a 
contract involving the selling of babies", Professor 
Sanford N. Katz, Chairman, American Bar Associationls 
Family Law Section. 
"Depersonalization of the reproductive process could 
have adverse effects on human society", Dr. Jack W. Provonsha, 
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M.D., Professor, Loma Linda University."26 
Chapter V: CONCLUSION 
This chapter will evaluate the material presented in the 
thesis in view of the Biblical and ethical arguments for the dignity of 
human reproduction. 
Survey of Literature 
The research will include reading, personal interviews, and a 
brief questionnaire. It will be conducted at the libraries of Liberty 
Baptist College and Seminary, Lynchburg College, Lynchburg City Public 
Library, and at the Medical School Library, Law School Library, and the 
School of Psychology Library of the University of Virginia in Char-
lottesville. 
The interviews will be conducted with gynecologists in the city 
of Lynchburg and with doctors at the University of Virginia Medical 
School. The questionnaire will be distributed to various college stu-
dents and professors of the local colleges. 
The literature used for research in this project is seventy-five 
percent articles which have been published in newspapers, i.e., New 
York Times, Washington Post, and Los Angeles Times. Many major maga-
zines and periodicals have also carried articles of interest. These 
include: Newsweek, Time, Venture, Reader's Digest, New England Law 
Journal, New England Journal of Medicine, Alabama Journal of Medicine 
and SCience, Fertility/Sterility, The Public Interest, The National 
Law Journal, Psychology Today, and others. 
26Markoutsas, p. 72. 
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Books which have been written on the subject will supply twenty-
five percent of the research material. There are few authors who have 
dealt extensively with surrogate parenting. However, those who have 
are professionals in their fields: attorneys, doctors, and nurses. 
These authors have approached the subject in a manner that presents 
openly the dangers and benefits and those "gray" areas which are pres-
ently hindering its furtherance. 
Noel P. Keane and Dennis L. Breo in their book, The Surrogate 
Mother, which is the only book written on this subject specifically, 
write from a positive viewpoint. Mr. Keane is the first attorney in 
the U.S. to deal with surrogate parenting. They are not reluctant, 
however, to express the negative aspects because they state that an-
swers are needed for these questions. Their motive is to instigate a 
reaction that will foster legislation establishing controls on the 
phenomenon. 
What To Do When You Think You Can't Have A Baby, written by Karol 
White, emphasizes the problem of infertility. It is noted in the Fore-
word that extensive time and research have been directed toward the 
writing of the book. Karol White devoted more than eighteen months in 
researching the material, interviewing the clinicians, conversing with 
the patients and compiling the data. The major contributors to the 
book are recognized authorities in their specific fields. She says of 
the book: 
This is a book of many voices, many tongues, and 
many viewpoints. From Israel to South America, from 
England to Australia, techniques, technology and treat-
ment are highlighted. I spoke to women lying on oper-
ating tables in cool, green operating rooms, their arms 
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strapped down, an IV dripping into their veins. I ques-
tioned doctors in their offices and operating rooms. I 
traveled from Boston to California, from St. Louis to 
New York, speaking to ferti1 ity "exgerts" in Tennessee 
and Illinois, Texas and New Jersey.Z7 
This history of artificial insemination and human reproduction is 
the thrust of Robert T. Francoeur in his book, Utopian Motherhood. He 
traces the course of medical science as it relates to the fertility 
processes of mankind from the early Greek writers, Aristotle, Hippo-
crates, and others, to the 1970's. 
The dilemma of infertility is discussed in They Say You Can't Have 
A Baby by Madeline Blais. This book discussed the psychological and 
physiological trauma suffered by infertile couples. She offers the 
many alternatives to childlessness and presents them in detailed form. 
The Fertility Handbook by Judith A1sofrom Fenton and Aaron S. Lif-
chez, M.D., gives insight into alternative conception plans such as 
artificial insemination, test-tube babies, and surrogate mothers. They 
offer detailed descriptions of male and female sexual anatomy, informa-
tion about the cost of medical treatment, case histories of infertile 
couples, and interviews with experts in the field. 
Wilfred J. Finegold, M.D., discusses all of the aspects of impreg-
nation through artificial methods in his book, Artificial Insemination. 
He presents the moral and ethical views of professional institutions, 
legal, medical, scientific and religious. 
Another book which deals with various aspects of surrogate parent-
ing is Law and Ethics of A.I.D. and Embryo Transfer. This book is a 
compilation of lectures of the Ciba Foundation. 
27Karo1 White. What To Do When You Think You Can't Have A Baby. 
New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1981) p. 5. 
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Numerous articles have been published in a quantity of profes-
sional journals. These deal with the many various aspects and impli-
cations of surrogate parenting. 
Results 
The results and conclusions of this thesis will show that the 
process of surrogate parenting ;s legally, morally, and Biblically 
wrong. It is an invasion into the sacredness of the marital bonds 
and an exploitation of the human reproductive process and human life. 
In surrogate parenting, babies become a commodity rather than the 
blessing which God intended them to be. 
It will also be proven that there are definite medical and psy-
chological effects upon the surrogate parent, the adoptive parents, 
and the child. The lack of legal restraints will be used as one of 
the arguments to provoke public awareness of the threat to moral de-
cency. 
Definition of Terminology 
There are several terms which need to be defined in order to es-
tablish a clear basis for the herein contained discussion. 
Abortion - The premature expulsion of an embryo from the uterus (either 
spontaneous or induced). 
Adhesions - The joining of the healed parts such as fibrous bands which 
attach to inner body organs. 
Amenorrhea - The absence or cessation of menstruation. 
Amniocentesis - The removal of a sample of amniotic fluid to test for 
certain conditions. 
Andrologist - One who studies men and disease of the male sex. 
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Artificial Insemination - The depositing of seminal fluid by mechani-
cal means into a woman's cervix to achieve pregnancy. 
Artificial Insemination, Donor (A.I.D.) - The depositing of seminal 
fluid into the cervix of a woman by mechanical means using 
donated semen. 
Artificial Insemination, Husband (A.I.H.) - (Artificial Insemination-
Homologous) The depositing of seminal fluid into the cer-
vix of a woman using her husband's semen. 
Artificial Insemination, Mixed (A.I.M.) - The depositing of seminal 
fluid into the cervix of a woman using mixed semen from her 
husband and a donor. 
Aspermatogenesis - The absence of sperm in the testis. 
Aspermia - The complete absence of sperm and semen. 
Azoospermia - The absence of sperm and semen. 
Basal Body Temperature - The temperature taken first thing in the morn-
ing, while the body is at rest. 
Cervix - The neck of the uterus. 
Cesarean A method of delivering a baby in which the uterus is cut to 
remove the child. 
Cilia - Tiny hairs attached to the fallopian tubes. 
Clomid - Called Clomiphene Citrate, it is a non-sterioid estrogen 
used to stimulate ovulation in women who do not ovulate. 
Coitus The sexual union between male and female; sexual relations. 
Condom - The sheath which covers the penis worn during intercourse 
to prevent pregnancy or infection. 
Contraception - The prevention of pregnancy. 
Culdoscopy - A visual examination of the female pelvic organs, using 
a telescope-like device (an endoscope) which has been in-
serted into the pelvic cavity through a slit in the vagina 
near the cervix. 
Dermatoglyphics - The study of patterns of ridges of skin of the 
fingers as a genetic indicator, specifically used to iden-
tify chromosomal abnormalities. 
Dysparneuia - Painful sexual intercourse for a woman. 
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Egg - The female sex cell, also known as female gamete or ovum. 
Ejaculate - The semen expelled during the process of ejaculation, the 
act of expelling sperm. 
Endometrium - Lining of the uterus. 
Epididymis - The elongated cordlike structure along the outside of 
the testis in which sperm are stored. 
Estrogen - Female hormone produced by the ovaries and, in much smaller 
amounts, by the adrenal glands of both men and women. 
Fallopian Tubes - The long slender tubes which extend from the ovaries 
to the uterus and serve to transport the ovum. 
Fertilization - The union of sperm and egg. 
Follicle - A sac filled with fluid containing the oocyte or ovum in 
the ovary. 
FSH - A gonadotropic hormone of the pituitary which stimulates 
growth and maturation of the foll icles in the ovaries and 
stimulates spermatogenesis in the male. 
Genetics - The study of heredity. 
Gonorrhea - A form of venera1 disease spread through sexual contact. 
Habitual Abortion - The recurrent spontaneous loss of a fetus pre-
maturely. 
Hysterosalpingogram - An x-ray of the uterus and fallopian tubes after 
dye is injected. 
Implantation - The attachment of the embryo to the lining of the uterus. 
Infertility - The inability to conceive after attempting to do so for 
one year. 
In Vitro Fertilization - Fertilization which takes place in a glass. 
Laparoscopy - The examination of the interior of the abdomen using an 
instrument that is equipped both for viewing and making 
minor corrections. 
Luteinizing Hormone (LH) - A gonadotropic hormone of the pituitary 
gland that causes ovulation and estrogen secretion in the 
female, and testosterone secretion in the male. 
Miscarriage - The loss of the embryo from the uterus, i.e., spontan-
eous abortion. 
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Morphology - The study of the form and structure of cells, e.g. sperm 
cell s. 
Motility - The ability (of the sperm) to move spontaneously. 
Normosperia - A semen sample which, under analysis, shows sperm 
numbe ri ng more than twenty mill ion per cubic centimeter 
of semen and showing normal morphology and normal motility. 
Oligomenorrhea - Irregular menstrual cycles. 
Oligospermia - Low sperm count, between fifteen and twenty million 
per cubic centimeter. 
Ovary - The female gonad, one of two sexual glands, in which the 
ova are formed. 
Ovulation - The discharge of an egg from the follicle of the ovary. 
Ovum - The egg produced by the ovaries each month. 
Polycystic Ovarian Syndrome (PCO) - A condition in which many cysts 
on the ovaries retard fertility. 
Post Coital Test (also called Sims-Huhner test) - A test which mea-
sures the ability of sperm to penetrate cervical mucus. 
Retrograde Ejaculation - The backward release of sperm, usually into 
the bladder instead of out through the penis. 
Rubin's Test - A test designed to evaluate the patency of the fallo-
pian tubes by insufflation with carbon dioxide. 
Semen - A thick, whitish secretion of the male reproductive organs 
composed of spermatozoa, nutrient plasma, secretions from 
the prostrate and other glands. 
Semen Analysis - Measures the quantity, quality, motility and morphol-
ogy of the semen. 
Sexual Dysfunction - The inability to perform sexually. 
Shirodkar - A stitch that closes the neck of the uterus to prevent 
spontaneous abortion. 
Sperm Agglutination - The collecting of sperm into clumps of cells. 
Spermacide - An agent that is destructive to spermotozoa. 
Spermatozoa - Mature ma 1 e cell s, the generative el ements of semen 
which impregnate the ovum. 
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Spinnbarkeit - The formation of a thread of mucus from the cervix 
when blown into a glass slide. 
Split Ejaculate - A process in which the semen is seperated. 
Sterility - The inability to reproduce. 
SWIM - Sperm Washing Insemination Model. A procedure to remove 
antibodies from semen. 
Testicle - The male gonad. 
Testosterone - The hormone produced by the testicles and responsible 
for male sexual characteristics. 
T-Mycoplasma - Tiny organisms found in the urogenital tract which 
form small colonies and may inhibit reproduction. 
Uterus 
Vagina 
The hollow, muscular organ in the female in which the egg 
becomes embedded and in which the embryo develops and is 
nourished. 
The female canal which receives the penis during coitus. 
Vaginismus - A painful spasm of the vagina. 
Varicocele - A varicose condition of the veins of the scrotum. 
Vas Deferens - The vessel carrying the spermatozoa. 
Vasovasostomy - The joining of the ends of a severed vas deferens to 
restore fertility in a man who has undergone a vasectomy.28 
Summary 
The overview presented in this chapter lifts the lid on Pandora's 
box and exposes the fact of existing moral, legal, medical, and psy-
chological problems created by the surrogate parenthood concept. Many 
scholars, scientists, theologians, and attorneys are being confronted 
with these issues. Society is demanding a resolution. The majority 
of articles, being by laymen, i.e, newspaper and magazine reporters, 
are pro. It makes for good circulation. 
28White, pp. 187-197. 
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Those professional institutions which are directly involved have 
published the most technical writings dealing with the relevant issues. 
Theses are questions which definitely demand an answer. This chapter 
has laid the cornerstone for the foundation of an examination of the 
questions. 
CHAPTER II 
Interests Furthered by Surrogate Parenthood 
Science has always been labeled as the instrument through which 
man can make life better and easier for all or it can be the monster 
which can destroy the universe. As scientists continue to explore the 
regions of the unknown, develop and prove new hypotheses, delve into 
the secrets of mankind and proclaim new "truths II , society will continue 
to reap benefits and experience increasing dangers from their experi-
ments. 
Leonardo da Vinci, premiere product of the Italian Renaissance, 
sculptor, artist, military engineer, and scientist, was labeled an 
heretic and a threat to humanity by his fellow countrymen and church-
men. He would often sit by the bedside of dying pauper men and women, 
talk with them and hold their hand as they slipped from this life into 
eternity. As their eyes closed in death, he carried their bodies td a 
makeshift morgue and there be~n dissecting the corpse. Ghoulish and 
horrifying as it may sound and as it was viewed in his time, medical 
science would not be what it is today without da Vinci's undertakings 
and personal sacrifice. Medical schools still use his diagrams and 
drawings of functions and positions of the human body both internal 
and external. Oa Vinci's interest in the human body in the fifteenth 
century and its results are an invaluable asset for mankind today.29 
29Robert Wallace. The World of Leonoardo da Vinci 1452-1519 (New 
York: Time, Inc., 1967) pp. 57-58. 
28 
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The attitudes of the general public are much the same today as 
they were in the fifteenth century. In the academic medical and sci-
ence laboratories of contemporary time much of the experimentation 
with new drugs and medicines and methods of bodily repair, which is 
done under the cloak of "betterment of man's state", would also be 
condemned as unethical and immoral by society. Scientists and doctors 
will never be totally free of the skeptics and gnostics of modern tech-
nology. Surrogate parenthood has become "the tal k of the town" in the 
past two years and will provide for and be provided with close scru-
tiny and criticism, both positive and negative, until it reaches its 
plateau of arrival. 
Noel P. Keane, a Detroit attorney who is the first to do an ex-
tensive writing on the subject of surrogate parenting, declares, "Sur-
rogate parenting is an idea whose time is coming ... "30 Mr. Keane is 
reputed as the first to engage in the surrogate mother aspect of par-
enting. His expertise is often sought by infertile couples who wish 
to have children. 
Dr. Philip Parker, who serves as a psychiatric consultant for Mr. 
Keane, has a novel theory about surrogate mothering which he calls, 
"an informed speculation". His hypothesis is: 
Strong opposition to the surrogate mother concept 
will, in many cases, be due to the fact that the concept 
triggers unconscious fantasies of adultery and incest. 
Although the surrogate mother is artificially inseminated 
and often does not even meet the biological father, to 
many adults her very existence will trigger anxieties and 
guilt about sexual intercourse. He says it all goes back 
30Keane, p. 15. 
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to Freud and the Oedipal complexes. In other words, the 
surrogate mother may remind many people of the repressed 
fantasies they may have had about having sex with their 
parents, or others, and their guilt may make them rise 
up and in knee-jerk fashion, condemn the surrogate mother. 
Also, Dr. Parker believes that our own unacceptable anger 
and hostility towards children may be stirred up and ex-
pressed by an irrational condemnation of the surrogate who 
will give up the child she bears. Such irrational oppo-
sition, he says, should be identified and discredited. 
Certainly, there are enough genuine problems pre-
sented by the surrogate mother that we do not need any 
that only exist in fantasy.31 
Mr. Keane aNd Dr. Parker are most likely the prominent leaders in 
the surrogate parenting movement. They have endured the blasts of 
criticism from ~int and sinner alike. Their experience is first hand 
and they are well aware of the ramifications of their undertakings. 
Keane declares, "I have become a legal expert on surrogate parenting 
simply by being a maverick attorney who did on-the-job training." 32 
He further states: 
I tend to have a very independent turn of mind and 
have never been afraid to take on controversial or un-
popular causes - if I believe in them. I believe in 
surrogate motherhood because I know there are thousands 
of people who want it and need it, including the surrogate 
mothers. I intend to help them. That's how I got into 
this and that's why I am staying. 33 
This Detroit attorney, though honorable in his declaration, is 
not without predecessors. Medical history records that artificial in-
semination is not a new issue. In order to understand the interests fur-
thered by surrogate parenting, a brief review of the history is necessary. 
31Ibid., pp. 254-255. 
32Ibid., p. 238. 
33Ibid., p. 23. 
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A History of Artificial Insemination 
In 1884 a wealthy businessman and his Quaker wife, ten years his 
junior, and childless, approaced Dr. William Pancoast with their dil-
emma. Dr. Pancoast was undoubtedly the right man to be approached with 
this situation. After graduation from Haverford College and Jefferson 
Medical College in Philadelphia and a tour of the medical facilities 
of London, Paris, and Vienna, he had begun a meteoric career in medi-
cine. He had served the Union as a Surgeon-in-Chief and second officer 
of the Philadelphia military hospital during the Civil War. At the end 
of the war he accepted a teaching position in human anatomy at his alma 
mater. 
Motivated by the nature of the problem, Pancoast brought it to 
his classroom for discussion with six student doctors. They decided 
to concentrate their efforts on the wife giving her an examination 
lias compl ete, almost as perfect as any army examination ll . The con-
clusion was that the husband was at fault. After confrontation, the 
husband admitted to a youthful bout with gonnorhea. Two months of 
treatment proved unsuccessful as a remedy, however. Discussion of the 
situation among the class led to the suggestion of a IIhired manll. They 
suggested that perhaps lithe best looking member of the class" might 
volunteer and during a routine examination of the wife, some of his 
semen might be :tnjected into her womb with a rubber syringe. All was 
to be done under anesthetics. Dr. Pancoast approved the ingenious solu-
tion and the experiment was conducted without consultation with either 
the husband or the wife. 
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When a healthy son was born, Dr. Pancoast began to wonder about 
the judiciousnous of the act. He disclosed the deed to the husband 
and was much relieved to find him not the least disturbed. His only 
request was that Pancoast not divulge to his wife how she had conceived. 
The case remained shrouded in secrecy until well after Pancoast's 
death in 1898. In 1909, Addison Davis Hard, one of the students in 
the class exposed the whole story in an article in Medical World under 
the title of "Artificial Impregnation". He personally had shaken hands 
with the son, who had himself become a successful businessman, on his 
twenty-fifth birthday.34 
Dr. Hard was motivated by his own interests to expose the story. 
He used it as a springboard to launch artificial insemination as a 
means of improving the human race. He advocated it as a method of 
eliminating venereal disease since four of every five men in New York 
city at that time were afflicted. His claim that men might in one 
stroke both protect their good women and improve the human race was 
to be performed by castrating the diseased and collecting semen from 
the respectable men. Thus the women could be inseminated with disease-
free semen. 
This bit of medico/scientific venturism was greeted with a some-
what double response: It has been done before and it is against the 
laws of nature and God. However, Hard's article brought to public eye 
the evidence of a major turning point and technological development in 
the biological revolution. This technology has already placed many 
34Robert T. Francoeur. Utopian Motherhood (New York: A. S. 
Barnes and Co., 1973) pp. 2-5. 
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aspects of human reproduction and sexuality in the controlling hands 
of man. 
The reproductive process of the human has posed as a mind-boggling 
mystery since Creation. Ambiogenesis, the spontaneous generation of 
life, has been held as an honorable explanation. The Greeks and many 
early civilizations accepted it as truth. 
Aristotle, for instance, tells of visiting a pond 
that had been completely dried up but was later filled 
with eels and fish spontaneously generated from decaying 
matter and slime. The Roman poet Virgil records a recipe 
for producing insects from mud, while other noted scho-
lars report how thunderclouds and rain produced fish and 
frogs and how honey bees came from the decaying carcasses 
of horses. In medieval times, people believed that worms, 
flies, and crawling creatures were the spawn of damp pu-
trid waters; serpents were born of women's hair that had 
fallen into water, and mice could be produced by wheat 
fermenting in a dark corner with a sweaty shirt. Such 
views held sway even into the time of our Pilgrim Fathers. 35 
To prove the evidence of mystery, consider the old question, 
"Which came first, the chicken or the egg?" Man is continually search-
ing for the roots of his beginning. The human egg was not discovered 
until 1672 by Regnier de Graaf. What he saw was actually a follicle 
inside the ovary. It was to be another century and a half before 
Karl Ernst von Baer would discover and correctly identify the mamma-
lian egg. 36 It is little wonder! Those who have younger brothers and 
sisters and were raised in a Victorian home can remember the "sudden-
ness"of their arrival in the family. When pondered, it is easy to 
35Ibid., p. 5. 
36Ibid., p. 6. 
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see how the early scientists could classify animals in two categories: 
those reproduced by eggs and those in which the male seed is the key. 
This was due to the fact that they could not relate the sexual inter-
course and pregnancy. The time lapse of months and the fact that in 
some cases intercourse did not result in pregnancy confused them. And, 
when you think about it the connection between coitus, with both male 
and female contributing equally, is not that obvious. 
An Egyptian papyrus of the Twelfth Dynasty, circa 
2500 B.C., contains prescriptions for contraceptives, 
abortion, and inducing permanent sterility. Early Hindu 
writers seem to have believed that human pregnancy was 
caused by the union of the male seed and the menstrual 
blood since menstruation stops with conception ... One 
eastern Australian tribe believes that baby girls are 
fashioned by the supernatural powers of the moon and boys 
by wood lizards. In Queensland, the thundergod suppo-
sedly forms babies out of swamp mud and inserts them in 
the mother's womb. Spirit children enter the womb 
through the mother's navel. Hunting a particular kind 
of frog, sitting by the fire or leaping over it, cook-
ing a special kind of fish, all can lead to pregnancy. 
The Pueblo Indians of New Mexico thought maidens 
could conceive from a heavy summer shower; ... the 
founder of the Manchu dynasty was conceived when a 
maiden ate red fruit dropped on her lap by a magpie; 
and Longfellow records how Winonah was quickened by a 
western wind and gave birth to Hiawatha. 37 
Hippocrates and Aristotle also researched the reproduction mecha-
nisms. Hippocrates formulated that since humans were not the products 
of eggs, like a chicken's, the preformed human could not be in any 
egg. He specified that semen was produced in all organs and members 
of the body and after traveling through the blood they gathered into 
one complete pattern in the testicles where they formed the male seed. 
Aristotle also viewed the male semen as the most important factor 
in reproduction. For him, the male shaped and formed society. The 
37Ibid., p. 7. 
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woman was passive matter waiting to be molded and activated by the male 
principle and then as an incubator of his seed. This appears to be the 
first time in recorded history a scientific and philosophical argument 
was worked out for the natural superiority of the male. Aristotle was 
an incurable male chauvinist. He was quick to point out that the male 
is larger, stronger, and\even more handsome. In reproduction it is 
the semen of the male which cooks and shapes the menstrual blood into 
a new human being. 
Thomas Aquinas, the "Universal Doctor of the Church", also held 
that the male semen was the active principle of reproduction and the 
menstrual blood or egg the passive molded substance. In some of his 
writings he purported that the semen cooked the unformed uterine blood 
much as a baker does his dough or that the semen coagulates the uterine 
blood just as certain substances curdle milk. He even had a beautiful 
canard about the conception of baby girls in his first book of his 
Summa Theologica: 
Woman is misbegotten and defective, for the active 
force in the male seed tends to be the production of a 
perfect likeness in the masculine sex; while the pro-
duction of a woman comes from a defect in the active 
force or from some material indisposition, or even from 
some external influence, such as a south wind which is 
moist. 38 
Leonardo da Vinci, in the fifteenth century, was the first man, 
of whom we have record, to truly conduct a scientific experimental 
approach to human reproduction. It has already been stated that he was 
the first to make medically accurate and detailed drawings of the dis-
sected male and female reproductive systems, of sexual intercourse, and 
38Ibid., pp. 8-10. 
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of the human fetus in the womb. He noted beside his drawing of the 
fetus in the womb that lithe heart of the child does not beat nor does 
it breathe because it is continually in water. If it breathed it would 
drown, nor has it need to breathe because it is vivified and nourished 
by the 1 ife and food of the mother ... 1139 Da Vi nc i pronounced that the 
semen is not produced in the blood system, but in the testes. This 
came from his observation of castrated men and male animals. 
Semen was not properly identified until Leeuwenhoek in 1677 exam-
ined the nocturnal emissions of an old sick man. This only opened the 
field for more debate. Many old wive1s tales about reproduction were 
passed from generation to generation. Belief in telegony is still 
very common among animal breeders. It proposes that if a purebred 
bitch first mates with a mongrel or a prize mare is first covered by 
an inferior work horse, the future of prize breeding results will be 
ruined. The poor blood of that first mating will carryover to any 
future offspring regardless of the sire. Some theologians have argued 
that if the human is preformed in the sperm, then every sperm must have 
a human sou 1 ! 
Abbe Lazzaro Spallanzai, in 1776, began to take the study of arti-
ficial insemination seriously. Experimenting with frogs he dressed up 
some male frogs in 1I1ittle breeches of oilskinll. As a control, other 
frogs were left lIall natural il • Placed with ripe female frogs the 
trousered males produced no offspring. Experimenting further, he re-
moved eggs from the female frog and secured semen from a male frog. 
He proceeded to dip a pencil into the semen and spread it over the eggs 
39Ibid., p. ll. 
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which hatched. "Thus I called into life a number of animals, by imi-
tating the means employed by nature." He continued his work with dogs 
and other animals. For him, the sperm was merely a stimulus to the 
development of the preformed germ in the egg. 
Spallanzani's experiment awakened the scientific world to new hor-
izons. The French biologist, Charles Bonnet, wrote to him and stated, 
"I am not so sure but that what you have just discovered may not some 
day have consequences for mankind of no mean significance." 40 
The first human A. I. was performed at about this same time in 
England. Dr. John Hunter successfully impregnated the wife of a Lon-
don linen merchant artificially. Dr. Everard Home reported a normal 
pregnancy and delivery. 
In France, Professor Thouret of the Medical Faculty of Paris, was 
successful in his attempt at A.I. He used a tin syringe to deposit 
the semen in the vagina. The patient was his own wife. 
In America, Dr. J. Marion Sims, reported fifty-five artificial 
inseminations performed on six women. He also reported the first 
"test-tube" pregnancy. Although at first he promoted A.1., he later 
recanted, proclaiming the method immoral and decided to abandon it. 
It was his report that gave rise to the publications on A.I. Most of 
this literature appeared in Germany and France. 41 
40Wilfred J. Finegold, M.D. Artificial Insemination (Springfield: 
Charles C. Thomas, Publishers, 1976) p. 6. 
41Much of the indepth study is presently being carried on in Ger-
many, France, and Sweden. These scientists have written numerous art-
icles covering the whole of surrogate parenting. Their experiments 
and articles have prompted the legal concerns of these countries to 
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Semen of a donor was not listed in any of the published material 
before 1900. However, Dr. H. Rohleder of France indicates that some 
patients were interested in obtaining A.I.D. He reports the follow-
ing: 
Professor Semola of Rome relates that a lady, on 
whom he had performed several inseminations to no avail, 
requested him to procure semen from someone else. To 
this he replied in no uncertain terms that a proposition 
of that kind came from the Devil and that an insemination 
such as she suggested was no whit less sinful than cohab-
itation with a stranger. 42 
In 1400, Dan Ponchom performed the procedure on fish; 1550, Bar-
tholomens Eustachius advised digital guidance of semen toward the cer-
vical as following coitus; 1677, louis Van Hamman discovered spermato-
zoa; 1838, Girault blew spermatozoa into the vagina through a hollow 
tube; 1876, de lajatre successfully treated 567 women; and 1884, Pan-
coast was the first to rely on donor semen. 
Since the 1890·s, Dr. Robert l. Dickinson has been the prominent 
pioneer of donor insemination. His enthusiasm stirred a host of follo-
wers. In the ninet~en twenties and thirties interest gained momentum 
and the following doctors produced American Medical writings: Dr. S. R. 
Meaker, Dr. I. Rubin, Dr. l. W. Mason, Dr. W. Gary and Dr. M. Huhner. 
In modern days, works have been produced by: Dr. A. F. Guttmach-
er, Dr. A. Koerner, Dr. Sophia Kleegman, Dr. Frances Shields, Dr. A. 
Wiseman, Dr. W. W. Williams, Dr. J. Macleod, Dr. Marie Warner, Dr. l. 
research and write legal opinions and introduce governing legislation 
in the past decade. These articles were not available at the law li-
brary at the University of Virginia. However, they are listed in the 
Bibliography of this thesis as IISuggested Readingll. 
42Francoeur, p. 6,7. 
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Portnoy, Dr. S. Payne, Dr. J. O. Haman, Dr. M. J. Whitlaw, Dr. R. S. 
Hotchkiss, Dr. S. Abel, Dr. Frances Seymour, Dr. G. S. Beardsley, 
Dr. S. J. Behrman, Dr. S. L. Israel, Dr. R. Bieren, Dr. R. N. Ruther-
ford, and others. 43 
A History of Surrogate Mothering 
The surrogate mothering phenomenon is not a new discovery in the 
strictest sense of the word. Like artificial insemination, it has its 
roots in animal husbandry. Experiments have been conducted by embry-
ologists since the early 1900 l s using everything from doe rabbits to 
prize cows. Francoeur gives an indepth review in Utopian Motherhood. 
He reports a conversation with a young research technician at Fair-
leigh Dickinson University: 
As we talked he casually mentioned that he likely 
held the world1s record for superovulation of the rab-
bit. In the course of one of his experiments he had 
injected a doe rabbit with a combination of female hor-
mones normally associated with ovulation. The shocked 
rabbit responded to this physiological overdose by re-
leasing not the usual eight or ten, but well over a 
hundred eggs. The doe was then artificially insemi-
nated. When she was definitely pregnant, the techni-
cian sacrificed her for observation. With 135 tiny 
embryos developing in her womb, this doe rabbit cer-
tainly would qualify as a IIsupermotherll, even though 
she could not have possibly carried the 135 fetuses 
full term and delivered them normally.44 
Francoeur asks the question, IIWant to be a mercenary mother?1I as part 
of the title of this particular chapter. 
The experiments of IIsuper motherhood ll continued. Dr. Gregory 
Pincus artifically inseminated a supermother rabbit in 1940. Sheep 
were added to the list in 1942 by co-workers at London1s National 
43Ibid., p. 7. 44Ibid., pp. 89, 90. 
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Institute for Medical research. Dr. John Hammond superovulated cows 
in 1944. Goats, in 1949, were added by Dr. A. J. Folley. Rats, mice, 
and hampsters were added in 1950, 1953, and 1962. The superovulation 
of monkeys, in 1957, spurred on the idea that this could also be achiev-
ed in women. 
After successfully ovulating a six-week old calf, it was decided 
to experiment with human infertility. In the mid-1960 ' s research mov-
ed rapidly on this project. 45 
Astounding results came from women who had stopped using the 
contraceptive pill. It seems that when they ceased using the pill, 
some women experienced immediate ovulation of not one but several eggs. 
One woman, who had taken a Pergonal base pill, gave birth to stillborn 
octuplets. With further research the scientists perfected a fertility 
drug with a high success potential. 
Following these genetic experiment successes, the question was 
asked, "Who wants a superpregnated rabbit, cow or wife?" The answer 
was soon announced. Transfer the embryos to a substitute mother or 
foster mother. Before long, (1963), ova transfers, or inovulation as 
this technique is called, were being tried successfully by Hungarian, 
Polish, Italian, Spanish, Russian, Japanese, British, French, and 
American scientists. Scientists were like children with new found 
toys. They conducted experiments in which a black Freisian cow carried 
and delivered a white faced Hereford calf and cared for it as a substi-
tute incubator for a pure black offspring. 
45Ibid., p. 91. 
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An amazing experiment in surrogate motherhood was conducted in 
1962 by Dr. L. E. Rowson. His plan called for two purebred Dorper 
ewes in South Africa to give birth to purebred lambs of the Border Lei-
cester strain from England. If it had been perfected, the shipping of 
frozen semen and eggs of the Leicester breed could have accomplished 
the task. The products could have been implanted in the Dorper ewes 
upon arrival. But, the freezing technique was not suitable. Rowson 
decided to fertilize the eggs and ship them to South Africa. He dis-
closed the operation in an articl e, "The Successful Long-distance Ae-
rial Transportation of Fertilized Sheep Ova", in the Journal of Repro-
duction and Fertility. 
The fertilized sheep embryos were implanted in the fallopian tubes 
of a doe rabbit. The rabbit was carefully crated for the jet ride to 
South Africa. Snuggl ed in their fur cover "incubator" the embryos con-
tinued to grow and differentiate while their substitute mother enjoyed 
the ride. Upon arrival, the embryos were surgically removed and im-
planted into two Dorper ewes who had been tricked physiologically by 
hormone injections into thinking they were about to become pregnant. 
The climax was that the two ewes delivered perfectly normal lambs. 46 
Surrogate mothers, substitute mothers, mercenary 
mothers - however you choose to describe them - were 
no longer mere grist for speculations and fantasies of 
the science-fiction writers. They had now become part 
and parcel of man's technology of reproduction, one of 
the several methods available to us in our exploding 
ability to manipulate and control our own reproductive 
behavior. 47 
46Ibid., pp. 93-94. 47Ibid. 
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Surrogate parenting is an element in the history of man whose 
time has come. Scientific knowledge continues to plow new ground 
where nothing else has dared. Not content to leave it fallow, genet-
icists and other medical scientists continually plant hypotheses, cul-
tivate experiments, and harvest theories which cannot be contained in 
the cluttered barns of our society. However, as these theories begin 
to prove fruitful to humanity, space is somehow made to accept them as 
part of life. These scientists are pulled along in their quest to 
solve the mystery of human reproduction. But what motivates a man or 
woman to become a part of something which society may condemn? 
Psychological Interests or Needs for Surrogate Parenthood 
The first surrogate parent to "go pub1 ic ll was El izabeth Kane (pseu-
donym) of Pekin, Illinois. She gave birth to an eight pound, ten ounce 
boy on November 9, 1980. The child was conceived through artificial 
insemination with the sperm of a husband whose wife was childless. Her 
motivation was compassion for the childless couple. One reporter lik-
ened her action to a biblical reference: 
Surrogate mothering is probably a very ancient 
practice that has only recently become a subject of 
widespread public attention and controversy. 
Almost 4000 years ago in Canaan, the Book of 
Genesis says, Abraham's wife, Sarah, who would not 
conceive, arranged the birth of a child by having 
Abraham sleep with Sarah's maid, Hagar. Hagar was 
called a concubine rather than a surrogate mother, 
but the arrangement was similar to what is happen-
i ng today ... 
A modern-day Hagar who lives in Pekin, Illinois, 
and calls herself Elizabeth Kane ... 48 
48Ange1 Castillo. IIWhen Women Bear Children for Others ll The New 
York Times STYLE. December 22, 1980, p. B6. 
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It is possible that some women would feel that they are giving 
God a hand when they volunteer. Others no doubt feel a great deal of 
compassion for the childless couple. One woman states, "There are 
some women who just like being pregnant. My mother had six children." 49 
When she carried a child, this woman continued, she felt important in 
ways she otherwise never did. Th~ idea of carrying someone else's ba-
by makes her feel even more important because then she is not just 
harboring a child, she is harboring a gift. The publicity about the 
surrogates is just an added bonus to the women: their gallantry shines 
back at them from the television set.50 
Dr. Richard Levin, founder of Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc., 
Louisville, Kentucky, says that he chooses surrogates very carefully, 
after a barrage of physical and psychological tests. He does a physi-
cal examination, reviews medical records, and does a genetic family 
history on the surrogates. Two psychiatrists evaluate each surrogate 
and her husband for their mental competence and psychological makeup 
and stability. The surrogate also takes a battery of psychological 
tests. 
Dr. Levin reports that he follows the surrogate through the preg-
nancy by phone and regular reports from her physician. He may even 
have dinner with her just to find out her motives. He relates that 
the motives seem to be twofold: First, they feel it's an interesting 
idea, and they are excited to be able to help another woman; second, 
they see it as a financial opportunity to put aside money for the 
49Anne Taylor Fleming. "New Frontiers in Conception" New Ybrk 
Times Magazine (July 20, 1980): 24. 
50Ibid. 
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future or to pay debts. 51 
Dr. Philip Parker, a psychiatrist at Wayne State University, has 
interviewed numerous surrogate mother applicants and adoptive parent 
applicants for Detroit attorney, Noel P. Keane. 
Dr. Parker said that one-half of his study subjects 
were married and many of those had children of their own. 
They saw surrogate motherhood as a chance to earn income 
for their families while rediscovering their joy in being 
pregnant. 
"Pregnancy made them feel more competent, complete, 
special, adequate, feminine and attractive," Dr. Parker 
reported. "A few called it the best experience they'd 
ever had. It gave them an inner glow and made them want 
to be pregnant for the rest of their 1 ives. "52 
Surrogate mothers have surfaced all across the nation in the past 
five years. Articles have appeared in magazines and newspapers with 
varying accounts. Each episode seems to have a different quirk. 
Carol Pavek, a practicing midwife in Amarillo, Texas, has a hus-
band and young son. She is motivated to be a surrogate out of a de-
sire to do all she can to help other people. She says she enjoyed her 
pregnancy and thinks "it would be wonderful to keep having babies with-
out the responsibility of raising them." She became a surrogate mother 
for Bob and Dorrie Norris of Placerville, California. Mrs. Pavek is 
twenty-seven and her husband is twenty-eight. 53 
51Patricia A. Mullan. "Surrogate Parenting Association Sparks 
New Interest at AFS Meeting" Ob. Gyn. News, Vol. 15, No.9 (May 1, 
1980): 1,36-37. 
52Parker, "Surrogate Mother's Motivations," p. 3. 
53 Jean Seligmann with Robyne Curry. "Pregnancy by Proxy" News-
week, Vol. XCVI No. I (New York, July 7,1980): 72. 
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What kind of woman would choose to be~r the inconvenience and 
risks of pregnancy for a total stranger? What motivates a woman to 
become a surrogate mother? 
Dr. Philip Parker is conducting what is believed to be the first 
psychological research on women who contract with a married couple to 
be artificallyinseminated, give birth to a baby, and then give the 
baby to the couple for adoption. An ad was placed in the Detroit News 
seeking a surrogate mother and promising a fee of $10,000 plus expenses. 
Of those women who responded, Dr. Parker has interviewed eighty-five. 
He alleges that money is the motivating factor in eighty percent of 
the cases. The remaining twenty percent expressed their motivation 
as ranging from enjoyment of being pregnant to a compassion to give 
needy parents a baby. 
The women average twenty-five years of age with about one-half 
now married and one-fourth divorced. About one-half were Catholic and 
one-half were Protestant. Sixty percent of the women work or have a 
working spouse with income range of $6,000 to $55,000. Fifty-five 
percent of them completed high school and twenty-five percent atten-
ded college, business br nursing school. One had received a bachelor's 
degree. 
About seventy-five percent of the women had experienced a full-
term pregnancy. However, one-third had experienced a loss of a child 
through abortion, miscarriage or adoption. "For these women, being a 
surrogate mother may become a way of dealing with unresolved guilt by 
repeating the traumatic experience in a controlled manner," Dr. Parker 
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says.54 His evaluation also included the following: 
Over 80% of the surrogate applicants said they 
required a fee for their participation with most 
giving $5,000 as the minimum amount. They related 
a need for the money, but the degree of need varied 
from a feeling that the money would be useful to 
pay bills to a more urgent need for funds. They 
also described .their requirements for the parental 
appli.cants for whom they would carry a child. About 
one-half said they would participate only for a 
married couple unable to have a child; one-sixth 
for a married or unmarried couple unable to have a 
child; one-sixth for a single man or couple (married 
or unmarried) but only if unable to have a child; 
and one-sixth for anyone for any reason. 
The data yielded some interesting results about 
the applicant'shistory. About 10% had no previous 
pregnancy and about 15% had no previous full term 
pregnancy. Those who had been previ~usly pregnant 
to term had a feeling regarding their pregnancy that 
varied from a tolerable experience to the best time 
of their life such that they wanted to be pregnant 
for the rest of their lives ... Those who were never 
pregnant to term described wanting to have the ex-
perience ... The average number of children that the 
applicants delivered and raised was over 1.3. 
About thirty percent lost at least one fetus, 
baby, or child and there were three cases who had at 
least two such losses and one woman had three losses ... 
In all but one of these cases there was a voluntary 
loss, i.e., abortion, adoption, etc. Some women 
believed these previous losses would help them to 
control or minimize any depressive feelings in res-
ponse to giving up the baby. For exampl e, one woman 
who gave up a child raised by her said: "Being 
pregnant doesn't make you the mother. Raising the 
kid and giving love, that's being a mother. II Ano-
ther said, "I know what itls like to give up a ba-
by." Other women felt that they were participat-
ing to atone for the guilt they felt in connection 
with a prior voluntary loss. 
Several factors appear to have a complementary 
relationship in determining the applicants's decision 
to be a surrogate mother including: 1) the perceived 
desire and need for money, 2) the perceived degree of 
enjoyment and desire to be pregnant and deliver a 
baby, and 3) the perception of the advantages and dis-
54"Surrogate Mothers - Why Do They Do It?" The Alumni Report, 
Wayne State University School of Medicine, (Fall/Winger, 1981): 8. 
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advantages of experiencing glvlng up the baby ... Also ex-
pressed here is the often expressed strong wish to give 
the gift of a baby to a needy parent. 55 
Compassion is the motivating factor in the majority of those ca-
ses which are made known to the public. Elizabeth Kane states that 
she wanted to help the childless couple. Carol Pavek expressed a de-
sire to have babies for others to experience the joy of raising them. 
One article relates that a thirty-year-old woman gave birth to a six-
pound, five-ounce baby on December 4, 1980. She had been artificially 
inseminated with the sperm of her sister's husband. In order to keep 
the birth quiet, a midwife was used and the adoptive mother and the 
surrogate mother's ten-year-old son assisted. The adoptive mother 
began breast feeding shortly after the birth. Details were not avail-
able as the sisters refused to give interviews. 56 
Another article relates how surrogate mother Anne Lockwood deci-
ded to have a baby for her sister and brother-in-law. Her sister had 
suffered several tubal pregnancies which necessitated a complete hys-
terectomy. Her husband was totally cooperative. "Itls your body," 
he assured her. "Itls up to you to make the decision." 57 
Dr. Darrell D. Franks, M.D., a psychiatrist who has a private 
practice in Louisville, Kentucky, has completed a psychiatric evalua-
tion of potential surrogate mothers. He administered the MMPI to ten 
55Dr. Philip Parker. "Surrogate Mother's Motivation - Initial 
Findings", a paper presented at the annual meeting of American Psy-
chiatric Association, New Orleans, 12 May, 1981. 
56 11 Delivery of Surrogate Mother's Baby is Reported" New York Times 
11 December 1980 Sec. D 11,25:1. 
57Mary Jane Beck liTo My Sister With Love" McCall I s September, 1981 
p. 83. 
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women who applied for and were accepted into a surrogate mother pro-
gram and found no psychopathology in nine of the subjects. Individual 
profiles of the semen showed high feminity and social extroversion 
scores. Dr. Franks states, liThe term, Isurrogate mother ' no longer ap-
plies only to those who substitute nurturing after birth: the term 
now also means the actual process of assuming a sUbstitute pregnancy. 1158 
(For psychiatric evaluation, see Appendix 1). 
The potential surrogate mothers have definite psychological moti-
vations, but what of the adoptive parents? What motivates them to seek 
the help of a surrogate mother? 
Noel Keane states that it is simply - Despair!· One of every six 
American couples is infertile. 59 This turn to surrogate parenting is 
due to the unavailability of adoptable babies. Abortion, free birth 
control, and the long lists of applicants at the adoption agencies have 
made surrogate mothering a viable alternative to childlessness. It is 
more meaningful because of the genetic link between the biological fa-
ther and the offspring. This makes it more appealing to the husband of 
the infertile wife. 
Karol White paints this picture: 
The application is on file at the adoption agency. 
Then the waiting begins, month after month, year after 
year. The couple appears at the agency to claim their 
right to a child. They can prove they are moral, up-
standing pillars of the community, with extra room in 
their home and in their hearts. How much do we have to 
wait? Do you have a baby for us? 
58Dr. Darrell D. Franks. IIPsychiatric Evaluation of Women in a 
Surrogate Mother Program ll American Journal of Psychiatry 138 (October 
1981) : 1378. 
59Keane, p. 13. 
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"Children? Have we tried? Yes!" The couple's 
answer is defiant as they secretly wonder, "Vihat's 
wrong with us?" The years go swiftly by. Their chan-
ces for parenthood are all but gone. Nighmarish dreams 
dominate their sleep as ahereal faces of the unborn 
float just beyond their grasp. They reach out. 
Empt i ness. 60 
A couple may experience this because of the following: 
A hysterectomy 
Fallopian tubes that are irreparably damaged 
Advice that she may not risk pregnancy because of 
the damage to her health 
She cannot become pregnant since she is a carrier 
of a genetically transmitted disease 
In the case of Carol Pavek, Dorrie Norris had two teenage daughters 
but had a hysterectomy before her second marriage. Dorrie stated, "Bob 
wants a child of his own."61 
A similar situation motivated the couple where Elizabeth Kane was 
involved. The couple, husband 37 years old, the wife 34 years old, had 
adopted a son two years previously. She was content with the size of 
the family. He was not. She explains: 
He wants and needs his own child. He went through the 
adoption with me, and I feel this is something I can do for 
him. The husband says, "I never stopped hoping there would 
be an alternate means." Says the wife, "Vihen I heard El iza-
beth was pregnant, I wanted to go to work and tell everyone 
the news - I was going to have a baby! "62 
One divorced, infertile woman relates, "John was an only child. I 
so much wanted to give him a child, to give his parents a link with pos-
60Vihite, p. 125. 61Seligmann, "Pregnancy by Proxy," p. 72. 
62Sarah Moore Hall, "An Illinois Vioman Decides to Bear a Stranger's 
Child as Surrogate for his Infertile Wife," People's Magazine, 21 April 
1980, p. 38. 
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terity - to carryon the family name. I desperately wanted a child 
to share with him. He started a family, only without me!" 
Another woman tearfully confides, "If something doesn't happen to 
give him encouragement, he may ask me to leave so he can find another 
woman who can have a baby. "63 
With these perils facing them, childless couples turn to surrogate 
mothers for help. It becomes a last ditch effort at holding the mar-
riage together. 
What is the motivation when the situation is reversed? The hus-
band is infertile and the couple resorts to A.I.D. Amazing, though 
not unexpected, the motivations are reactionary just as the infertile 
wife union. A.I.D. is the only alternative to adoption when: 
A husband is absolutely sterile 
A.I.H. has failed 
For unexplained infertility when time is short 
Genetic disease in husband's line 
Rh incompatibility 
Sperm agglutination, when washing or other male treatment 
is not effective 
Emily Brennan, twenty, expresses the following upon seeking advice 
at a fertility clinic: 
"There are two parts to our problem," she explains. 
"The first was being told at nineteen that my husband 
probably can't give me children, and the second is that 
our very good marriage has sometimes hit bottom over this 
problem. We1ve been told that ours is not a hopeless sit-
uation. One doctor told us, for two hundred dollars, that 
conception will probably occur in the next ten years. 
VJhy?"64 
63White, p. 125. 64Blais, p. 132, 133. 
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An infection has left her husband with only one functioning testi-
cle and a series of blocked ducts. His sperm count is between 10.8 to 
12.6 million per cubic centimeter out of an ideal count of 40-60 mil-
lion. 
It is estimated that between 6,000 and 10,000 children are born 
through A.I.D. yearly. Reports indicate that some 12,000 to 15,000 
couples request this procedure annually and that for the past twenty 
years more than one-quarter million children have been born through 
this procedure. 
A 1954 study of 38 couples asked: "Why did you choose A.I.[). ra-
ther than adoption?" The responses may be summarized as follows: 
Reasons 
Desire to experience pregnancy 
Dissatisfaction with adoption procedure 
Derive benefits from maternal heredity 
Closer relationship to child 
Conceal infertility 
Faith in selection of donor 
Wife 
23% 
21 % 
20% 
15% 
8% 
2% 
Husband 
16% 
25% 
22% 
32% 
6% 
3% 
This study surveyed middle-class, college-educated parents. Sig-
nificantly, the most frequently given reason for the husband's prefer-
ence for A.I.D. was the belief that a closer relationship would exist 
than with an adopted child. Among the women surveyed, the largest num-
ber (but less than one out of four) indicated their primary considera-
tion was a desire to experience pregnancy.65 
The consuming desire to be a parent evidently motivates both sexes 
equally. For many, infertility can be and is a life crisis. Those 
65Aphrodite Clamar. IIPsychological Implications of Donor Insemi-
nation," The American Journal of Psychoanalysis 40 (1980): 173-177. 
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afflicted almost live a psychosocial vacuum of fear and anxiety. They 
feel they are "picked on" by God; have been slighted by nature; are 
freaks of society. These men and women are forced to face the reality 
of being members of an infertile couple group. Male infertility is 
probably more traumatizing than female infertility. Our culture has 
designated man as the procreator and the woman as the "birther". 
In a survey of sixteen couples in which the husband was infertile, 
reactions ranged from hatred to infidelity for both partners. The pur-
pose of the study was to examine the conflicts and behavior patterns of 
sterile husband couples. The following was reported: 
I interviewed sixteen married couples after the 
diagnosis of azoospermia or severe oligospermia ... 
Excluded were women who knew before marriage that the 
husband was infertile ... The women's ages ranged from 
21 to 34 years. The men's ages ranged from 21 to 38 
years. At the time of the interview, 10 couples had 
decided for A.I.D., 2 couples decided against it, and 
4 couples were undecided. The couples had known of the 
infertility for 8 months to 4 years. 
Of the men, ten reported a period of impotence 
that had lasted 1 to 3 months after discovery that they 
were sterile. Before this, their sexual frequency was 
1 to 3 times per week. The onset was within 1 week. 
One of them was impotent for 4 months ... Three of the 
eleven men with impotence admitted depression, 1 devel-
oped ulcers, 1 man began an affair within one month 
(which he felt cured the impotence), and one man suffered 
a whiplash and was incapacitated for 6 months. Two of 
the 16 men reported no change in sexual or mood but the 
frequency was low (less than once per month), and only 
3 reported no change ... 
Only in the case of the affair was the attitude 
toward the wife changed negatively. Some wives said 
the husbands were more withdrawn and moody . 
.. . Six of the 16 couples reported that the wives 
were significantly angrier toward the husbands shortly 
after the diagnosis. In 1 couple this led to a tempo-
rary seperation. In 2 couples it led to the wife's having 
an affair in which no contraceptives were used ... 
One woman developed a fear that she would give birth 
to a defective child. The phobia was accompanied by rage 
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and envy directed at others "who did have children but 
were terrible parents." 
Ten of the women reported dreams none of them had 
experienced in the past. Three themes seem to be in-
corporated: 1) the women felt bad (perhaps guilty) 
about the husband's infertility, 2) she wished to be 
rid of her husband, and 3) she felt guilty about her 
wish to be rid of him ... 
For these couples the decision to pursue donor in-
semination involves two problem solving stages: 1) com-
ing to terms with the husband's infertility, and 2) con-
fronting the problems of donor insemination itself ... 66 
The motivations for seeking A.I.D. are psychological: infertile 
couples searching for help. But, what are the motivations of the sperm 
donor? 
In previous days, the brothers or other male, blood relatives of 
the husband were encouraged to be the donor. Friends of the husband 
in some cases were sought as donors. These suggestions led to unsatis-
factory results. 
One case is reported in which the sterile husband's extremely fer-
tile father insisted upon being the donor with the couple's approval. 
The doctors refused. Another case related that after being inseminated 
several times with the semen of the husband's friend, the wife failed 
to become pregnant. The husband in frustration encouraged her to coha-
bit with the man. She immediately became pregnant. 
It is reported that in most instances the donors are screened by 
doctors for genetic, psychological and physical make-up. In Los Angeles 
one clinic maintains a pool of forty in which are graduate students, 
mostly in medicine and science, sometimes in law, or administrators at 
66David M. Berger, "Couple's Reactions to Male Infertility and 
Donor Insemination," American Journal of Psychiatry 139 (September 1980): 
1047. 
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the nearby University of California, the kind of men who would have 
high IQ's. 
These men are usually responding to an ad in a campus paper. On-
ly one out of seven will be chosen. Once accepted, they are placed on 
weekly schedules, every other day, two to three times per week. On an 
average, they will donate sperm for four years. These men like the 
idea that they have been chosen - culled from the crowd; they have a 
strong but polite pride, not in their virility as much as their fer-
ti1ity. They like the idea that they are making babies, making them 
for people who can't have them as well as just making them, and they 
almost all say that they don't do it for the money.57 
Over thirty years ago, Dr. Abner I. Weisman listed 
standards for selecting proper donors. All vigilant 
sterologists are aware of their credos: 
1. The donor must remain an unknown. 
2. The donor should be in fine health mentally 
and physically. 
3. The donor should be of fine physical stock. 
4. The donor should be between thirty and thirty-
five years of age. 
5. The donor should be of high fertility. 
5. The donor should be of excellent character. 
7. The donor must be cooperative. 
8. The donor's characteristics must match those 
of the patient's husband. 
9. The donor's temperment should closely resemble 
that of the husband. 
10. The donor's religion must be the same as that 
of the husband. 
11. The donor should protect himself legally by 
ascertaining that the physician has the usual 
signed documents. 
12. The donors should be men of science or medicine. 
13. The donor's Rh must be suitable. 
14. Multiple donors should be used if possible. 58 
57Fleming, p. 22. 58Finegold, p. 38. 
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The motivations for surrogate parenting are numerous and varied. 
With each situation there is a particular need to be filled and an 
emotion to be quelled. But, the motivations for surrogate parenting 
of the couples and donors are not the only motivations satisfied by 
the procedure. 
Medical Research Interests In Surrogate Parenthood 
The medical research motivations for surrogate parenthood are 
extremely positive when outlined by those medical scientists who are 
performing the research. Their ultimate aim is to improve the human 
race, to eliminate birth defects, eliminate hereditary disease, elimi-
nate the pain and suffering of the mother in childbirth, and to provide 
childless couples with children. 
On Monday night, March 22, 1982, the ABC Network aired a made-for-
TV movie entitled, "Tomorrowls Child." The plot centered around a 
medical experiment in which an embryo, generated in a petra dish -
the egg and sperm being that of the biological parents - was fertili-
zed and brought to birthing age in an artificial womb. A statement 
was made in the conclusion of the movie that what had just been viewed 
was based on factual experiments concurrently being conducted in a 
laboratory somewhere in the u.S. 
Medical science has come out of its hiding. Francoeur discusses 
these experiments in the chapter, "Wombs of Gl ass and Steel", in hi s 
book, Utopian Motherhood. He cites: 
Dr. Chamberlin has worked with human fetuses in 
both England and Washington, D.C. In his initial ex-
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periments, Dr. Chamberlin used eight living human fe-
tuses, weighing between 300 and 980 grams, which had 
been obtained through therepeutic abortion. Seven 
were removed with the amniotic sac intact while the 
other was placed in a saline solution. All were 
placed in tanks immersed in artificial amniotic fluid 
to prevent regular breathing from starting. Within 
twelve minutes of surgery, the umbilical blood vessels 
were connected to perfusion equipment, a combination 
heart-lung-kidney machine. The largest fetus, a male 
from a fourteen-year-old girl, survived the longest in 
these series of experiments. As the Ob-Gyn Observer 
reported: "A brisk spontaneous flow of blood was 
noted 22 minutes post partum; the fetus was kept on the 
circuit for 5 hours and 8 minutes ... Only when a can-
nula slipped out by accident and could not be reintro-
duced was the experiment halted."69 
There are other reported instances as early as nineteen sixty-
eight and nineteen sixty-nine. The E.M.O., extracorporeal membrane 
oxygenator, is one of the earlier devices used to replace the function 
of the natural womb. This instrument has been used to support life 
in lambs for up to two and a half days. 
Most of these facts were, not long ago, a matter of fantasy or 
science fiction. Aldous Huxley, in his fictional book, Brave New 
World, establishes the theme for his readers by recalling a day in 
the year 632 A.F. (After Ford), when the director of Central Hatchery 
and Conditioning Center gave some new st~dents a tour of the mass-
producing human assembly line. Trained technicians controlled the 
entire nine months in a manner which completely bypassed sexual inter-
course and personal parenthood. Eggs and sperm were collected in a 
sterile, scientific procedure, fertilized and placed in large bottles 
with a solution specific for the type of individual desired. Decanta-
tion Day would come for these "babies", only to be followed by further 
psychological conditioning until at length each child was properly 
69Francoeur, pp. 53-54. 
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prepared to enter its predestined class in society. 
In the 18301s, the French writer Diderot was a fantastic dreamer 
when he wrote The Dream of dlAlembert. IIA warm room with the floor 
covered with little pots, and on each of these pots a label: soldiers, 
magistrates, philosophers, poets, potted prostitutes, potted kings ... 11 
seemed ridiculous to Frenchmen. Americans today are just as reticent 
to accept genetic manipulation. A 1969 Harris poll revealed that only 
three percent of the American population had ever heard of artificial 
insemination. 70 
In Vitro Fertilization 
Dr. Daniele Petrucci, a forty-three-year-old father of two chil-
dren, shocked and horrified the public evoking moralistic tirades and 
threats of criminal lawsuits in 1959. He announced to the world that 
after forty failures, he had finally fertilized a human egg in vitro 
and had kept the embryo alive in an artificial environment for twenty-
nine days. The doctor terminated the experiment at that time because 
the embryo had become grossly deformed and enlarged - a monstrosity. 
His motivation had been to find a way to culture organs which the 
human body would not reject when transplantation took place. Another 
fetus, a female, was killed after fifty-nine days as a result of a 
technical error. 
Not to be overshadowed, the Russians moved to capitalize on Pe-
trucci1s findings. Two Soviet scientists, Dr. Anokhin and Dr. Maiscki, 
of the Institute of Experimental Biology in Moscow, began their exper-
70Ibid., p. 57. 
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imentations. In 1966, the Russians reported that two hundred fifty 
embryos had been kept alive beyond Petrucci's record and stated that 
one fetus had survived for six months and reached a weight of one-
pound, two-ounces at death. The 1966 report suggested that the Soviet 
~ioni had ambitions of producing the first human being to spend the 
entire prenatal life in an artificial womb. But, to date there has 
been no such happening. 
In vitro fertilization involves the removing of an egg from the 
ovary and then fertilizing it in a petri dish. It is the most unique 
and revolutionary method for overcoming tubal blockages, in particu-
lar for those women who have learned that their fallopian tubes are 
hopelessly and irreparably blocked. In vitro, the Latin for "in glass" 
indicated here the use of an artificial environment rather than a 
glass test tube as many may think. 
Between 1878 and the 1960 ' s, over two dozen scientists in a doz-
en different countries tried to fertil ize the human egg artificially. 
Included were Onaff who worked with rabbits and guinea pigs in 1893, 
F. R. Lillie in the twenties and thirties at Woods Hole Marine Biolog-
ical Station, Yamane and Pincus with rabbits and humans in the thir-
ties, Krosovskaja with rats and rabbits in 1935, John Rock and Menkin 
with human eggs in the forties, Moricard with rabbits and humans in 
the fifties, and Austin, Yanagimachi, Chang, Dauzier, and Thibault 
with golden hampsters and other animals in the fifties. 71 
This techinque was perfected by two British scientists. Robert 
Edwards, a physiologist, and Patrick Steptie, a gynecologist. Since 
71Ibid., p. 60. 
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November, 1977, they have used this procedure on seventy-nine patients, 
implanted fertilized eggs in the thirty-two cases where eggs were fer-
tilized in vitro, and achieved four pregnancies. Two pregnancies en-
ded in spontaneious abortions and two resulted in the birth of Louise 
Brown in London in 1978 and Alastair Montgomery in Scotland in 1979. 72 
East Virginia Medical School and Norfolk General Hospital is the 
first in vitro fertilization clinic. They announced their first suc-
cessful in vitro pregnancy resulting in a birth in February, 1982. 
Dr. Howard Jones is the physician who screens the applicants. 
In vitro fertilization involves basically the following taken 
from the August 1979 issue of the Hastings Center Report. 
Fertilization creates a one-celled zygote which, 
after 24 to 36 hours, begins to divide. No special 
name is assigned to the two-, four-, and eight-celled 
human embryo. However, at about the l6-cell state 
(two and one half days) the embryo resembles a little 
mulberry and is therefore called a morula. 
After four and one-half days a blastocyst (literally "germ-bag") is 
formed in which an inner cell mass, or embryoblast, gives rise to the 
embryo. On the sixth day, the blastocyst containing the embryo (bare-
ly visible) is ready for implanting in the uterine wall. Following 
implantation, the human embryo develops to newborn infant provided 
all goes well.73 
The embryo is implanted by means of a cannula (tube) 1.4mm. in 
diameter which is placed through the cervix. Dr. Steptoe relates: 
It is comfy for the patient and no anethesia is 
72Judith Alsfrom Fenton and Aaron S. Lifchex, M.D. The Fertility 
Handbook (New York: Clarkson N. Potter, Inc., 1980) pp. 79-81. 
73Jack W. Moore. "Human In Vitro Fertilization: Can We Support 
It?" The Christian Century, 22 April 1981, pp. 442-446. 
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necessary. It is impossible to see the embryo, which must 
be picked up from the vessel and loaded into the cannula 
under a microscope. It is tricky not to accidentally 
draw the embryo out again when removing the cannula. A 
small amount of culture medium must be used so the ute-
rus won·t contract. After withdrawing the cannula, the 
doctor must check to see if the embryo is gone. Even 
at that, one cannot be sure. 74 
In order to be a candidate for in vitro fertilization, certain 
stipulations are set forth: 
1. The woman must have normal functioning ovaries 
that ovulate and menstruate regularly. 
2. Her genitals must be infection free. 
3. Her husband must be fertile, have a normal sperm 
count, normal motility, and normal morphology,75 
4. The couple must be under thirty-five years of age. 
5. Their marriage must be stable. 
6. There must be no other chance of achieving preg-
nancy by any other means other than surgery (as 
the last resort), as certified by their physician. 
7. They must be in good physical and mental health.76 
The new clinic in Norfolk, Virginia, has received more than five 
hundred applicants since its opening. There are six in vitro clinics 
planned throughout the United States. This has been a source of great 
encouragement to many childless couples. Some of these couples have 
been childless for fifteen years. One young wife reports: 
People who can have children at the blink of an 
eye don't know how lucky they are. Remember about a 
year ago, the woman who dropped her baby at the Social 
Services office and left? Oh God, how could she do 
that?!Ld go work in the fields before I would give 
up a ch,ld. n 
74White, pp. 164-165. 
75Fenton, p. 79. 
76Moore, p. 443. 
n"Childless Women Find Hope in New Clinic," The New York Times, 
18 March 1979, p. 26. 
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Fetal Adoption 
Medical science has also introduced another aspect which is fur-
thered by the surrogate parenting phenomenon, fetal adoption (arti-
ficial embryonation). This aspect is the thrust behind a new infer-
tility clinic which was opened in Chicago recently. Two brothers, 
Drs. Randolph and Richard Seed have master minded this technique af-
ter years of research and experimentation with cattle. 
There are two methods to this process: a childless woman will 
be able to give birth to an embryo which was artifically fertilized 
in another woman (surrogate) by her husband1s semen; a fertile woman 
will donate an egg which is fertilized in the Petri dish with the 
sperm of the husband and then implanted in the womb of the childless 
woman. 
The procedure involves four steps. First, the doctors try to 
regulate the menses of the two women, hormonally, over a period of 
several months. When the cycles are paralled, the uterus of each 
woman will be ready to receive the fertilized egg at the same time. 
When this occurs, the doctor inseminates the donor woman (surrogate) 
with the sperm of the recipient's (childless woman) husband. The 
second step involves a process in which the doctor flushes the fer-
tilized embryo from the donor1s womb. This is done four or five days 
after the insemination. It takes the elgg three to four days to make 
the journey from the ovary, through the Fallopian tube, and into the 
womb. During this journey fertilization occurs. After reaching the 
womb, the embryo will fl oa t freely for another two or three days be-
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fore attaching itself to the uterine wall. Thirdly, the embryo is 
then transferred to the recipient. This is the same procedure which 
is used in the implantation process in in vitro fertilization. Fourth-
ly, the recipient mother carries the embryo for nine months and qives 
birth to her "ownll baby. 
Francoeur discusses this same process, only in more detail in the 
Utopian Motherhood. He gives a history of the procedure in which ani-
mals were used. Then he poses the question: Could this technique be 
applied to man? 
The Cambridge team of Steptoe and Clyman think it is possible. 
Dr. Edwards is convinced that there is no medical or biological rea-
son why such a transplant would not work. 
The transplanted fetus is indeed an allograph, a 
foreign tissue, but, the uterus for some unknown reason 
is not triggered to an immune response to the embryo. 
In fact, Edwards~ earlier experiments with implanting 
unfertilized human eggs into a rabbit foster mother 
makes him very optimistic about this animal providing 
an excellent nursery for a very young human being. 
Before the Cambridge group attempts a zygote trans-
plant between two women, they first plan to put hu-
man embryos into such furry, four-legged incubators. 78 
Since 1973 when the Supreme Court made its historical ruling in 
the Roe vs. Wade case, abortion had been an overwhelming issue. Fetal 
adoption/embryo transfer could present an answer to this problem. Fe-
tal Adoption Centers could be established throughout the nation and 
using the technology of the in vitro research, abortions could be elim-
inated. 
78Francoeur, p. 99. 
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The unwilling pregnant women would have an alterna-
tive to feticide or unwanted pregnancy. The reluctant 
prospective mother simply visits the local Fetal Adop-
tion Center, undergoes surgery for removal of her viable 
fetus, signs legal documents, and exits a free woman. 
At the same time, the developing embryo is preserved. 
Fetuses removed during the first trimester are trans-
planted into the uterus of a surroqate or infertile 
adoptive mother and carried to term in the usual man-
ner. Second trimester fetuses are nurtured in warm, 
organic artificial wombs until the third trimester, 
when conventional modern incubation techniques can be 
brought into play. Fetuses taken during the third 
trimester are transferred directly to an incubator, 
an existing medical technology often used to save 
the lives of infants born up to three months pre-
mature. 79 
Dr. Petrucci quoted the rationale for his experiments as follows: 
One of my aims is to help women have babies, for 
I have been upset by the large number of women giving 
birth to stillborn children, especially at their first 
pregnancy. Thus my research was directed along human-
itarian lines, guided by the Christian principles I 
have practiced since childhood. I love mankind. If 
a wife should lose a baby on which the hopes of herself 
and her husband have been centering, this is a human 
tragedy. That I should be denounced for my experiment 
is a great personal blow, for I am a scientist dedicated' 
to uncovering those mysteries of nature that God is pre-
pared to reveal to us. SO 
Summary 
Interests furthered by surrogate parenthood, from the medical/ 
scientific viewpoint are clear. Those psychological emotions of the 
childless couple, the infertile wife or husband, to be parents are 
assuaged by the process. For the surrogate mother, her need to express 
79Robert A. Freitas, Jr. "Fetal Adoption: A Technological Solu-
tion to the Problem of Abortion Ethics," The Humanist, May/June 19S0, 
p. 22. 
SOFrancoeur, p. Sl. 
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compassion, correct a wrong (abortion, etc.), or receive the benefit 
of extra income, is granted. The motivational needs of the donor of 
sperm for A.I.D., to feel superior to other men and to feel they are 
making babies for those who want and need them are satisfied. Medi-
cal researchers can feel fulfilled because of their new-found infor-
mation about the genetics and reproductive processes of the human 
mammal. But, these are not all the interests which seek to promote 
the surrogate parenthood phenomenon. 
CHAPTER III 
Current Efforts Promoting Interest In Surrogate Parenthood 
Primary to the success of any new venture is the amount of posi-
tive visability in the public arena. This is accomplished to the 
greatest extent through the media. Newspapers throughout the world 
carried headlines when the first in vitro conceived baby was born. 
When Elizabeth Kane, the first surrogate mother to go public, announ-
ced to the world her undertaking, numerous newspaper articles were 
written, she and her husband were interviewed by magazine writers, 
she and the physician, Dr. Levin, appeared on a variety of TV Iitalk 
shows II and news programs. The renowned Detroit attorney, Noel Keane, 
who is probably the first to write contractual agreements for surro-
gate mothers, has appeared on a majority of talk shows, also promotinq 
the new phenomenon. 
Surrogate parenting is definitely an answer to a problem which 
many childless couples have had to live with until now. There are 
many people who have determined to take advantage of the phenomenon 
and promote it to the fullest. 
Advertisements in newspapers have been extremely effective in 
"getting the word out." One person reads the ad and word-of-mouth 
takes over! This classified ad in a California paper brought in one-
hundred sixty responses: 
WANTED: Childless couple with infertile wife 
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wants female donor for artificial 
insemination. State fee. All re-
plies held confidential. 
One hundred and sixty women responded to this ad and each of them 
probably told a friend who told a friend, and so on. The respondent 
who was chosen for this particular situation received $7,000. The 
couple who placed the ad picked up all the medical, hospital, and 
related maternity expenses. They referred to the surrogate mother 
as "an angel in human form taking pity on a forlorn and helpless man 
and woman giving them a child. 11 Now they are thinking of trying for 
a boy.81 
This article alone spread the news of something great to thou-
sands, perhaps millions. When worded correctly on the front cover, 
the article no doubt sold many additional copies of the periodical. 
The Detroit News carried this ad: 
013 Personals 
Couples unable to have children 
willing to pay a $10,000 fee and 
expenses to woman to carry their 
child. Conception to be by arti-
ficial insemination. 
All Responses Confidential 
Please Contact: 82 
This ad prompted many responses. Any time a new product is placed on 
the market, the price is the main attraction. 
There have been recent efforts by the national TV networks, ABC 
81Karol White. "Motherhood the Surrogate \~ay: Practice Has Pit-
falls, Joys," Science Digest, March 1980, p. 25, 
8211Surrogate Mothers _ Why Do They Do It? II The Alumni Report, 
p. 8. 
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and CBS to promote to the public both surrogate motherhood and in 
vitro fertilization with the artificial womb. The CBS movie, "The 
Gift of Life" centered on the surrogate mother. Brought into pers-
pective were the overriding negative responses of family, friends, 
and society in general. As the young wife who sought to be the 
surrogate encountered the negativism, the plot brought out the 
positive aspects in such an overwhelming manner that this was pre-
sented as the "way to go."83 
The ABC movie, no doubt programmed as competition, dealt with 
in vitro fertil i zation and the mechani zed artifi ci a 1 womb. "Tomor-
row' s Chi 1 d" dealt with the pos itive aspects of becomi ng parents with-
out even the act of sexual intercourse or a "fat tummy." Presented in 
a manner which condemned the negative proponents as old-fashioned pro-
moters of pain and agony, the movie definitely gave the young couples 
of the future an extremely inviting alternative method of reproduc-
tion. 84 However, the media is not the only means by which surrogate 
parenthood is being furthered. 
Surrogate Parenting: A Growing Business? 
The American way, the free enterprize system, a capitalisti'c so-
ciety knows no limits. Products for sale range from toothpicks to 
space shuttles, from insects to elephants, and they go to the highest 
bidder. In every transaction there is a "middle man 'l who skims the 
83CBS's "Tuesday Night Movie" 
"The Gift of Life" on WDBJ. 
84ABC's "Monday Night ~10vie" 
"Tomorrow"s Child" on WSET. 
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cream off the top. Now there is a market for human beings. But this 
market need not be looked upon as evil or damaging to society. There 
is a need for the product. There are manufacturers. And, there are 
buyers! 
Surrogate motheri ng, or as one arti cl e puts it, "Wombs for. Rent, II 
has already become something of a business venture. Organizations 
have been formed to deal with the varying elements of the process. Dr. 
Richard Levin, an obstetrician-gynecologist from Louisville, Kentucky, 
has organized and founded Surrogate Parenting Associates. This Ilbusi-
ness ll operates for the purpose of matching an infertile couple with a 
woman willing to bear them a child for a fee. 85 
Dr. Levin1s practice is not an ordinary merchandising situation. 
He has worked exclusively in the field of fertility for five years 
following a reproductive endocrinology fellowship at Yale. There is 
no doubt that the thirty-six year old father of four is well qualified 
and capable. He has taken great care to insure against error. 
"I suppose you could set up shop and start doing 
this fairly cheaply. Just match the couple and surro-
gate and let them find their own doctors. Pve spent 
a fortune though, with sperm-freezing equipment that 
cost $15,000 and an $11,000 computer to help me make 
an initial selection of five suitable surrogates for 
each couple," he says. In all, count i ng 1 ega 1 expenses 
(which include a running battle with the state·s attor~ 
ney general that may wind up in the U.S. Supreme Court), 
Levin estimates his startup costs at $100,000. 
Of the handful of people in this field, Levin seems 
to have the biggest operation with a staff of three -
two coordinators and a clerical worker. But so far, 
he has used only his own money. "Investors?1I he says, 
1I0h, God no! An investor is like another wife." 
85Judy Alsofrom, "Physician Sees No Problems in Surrogate Mother 
Business,1I American Medical News, 23 (June 20, 1980): 13. 
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... Levin charges up to $6,000 according to a coupleLs 
ability to pay. He now handles 150 to 200 cases per 
year. 
"We practi ca 11y 1 ive with these women for nine 
months, dealing with their problems early on so they 
wonLt cause trouble later," says Levin, who is putting 
$100,000 into an interest-bearing escrow account for 
1 ega 1 expenses. "That keeps me from payi ng taxes 
on it, and if I get a bi 11 from my 1 awyer someday, it 
won~t be so painful." 
And, adds Levin, "There's been a lot of joy invol-
ved in this for me - joy in helping the couples be-
come parents and joy in hel ping the surrogates. "86 
Dr. Levin explains that they are not selling a baby but merely 
compensating a surrogate for her potential loss of income, the pain 
and suffering (that accompanies childbirth) and the loss of consor-
tium. Their business is not to be compared to blackmarket baby-
selling. There is a definite biological link between the baby and 
the adoptive parents through the husband. 
The fees to the surrogate, according to Dr. Levin, range from 
$5,000 to $13,000, with some doing it for free. Many couples write 
in, he says, with the idea their insurance will cover all costs, in-
cluding the surrogateLs fee. The total charge is from $13,000 to 
$20,000, including medical fees (his services), the surrogate fee 
(around $10,000), hospital expenses, flights to Kentucky for the par-
ticipants, and legal fees. 87 
Dr. LevinLs Surrogate Parenting Association is not the only en-
trepreneural enterprise springing forth on the surrogate parenting 
860ave L i ndorff. "The Busi ness of Surrogate Bi rths," Venture, 
The Magazine for Entrepreneurs, September 1981, pp. 56, 57. 
87Alsofrom, p. 13. 
70 
vine. There is also an organization on the West Coast, Surrogate Par-
enting Foundation, founded and operated by Bill Handel. 88 The finan-
cial success of this particular venture was not available to this 
writer. 
Katie Brophy, twenty-five-year-old Louisville attorney who is a 
partner with Levin, started her own organization in 1981. Surrogate 
Family Services was opened with only a three thousand dollar invest~ 
ment by Miss Brophy, for office expenses. 
Surrogate Family Services has arranged several 
pregnancies for fees of $3,000 to $4,000 each ..• 
"A lot of people desperately want a child," says 
Brophy. HThere are business aspects to this, but 
it"s such an emotional thing that if you approach 
it from a typical business standpoint, you have 
prob 1 ems. 1189 
Miss Brophy rel ates that fees for surrogate mothers normally 
range from $5,000 to $10,000, but can also go as high as $20,000.90 
She says the business is dominated by attorneys primarily due to the 
vagueness of the 1 aws in each state. For her, "it I'S very exci ting. 
I~m creating a new era of law, which is a chance most attorneys never 
have. "91 
Another attorney, Noel P .. Keane of Detroit, is also very much 
into the financial aspect of the surrogate mother business. His law 
office spends upwards of seventy percent of its time on surrogate 
88Lindorff, p. 56. 
89Ibid., p. 57. 
90James Giranelli, The National Law Journal 4 (April 9, 1981):33. 
91Lindorff, p. 56. 
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matters. He charges a fee of $3,000 plus expenses and says that 
that is too low, "because I spend two years worki ng on each case. II 
In October, 1981, his office arranged twelve inseminations. Keane 
maintains he will handle one hundred cases a year at earnings after 
expenses exceeding $300,000. 92 
Sperm Banks: Funds For A Deposit? 
The enterprising expertise of business tycoon, Robert K. Graham, 
is a motivating factor behind Sperm Banking. For Graham, income is 
not of importance. His motivation is to promote a IIbetter, more in-
telligent ll human race. The sperm bank he founded is called the Her-
mann J. Mull er Repos itory for Germinal Choi ce, 1 oca ted in Escondi do, 
California. Sperm collected for this bank comes only from Nobel Prize 
winners. Thus far, five donations are known to have been made with 
only William B. Shockley of Stanford University, a Nobel Prize winner 
in Physics in 1956, admitting to the deposit. Three women are now 
known to be pregnant after being artificially inseminated with Nobel 
Sperm from Graham's bank.93 
To qualify for a Nobel sperm insemination, a woman must have an 
IQ which would rank her in the top two percent among all Americans. 
Graham requires that the women be young and healthy, with no family 
background of genetic defects. Their husbands must be infertile. 
The ladies must agree to keep him informed of the outcome of their 
92Ibid. 
93William J. Broad. "A Bank for Nobel Sperm,1I Science, 21 March 
1980, pp. 1326-1327. 
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pregnancies and the child's development. Those who are accepted pay 
air-freight costs and a two-hundred, fifty-dollar deposit, refunded 
when they return the liquid nitrogen containers used for shipping the 
frozen semen. 94 
Not all sperm banks are on a level with Graham~s. The Tyler 
Cltnic in the Los Angeles area selects men to be donors on the basis 
of the IQ also. These men receive twenty dollars for one ejaculate 
and then leave. They also store sperm for individuals at a yearly 
rate of forty-five dollars. 95 
The largest sperm bank, commercially, is Idant in New York City. 
They have over thirty-thousand frozen samples which include those of 
many Broadway stars. Idant pays its donors twenty dollars for each 
specimen. The donors and storage customers (twenty-five dollars per 
year per ejaculate) are led to a private room equipped with a reclin-
ing chair and a stack of magazines with erotic art. They are asked 
to ejaculate into a jar and bring the specimen to a technician who 
does an analysis and then freezes it. 96 
Artificial insemination is big business. It is 
estimated that approximately 20,000 human beings were 
created as a result of A.I.D. in 1978 alone. Typi-
cally, donors are paid $20 - $40 for each accepted 
ejaculate. If your physician decides to buy his sperm 
94Matt Clark with Jonathan Kirsch, IIRecipe for Genius: First, 
Get Sperm," Newsweek 10 March 1980, p. 85. 
95Fleming, "New Frontiers In Conception," p. 20. 
96John Stossel, "One Answer to Childlessness - Artificial Insem-
ination,N Science Digest, March 1980, pp. 20-23. 
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from a sperm bank, he will probably pay $35 for each 
str-aw(sample). You will probably be charged $40 -
$50 per insemination. 97 
The charge for each insemination can vary from 
$75 - $100, of which the donor receives about $30. 
According to Dr. Sherwin Kaufman, a gynecologist at 
New York Hospital - Cornell Medical Center who has 
performed hundreds of A. 1,0. IS, about 80 percent of 
the women who try the method become pregnant, though 
two or three artificial inseminations may be neces-
sary.98 
That group of women who respond to the ads for surrogate mothers 
are also an enterprising group. They hope to gain anywhere from two 
hundred dollars to ten thousand dollars plus expenses. One applicant, 
a medical student, asked that her tuition be paid for one year. They 
have a commodity for which there is now a demand. 
Gestation, Inc .. 
If Englandls Baby Louise Brown, who was conceived 
in a petri dish, is a triumph of medicine, what then is 
the baby born recently to a surrogate mother? Neither 
the product of adultery, as some claim, nor of a scien-
tific breakthrough, as was Baby L., he is still some-
thing more than a much-wanted child who arrived at his 
parentis home by a rather circuitous route. 
Given the fact that she was paid for her time and 
trouble, his mother is, in a sense, an entrepreneurial 
pioneer. And although babies have been bought before, 
he himself, being custom-tailored, is the human equi-
valent of a bespoke suit. Which leads us to ask: What 
are the economic implications of surrogate motherhood 
in the marketplace? 
Will the doctors responsible for enqineering con-
ception get a slice of the surroqatehs fee? If they 
have a number of prospective surrogates on their books, 
97White, p. 120. 
98Jean Seligmann, IlLife Without Father,f1 Newsweek, 22 September 
1975, p. 87. 
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could they be said to be keeping a stable? If so, should 
a further job description be added to M.D.? And another 
consideration: must the surrogate mother pay income tax? 
Is the baby then subject to sales tax? 
As to the fee itself, how should it be determined? 
Since this appears to be a seller's market, we assume it III 
be pretty much in the hands of the surrogate, and closely 
tied to quality control. Will the college graduate with 
an immaculate gene pool be able to charge more for her 
service than the high school dropout with unsavory rel-
atives? Can the raving beauty command more money than 
the plainer jane? Do blondes get a bonus? 
While it's true that some of the same questions were 
raised in the past about sperm donation, two factors sep-
arate the issues. One is the relative impersonality of 
sperm donation. The second concerns the wide difference 
in financial incentive. At $20 per donation, there is 
just no comparison with the fees a woman could command 
for each nine-month gestation. 
It is impossible to predict all the medical or 
ethical implications of surrogate motherhood. These 
are, as the saying goes, early days. But that it repre-
sents a whole new sector of the economy is beyond dispute. 99 
Legal Efforts to Further Interest in Surrogate Parenthood 
According to Noel P. Keane, there are no laws pertaining to surro-
gate mothers. Anywhere. 
At the time I first heard this request, I had 
never even done as much as an adoption. Today, I find 
myself the expert in what is a virginal legal frontier.IOO 
While specific laws governing surrogate mothers have not Been 
enacted, some states have taken steps to regulate and control A.I.D. 
These include Georgia, Oklahoma, Kansas, California, Maryland, New 
York, Arizona, North Carolina, and Connecticut. There have also been 
cases which have been pursued by attorneys for the purpose of forcing 
legislation and rulings by the U. S. Supreme Court. Many of the rulings 
99Editorial, The New York Times, 23 November 1980, p. 20. 
100Keane, p. 15, 234. 
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in the various states mentioned above resulted from the efforts of the 
American Medical Association. Some of these in summary are: 
In 1964, Georgia passed the first such law, declar-
ing: wAll children born within wedlock or with usual 
gestation period thereafter, who have been conceived by 
means of artificial insemination, are irrebuttably pre-
sumed legitimate if both husband and wife consent in 
writing to the use and administration of artificial in-
semination," providing that the physicians and surgeons 
involved are licensed to practice medicine. 
In 1967, Oklahoma enacted a similar law. This 
statute, however, requires that the consent document 
be executed before a judge and filed in the manner of 
adoption papers. Although such a document prevents 
the husband from denying paternity, the required man-
ner of the filing may be a disadvantage. 
In 1968, Kansas legitimized the procedure but did 
not specify who is legally authorized to perform A.I.D. 
In 1968, a decision of a California appellate court, 
held that the term "father" cannot be limited in its bio-
logical sense: The determining factor is whether the 
"legal relationship of the father and child u exist. The 
consent of the husband to A.I.D. is irreversible: "One 
who consents to the production of a child cannot create 
a temporary relation to be assumed and disclaimed at 
will. II 
In 1973, a New York court ruled that A.r.D. accedes 
not only the legal duties owed by a father to a natural 
child, but also all the legal right in regard to that 
child. Thus, the first husband must give his consent 
before a second husband can adopt a child born as a re-
sult of A.I.D. during the first union. 
.. In 1974, Maryland passed a law that legitimizes 
A,f.D. children if the husband consents to A.I.D. New 
York enacted a law similar to that passed in Maryland 
in 1975.101 
For A.r.D. cases, the main issue addressed is the introduction of 
adultery as a basis for divorce.. As a result of the artificial insemi-
101Bertha Ledecky, IIWhen A Childless Couple Asks For Help - Ex-
plaining the Artificial Options," Patient Care, 15 March 1979, PP. 71-82. 
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nation, husbands have contended that what took place was an adulterous 
act. States are now enacting statutes which will define artificial in-
semination, its procedure, those who are participants, i.e. the donor, 
recipient, adoptive father, and those who may perform artificial insem-
ination. Many of those states choosing to deal with artificial insemi-
nation have adopted language substantially similar to that proposed in 
section five of the Uniform Parentage Act,102 
At this present time, twenty-four other states are known to have 
statutorily addressed issues related to artificial insemination. The 
great social and moral adversity to artificial insemination has no 
doubt contributed to the hesitancy of the legislatures. However, an 
increased public awa~eness of the process and its practice, has and 
will continue to force 1 egisl ative action, 
New Jersey, one of the remaining states which has not made a leg-
islative decision, had an interesting ruling in Cumberland County 
l02Uniform Parentage Act - Section 5 provides: 
(a) If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the con-
sent of her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen do-
nated by a man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he 
were the natural father of a chil d tnereby conceived. The husband I,S 
consent must be in writing and signed by him and his wife. The physi-
cian shall certify thei'r signatures and the date of the insemination 
and file the husbandl,s consent with the (State Department of Health), 
where it shall be kept confidential and in a sealed file. However, the 
physictanhs failure to do so does not affect the father and child rela~ 
tionshtp. All papers and records pertaining to the insemination, whe~ 
ther part of the permanent record of a court or of a fil e held by the 
supervisi'ng physician or elsewhere, are subject to inspection only up-
on an order of the court for good cause shown. 
(b) The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in art-
ificial insemination of a married woman other than the donorl,s wife is 
treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby 
conceived. (Lindsey E. Harris, HArtificial Insemination and Surrogate 
Motherhood - A Nursery Full of Unresolved Questions," Williamette Law 
Review,17 (Fall, 1981): 925 Footnote), 
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Court. The case involved a Vineland beautician and a Vineland elemen-
tary school teacher. The school teacher, who was the donor of the 
semen, had sued the unmarried beautician for visitation rights to a 
son who was born to her as a result of artificial insemination. Both 
of them testified that she had wanted a child by artificial insemina-
tion and he agreed to supply the sperm. Marriage was planned and she 
had specified that she wanted no sexual relationship before marriage. 
She had conceived after injecting herself with his semen. 
After learning that she was pregnant she broke off the relation-
ship and barred him from her house. She testified that she had care-
fully selected the donor. During the pregnancy and subsequent birth 
she had paid for all the expenses. Judge Frank Testa of the Cumberland 
County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court ruled: 
... a case of first impression, presenting a unique 
factual situation with no reported precedents ..• in this 
or any other jurisdiction .,. unlike anonymous donors to 
sperm banks, the donor in this case was known and conse-
quently qualified for designation as the natural father . 
. ,. any natural father is entitled to visit his illegi-
timate children ... The court takes no position as to the 
propriety of the use of artificial insemination between 
unmarried persons, but must be concerned with the best 
interests of the child in granting custody or visitation. 
In this situation a man wants to take upon himself the 
responsibility of being a father to a child which he is 
responsible for helping to conceive. 103 
Some interesting observations came from this particular case which 
are of interest: 
1. The judge referred to the donor as the natural father. 
2. The natural father is entitled to visit his offspring. 
l03Dona1d Janson, "New Jersey Judge Gives Donor of Sperm the Right 
of Visits to Woman's Son," New York Times, 22 July 1977, p. 3. 
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3. The child was designated as illegitimate. 
4. The natural father does have a responsibility toward the 
chil d. 
A 1948 New York case ruled on a similar situation. In the case of 
Strand v. Strand, the husband had consented to A.I.D. but then sepa-
rated from his wife. The court granted him visitation rights and fur-
ther held that lithe husband was entitled to the same visitation rights 
as those acquired by a foster parent who has formally adopted a child, 
if not the same rights as those to which a natural parent would be en-
titl ed. "104 
Lindsey E. Harris in the Willi~mette Law Review (Fall, 1981) has 
provided an excellent overview of various cases which pertain to the 
different aspects of A.I.D. One of the earliest cases brought to 
court involving artificial insemination was Hoch v. Hoch. This issue 
was whether or not the wife was involved in an adulterous act. This 
Illinois court found the wife guilty of adultery in the normal sense, 
but it determined that the resulting conception by A.I.D. would not 
constitute adultery.l05 
In the case of Gurskey v. Gurskey a New York State court ruled 
that the offspring of A.I.D. was illegitimate. However, since the hus-
band had consented to the insemination the court imposed a support 
obligation on him.l06 
104Harris, p. 923. 
105Hoch v. Hoch, No. 44-6-8037 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill. 1945). 
106Gurskey v. Gurskey 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S. 406(1963). 
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A ruling in 1968 by the California Supreme Court on the case of 
People v. Sorenson, the question of the legitimacy of the child was 
evaded. It held that the husband was the "legal father" and as such 
he was obligated to provide support for his "legal chi1d.,,107 
The issue of the legitimacy of a child born to a woman whose hus-
band had consented to A.I.D. was established by one state, New York, 
in 1973. In this case, Adoption of Anonymous, the court held that a 
child born of consensual A.I.D. is a legitimate child entitled to the 
rights and privileges of a naturally conceived child of the same 
marriage. 108 
Adultery is an issue in which the courts will declare a child i1-
legitimate if it is proven on the part of a woman. A.I.D. for most 
jurisdictions is said to constitute adultery.l09 The court in the case 
of Orford v. Orford rejected the traditional definition of adultery 
and placed its emphasis instead on the fact of impregnation. Justice 
Orde believed that: 
The essence of the offence of adultery consists, 
not in the moral turpitude of the act of sexual inter-
course, but in the voluntary surrender to another person 
of the reproductive powers of faculties of the guilty 
person; and any submission of those powers to the ser-" 
vice or enjoyment of any other person other than the 
husband or wife comes within the definition of adul-
tery.110 
107People v. Sorenson, 68 Cal. 2d 280,437 P.2d 495,66 Cal. Rptr. 
7 (1968) . 
108Adoption of Anonymous, 74 Misc. 2d 99, 345 N.Y.S. 2d 430 (Sup. 
Ct. 1973). 
109Pau1a Diane Turner, "Love's Labor Lost: Legal and Ethical Im-
plications in Artificial Human Procreation," University of Detroit Jour-
nal of Urban Law, 58 (Spring, 1981): 464. 
1100rford v. Orford, 58 D.R.L. 251, 258 (1921). 
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The English case of l v. l held that the child of A.I.D. was 
illegitimate because it was "not the result of normal sexual consuma-
tion."lll A contrast to this decision was established by the Scottish 
case of Macl ennan v. Macl ennan,112 in 1958. It determined that A.I.D. 
did not constitute adultery and that the resulting child was not ille-
gitimate. Accordingly, it stated that insemination is not necessary 
for adultery and that "the placing of the male seed in the female ovum 
need not necessarily result from the sexual act, and if it does not, 
but is placed there by some other means, there is no sexual inter-
course. 11113 
A.I.D. is not the only area of controversy to make its way into 
the courtroom. One such controversial case involves a surrogate mo-
ther and has been compared to the setting of Solomonhs judgement. It 
involves Denise lucy Thrane who contracted with a childless couple, 
Mr. and Mrs. James Noyes of Rochester, N.Y., to be inseminated with the 
semen of Mr. Noyes, give birth, and surrender the baby to them. Since 
the birth, Mrs. Thrane has changed her mind and wants to keep the 
chil d. 
Judge Robert Olson has been asked by Noel Keane, attorney for the 
Noyes couple, to allow Mr. Noyes the same right to seek custody as any 
other father under California law. Mrs. Thranets attorney countered 
l11l v. l, (1949) 1 All Eo. R. 141 (Probate, Divorce and Adm. Div. 
1948) . 
112Maclennan v. Maclennan, (1958) Sess. Cas. 105 (Scot. Outer 
House) . 
113Turner, pp. 465-466. 
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by stating that under California law semen donors have no rights to 
resulting offspring. Judge Olson admits that he doesn't have a solu-
tion. He has allowed Mrs. Thrane to name her baby after it is born.114 
Noel P. Keane has been involved in several court cases involving 
surrogate motheri ng. He says, II I have fil ed a 1 awsuit in vJayne County 
(Michigan) to make payment of a fee to surrogate mothers legal and 
plan to pursue this landmark litigation all the way to the U. S. Su-
preme Court, if necessary ... Binding agreements ... will require 
legislation and state regulation, which is the long-term goal for sur-
rogate parenti ng. 11115 
In his case, Doe, Doe and Roe v. Kelley and Chalan, Keane con-
tends that the natural mother CRoe) and the couple (Doe) are free to 
"conceive a child, bear it, and raise it as they agree among them-
se 1 ves because these acts are guaranteed by the ri ght of pri vacy. II 
The oddity of this particular case is that Mary Roe has been employed 
by John Doe for three years. This case is still pending in the Michi-
gan Supreme Court. 116 
Another case with which Keane is involved is Syrkowski v. Apple-
yard. The Attorney General of the State of Michigan is arguing in 
this situation that since Mr, Appleyard consented to the artificial 
insemination of his wife, Cormae, by the semen of Mr. Syrkowski, the 
114 l1 Whose Baby Is It, Anyway?" Newsweek, 6 April 1981, p. 83. 
115Keane, The Surrogate Mother, pp. 18, 19. 
116See Appendix 2, 3, and 4. 
82 
resultant chil d is the 1 egitimate chil d of Mr. Appl eyard. At this 
present time the case is sti'll pending. 117 
The Attorney General of Kentucky, Steven L Beshear, has challen-
ged the legi'timacy of the practice of Surrogate Parenting Associates, 
Inc., the organization founded by Dr. Ri'chard M. Levin. His conten-
tion is that the contracts prepared for and signed by the participants 
of the surrogate mother process are illegal. The business operated by 
Dr. Levin is stated to be in violation of certain Kentucky statutes 
which pertain to the buying and selling of children. The Attorney 
General also states that Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc., is 
guilty of an abuse and misuse of its corporate power, privilege and 
franchise which is detrimental to the interest and welfare of the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky. His objective is to seek an invalidation of 
the corporate powers and franchise of Dr. LevinLg corporation. IIB 
Mr. Beshear has a well documented case. In his opinion he writes: 
In conclusion, it is the opinion of this office that 
because of the existence of the above-mentioned Kentucky 
statutes and the strong public policy against the buying 
and selling of children, contracts involving surrogate 
parenthood are illegal and unenforceable in the Common-
wealth of Kentucky.119 
No aspect of the artificial reproduction of human beings bas es ... 
caped its day in court. The process of in vitro fertilization came 
117See Appendix 5. 
IIBKentucky v. Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc. Bl-CL-0429 
Franklin Circuit Court (March 12, 19B1). (See Appendix 6.) 
119Steven L. Beshear, Attorney General, Commonwealth of Kentucky. 
"An Opinion on Surrogate Parenting,1I (January 26, 19B1) OAGBl lB: 
p. 7. (See Appendix 7.) 
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before the bench in the summer of 1978. The case was John and Doris 
Delzio against the Presbyterian Hospital, Columbia University and 
Raymond Vande Wiele, M.D. 
Mrs. Delzio had undergone two operations to correct a blockage 
of her Fallopian tubes. After the second qJerationin 1971 failed, the 
possibility of in vitro fertilization was discussed between her physi-
cian, Dr. William Sweeney, and Dr. Landrum Shettles of Columbia Pres-
byterian Hospital Medical Center. Mrs. Delzio was a patient at the 
New York Hospital Cornell Medical Center. Columbia Presbyterian is 
located at West 168th Street and Cornell is at East 70th Street. Dr. 
Shettles (the in vitro expert at this time) could not come to Cornell 
to do the work. After discussing the project with Dr. and Mrs. Del-
zio, she wanted to proceed immediately. 
On September 12, 1973, Mrs. Delzio entered Cornell Medical Center. 
She was taken to an operating room, where follicular fluid was obtained 
from both ovaries after great difficulty. Sealed in a sterile container 
it was shipped immediately to Columbia Presbyterian to Dr. Shettles. 
Dr. Delzio provided the necessary sperm and the in vitro fertilization 
culture of the ovum was begun. The culture was then placed in an in-
cubator at Columbia Presbyterian Hospital Medical Center. 
The next morning the culture was removed and opened by Dr. Raymond 
Vande Wiek, the Chairman of the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology 
at Columbia Presbyterian. He was assisted by Dr. Duane E. Todd. That 
afternoon they called Dr. Shettl es and informed him that 1) there was 
an N.r.H. ban against this type of experimentation; 2) both Dr. Shet-
tles and Dr. Sweeney were unqualified for this; 3) it was immoral and 
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unethical; 4) no experimentation had been conducted on sub-human 
primates; and 5) there had been no clearance given by Columbia Presby-
terian for the procedure. Dr. Shettles then called Dr. Sweeney to in-
form him of the happenings. Dr. Sweeney then called Dr. Delzio and 
informed him. Mrs. Delzio was recuperating from the operation and was 
in such pain that she was not informed until the next day. 
When informed the next day, Mrs. Delzio was extremely upset. La-
ter that day she went into a profound depression and remains so to 
this day. Dr. and Mrs. Delzio filed suit and the case finally came to 
trial on July 17, 1978. The trial lasted for five weeks. After thir-
teen hours of deliberation, the jury found for the De1zio ' s first 
claim of mental anguish and awarded Mrs. De1zio the amount of $50,000 
to be awarded in the amount of $12,500 from Presbyterian Hospital, 
$12,500 from Columbia University, and $25,000 from Dr. Raymond Vande 
Wiele. Dr. De1zio was awarded a total of three do1lars. 120 
Although there are negative issues involved in all of these cases, 
the phenomenon of surrogate parenthood is receiving positive promotion 
from the coverage afforded these trials by the media. This is one 
more means by which the proponents can keep the issue in public view 
thus prompting acceptance by society. Those who oppose it are exposed 
by the media as being anti-life and anti-happiness. 
Summary 
Current efforts to further interest in surrogate parenthood are to 
120Wil1iam J. Sweeney, III, M.D. and Lee S. Goldsmith, M.D., LL.B., 
"Test Tube Babies: Medical and Legal Considerations," The Journal of 
Legal Medicine, 2 (April, 1980): 1-12. 
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some extent successful. Each of those who are involved are seeking 
to gain financially. Baby-making is big business! As the article in 
Venture Magazine pointed out: For a small investment the profits can 
be unlimited. This type of exposure will soon bear the news of surro-
gate parenting to the business world. In the past year Americans have 
seen the deregulation of certain commodities. The surrogate parenting 
business is presently operating without any regulation or control and 
seems to be enjoying good success. Shall it be allowed to continue? 
Dr. Philip Parker states, Ult is time to seriously consider the direc-
tion that public policy should take in this matter. N121 
121Parker, IISurrogate Mother ('s Moti vation, II p. 6. 
CHAPTER IV 
Public Policy Implications of Surrogate Parenthood 
There are no laws anywhere controlling surrogate mothering. Only 
twenty-four states have bothered to enact statutes concerning A.I.D. 
Presently, neither the United States Constitution nor any federal sta-
tute prohibits the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) 
from conducting and supporting in vitro fertilization programs. 
Those who favor the unregulated use of IVF claim 
that regulation would hampe\r "free scientific inquiry," 
and that because of the complexity of the issues involved 
in IVF, and because non-complying scientists could evade 
government regulations or perform experiments outside the 
United States, the only rational approach would be self-
regulation by the scientific community ... Legislation 
will ensure that until research has reached a point 
where little or no legal and ethical problems remain, 
the scientific community will strive to conform to the 
highest possible standard of legality and morality.122 
Public policy or legislation, as preferred, must originate with 
the people. The hindrance to the formulation of public policy is a 
lack of knowledge by the majority of the population concerning the 
present escalation of human reproduction experimentation. As mentioned 
in chapter three, the media is the means whereby the most people will 
be informed. It tends to display only the positive "look what great 
accomplishments for the good of mankind science has performed today," 
aspects. Public policy cannot be properly formulated until both the 
122Turner, "Love I'S Labor Lost," p. 477. 
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pos itive and the negative, have been given equal acknowl edgement by the 
media and presented in an unbiased manner to the population. 
Numerous issues have been posed for each of tne menti'oned areas 
of surrogate parentnood, A. r~D~, in vitro ferti'l i'zati'on ~ and surrogate 
mothering. Some are summarized as follows: 
First, are the new conception technologies an intel-
ligent effort to aid and abet nature to achieve its goals? 
Or are these unwarranted depersonalized incursions into a 
reproductive process that should be naturally linked to 
the interpersonal physi~al act of married physical love 
alone? 
Second, is the zygote, albeit human-like, less than 
fully human? Or i's the zygote a fully human person from 
the moment of conception? 
Thirdly, do surrogate mothers and male sperm donors 
positively serve the family unity of married couples by 
helping them have children they so desperately long for? 
Or are these third party surrogates and donors to be 
viewed as intruders who sever the interpersonal bonds of 
married love? 
Fourthly, as for the potential of psychological 
harm to surrogates, parents, and their children, there 
is no disagreement that every precaution should be taken 
to forestall such harm.1 23 
The formulation of publi~ policy in a free land has never been 
given over totally to those who hold legislative positions. Every 
section of a population is given the opportunity to voice its opi'n.,. 
ion. Inevitably almost every pi'ece of resulting legislation has 
been derived from some aspect of some moral code or guideline expressed 
in Scripture. To properly arrive at any law of the land, the views 
of the nationLs religious leadership must be given an airing. 
Religinus, Moral and Ethical Views 
The religious views of the various aspects of surrogate parent-
123Edward Stevens. Making Moral Decisions (New York: Paulist 
Press, 1981), pp. 55,56. 
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hood differ from group to group. Opinions may even vary within a oar-
ticular sect. Opposition to the whole idea of artificial conception 
is rather vehement from certain theologians. Paul Ramsey, Professor 
of Religiori at Princeton, voiced his stand like this: 
I'd rather every chil d were born illegitimate than 
for one to be manufactured. Already women think of them-
selves as machines of reproduction. Look at the ease 
with whi'ch young women have abortions, so sure they can 
have another child any time they want. And now women 
are selling thei'r bodies for nine months and people 
are talking about freezi'ng fertilized eggs. Pretty 
soon, a woman will be able to go to the supermarket 
and pick out an embryo.124 
Dr. Ramsey has been involved in many debates on the subject of 
human reproduction and its moral, ethical and religious issues. His 
points of view have been taken into considerati'on in legal writings 
such as the University of Detroit Journal of Urban Law. 
The Roman Catholic Church is the first relioion to denounce the 
artificial experimentation. In 1959, after Or. Daniele Petrucci announ-
ced to the world his experi'ments with in vitro fertilization, the Vat-
ican~ semiofficial daily C~Observatore Romano, ordered him to cease 
and dessist. Petrucci became very distraught over the implications of 
the work. His conversations with Vatican officials implied that he 
may have committed a double sin; creating life and then destroyinq it. 125 
The underlying methods of the artificial reproduction process are 
the cornerstone of the varying theological viewpoints. These include: 
1) masturbation, 2)coitus interruptus, 3) coitus condomatosus, and 4) 
124Keane, p. 261. 
125Francoeur, p. 57, 58. 
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semen obtained after normal coitus. All of these have a vital role in 
the practice of artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, and 
surrogate motherhood. 
Catholic theologians look upon masturbation as an act against na-
ture and extremely evil. IIWasting of the seed ll is also considered a 
grave sin by the Orthodox Jews. For the most part, the Protestants 
are not so dogmatic on the method of obtaining semen. 
As for coitus interruptus and coitus condomatosus, the various 
sects examine the motivation for obtaining the semen. Few, however, 
would have any objection to removing semen from the vagina for analy-
sis. If the semen were to be used for artificial insemination, it 
would be of great concern to the different faiths. 
The Catholic viewpoint on artificial insemination was set forth 
by Pope Pius XII in 1949. He listed the following: 
1. The practice of artificial insemination, when concerning 
a human being, cannot be considered, either exclusively 
or even principally, from the biological and medical 
view, while ignoring that of morality and of right. 
2. Artificial insemination, outside marriage, is to be 
condemned purely and simply as immoral. 
The Natural Law and the Divine Positive Law lay 
down that the procreation of new life may be the fruit 
of marriage only ... 
3. Artificial insemination in marriage, but produced by 
the active element of a third person, is eaually im-
moral, and, as such,.to be condemned outright. 
The husband and the wife have alone a reciprocal right 
over their bodies in order to engender new life. 
4. As to the lawfulness of artificial insemination in 
marriage, 1 et it suffi ce for the moment that we reca 11 
to your minds these principles oT the Natural Law: 
the mere fact that the result envisaqed is attained 
by this means, does not justify the use oT the means 
itself, nor is the desire of the husband and wife 
to have a chi 1 d - in itself a very 1 eaitimate de-
s ire - suffi cient to prove the 1 eqitimacy of havi nq 
recourse to artificial insemination, which would ful-
fill this desire. It would be wrong to hold that the 
, 
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possibility of having recourse to this means would 
render valid the marriaqe between persons incapable 
of contracting it because of impedimentum impoten-
taie. 
On the other hand, there is no need to point 
out that the active element can never lawfully be 
procured by acts contrary to nature. 
11.1 thouqh one cannot excl ude new methods Ila pr;-
ori ll simply'because they are new, nevertheless, as 
reqards artificial insemination, not only is extreme 
caution called for, but the matter must be absolutely 
dismissed. In speakinq thus, we do not imply that 
the use of certain artificial means solely destined 
either to facilitate the natural act or to cause the 
natural act normally accomplished to attain its end, 
are necessarily forbidden. 
Let it not be forqotten that the procreation of 
new life according to the will and plan of the Creator, 
alone brings with it and to an astonishinq decree of 
perfection, the realization of the ends pursued. 
Donor insemination would be considered adultery 
if one or both parties were married and fornication if 
both were single. Even though no physical pleasure 
were obtained such actions are contrary to nature and 
consequently are forbidden. The Holy Father has also 
forbidden any attempts to unite sperm and ovum in 
vitro.126 
For the Catholic, who is true to his faith and reverences the leader-
ship of the Pope, any form of A.I. is morally and ethically wrong. 
Pope Pius XII made this statement at a convention for Italian midwives: 
liTo reduce the cohabitation of married persons and the conjuqal act 
to a mere organic function for the transmission of the qerm of life 
would be to convert the domestic hearth, sanctuary of the family, into 
nothing more than a biological laboratory.1I127 
Pope Pius XII is not the only Pope to speak out aqainst the ef-
forts of science in behalf of human reproduction. Pope John Paul II 
has this to say: 
126Wilford J. Finegold. Artificial Insemination (Springfield: 
Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, 1976), pp. 80-82 
127Turner, p. 463. 
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We are well aware, ladies and gentlemen, that the 
future of man and mankind is threatened, radically threat-
ened, despite very noble intentions, by men of science. 
And it is menaced because the tremendous results of their 
research and their discoveries, especially reoarding nat-
ural science, have been and continue to be exploited --
to the prejudice of ethical imperatives -- for ends which 
have nothing to do with the prerequisites of science, but 
with the ends of destruction and death ... This can be veri-
fied as well in the realm of genetic manipulations and 
biological experiments as well as in those of chemical, 
bacteriological, or nuclear armaments. 128 
Ironically, the attorney who is the spearheading influence for 
surrogate mothering is a Catholic. His basic attitude toward the pre-
ceeding statements and views of the leadership of his faith is some-
what defiant. 
There are those who do not like the idea of surrogate 
mothers one bit. 
One is Pope llohn Paul, II ... He attacked the harmful 
effects of progress IIthat cares more for itself than for 
man for whom it must serve. Scientific progress cannot 
pretend to place itself in a sort of neutral ground," 
My reaction to the Pope is ... For a million years 
mankind has progressed by learning to master nature in 
one respect or another. Are we now to draw a line and 
say, IINo farther ll ?129 
Keane also includes the opinion of his pastor. He states that the pas-
tor says it is too early for the church to have an opinion. Reoardless 
of what the Church decides, Keane says it will not bother him, he will 
follow his own conscience. 
Bishop Thomas C. Kellogg, general secretary of the National Con-
ference of Catholic Bishops, believes the position taken by him on 
128Nicholas Wade, IIPope Issues Warning to Scientists,1I Science, 
27 June 1980, p. 1441. 
129Keane, p. 20-21. 
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test-tube babies also applies to surrogate parenting. He states, 
"Christian morality has insisted upon the importance of protecting the 
process by which human life is transmitted. The fact that science now 
has the ability to alter the process significantly does not mean that, 
morally speaking, it has the right to do so.11130 
It is a well known fact that among "good" Catholics, when the Holy 
Father gives an encyclical announcement it is an accepted law to the 
members of the faith. Could it be that those (Catholics) who are deep-
ly involved and committed to the surrogate parenting phenomenon would 
indeed defy all that is holy to conduct their business? 
The overwhelminq view of the Catholic leadership is that surro-
gate parentinCJ in any form is morally and ethically wrongl Dr. Charles 
J. McFadden is extremely dogmatic in his view and states: 
... It is repulsive to every decent tendency of human 
nature, and it certainly bears witness to unnatural 
extremes to which science based on materialistic phi-
losophy will go ... It is impossible to imagine a 
Christian woman submitting to such an unnatural act." 
According to the teachings of sound ethics, it is a 
principle of Natural Law that a woman has no right to 
receive i'nto her vagi na the semen of any man except her 
husband ... Institution of marriage is primarily so-
social in its objective, and for this institution to 
achieve the adequate and proper conservation of the 
race, offspring must be born only of couples united 
in marriage. The fact that some couples are inca-
pable of having children does not confer upon them 
an authorization to infringe upon the divinely-es-
tablished unity of marriage. 131 
Another Catholic authority is Gerald Kelley, S.J., who claims that 
130Ibid. p. 262. 
131Finegold, p. 82. 
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there neither has been nor can be controversy among Catholic moralists 
concerning artificial procreation. He says, "They are definitely and 
certainly immoral because they violate the natural law, which limits 
the right to generate to married people and which demands that this 
right be exercised personally and not by proxy."132 
The Catholic Church leaves no room for a loose interpretation of 
its position. However, this is not true of the Jewish sect. Rabbi Sey-
mour Sigel of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America in New York 
City contends, "if the Cjoal is to provide an infertile couple with 
children, surrogate motherhood is morally unobjectionable,,,133 
In contrast to this opinion, another Jewish scholar, J. Jakobouits, 
summarizes the rabbinic attitude as: 
By reducing human generation to stud-farming 
methods, A.I.D. severs the link between the pro-
creation of children and marriage, indispensible 
to the maintenance of the family as the most basic 
and sacred unit of human society. It would enable 
women to satisfy their craving for children without 
the necessity to have homes and husbands. 134 
Rabbi Emanuel Rachman interprets the Jewish as being extremely 
liberal in their view of A.I.D. He states that a woman would not be 
guilty of adultery nor would the child be illegitimate. He is suppor-
ted in his view by Dr. Solomon B. Freehof. They both agree that the 
possibility of incest throuCjh marriages between offsprinq is very min-
imal and should be viewed as a practical problem rather than a moral 
one .135 
132Ibid. 133Markoutsas, p. 72. 
134Turner, pp. 461, 462. 
135Ibid. 
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The difference of opinion among Jewish leaders is the result of 
the division of the faith - Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform. Rab-
bis of each persuasion will interpret the Jewish law differently. Dr. 
Freehof writes: 
As for the Orthodox point of view on the question, 
it is veering increasingly toward disapproval. The 
chief element in the negative attitude is not the sta-
tus of the woman or the child, but the process of ob-
taining the seed. Most of the more recent discussions 
consider the taking of the seed to be a sinful act, 
and the fact that some of the seed is bound to be wasted 
is also sinful . 
... The Orthodox scholars generally admit that 
the injection of the seed of a stranger is not an adul-
terous act, and therefore the woman IS relationship to 
her husband is not thereby impaired ... 
Since the operation is not deemed to be adulterous, 
the child that is born of it is not illegitimate. Fur-
thermore, even if the seed is not taken from the husband 
but from some donor, the child is not deemed to be the 
child of the donor but of the woman, and therefore be-
longs to her family ... 
... Artificial insemination is therefore favored 
if both the husband and wife wish it. It is preferable, 
of course for the seed to be taken from the husband, 
but even if a stranger is the donor, there is no objec-
tion. 
Nor is the insemination objectionable even if the 
donor is not Jewish. Actually, there may be some ad-
vantage in that fact. For while legally the resultinq 
child is not deemed to be the child of the donor but 
of its mother, nevertheless there would be some bio-
logical, hereditary kinship between that child and 
the children of the donor in his own marriage. In 
that case, if the donor is Gentile, the likelihood is 
far less that the child born of the insemination might 
some day marry one of his own blood kin ..• 136 
With these divided opinions on surrogate parenting, individual 
rabbis will advise couples to follow the dictates of their own con-
sciences. Orthodox rabbis base their opposition on grounds of adultery 
(donor and doctor as well as husband and wife are included in this 
136Finegold, pp. 84,85. 
95 
charge); in addition, they hold that the offspring is illeqitimate and 
that the child's genealogy is in doubt. The most crinservative main-
tain that the husband should leave the wife and that she has an obli-
gation to forfeit the Ketuah, the money settlement that would be owed 
her in the event of death or divorce. 137 
The Protestant sect is just as diverse in its opinion as the Jew-
ish sect. In 1945, the Archbishop of Canterbury appointed a thirteen 
member commission to examine fully all the theological, moral, legal, 
social, and psychological issues surrounding human artificial reproduc-
tion. Every member of the commission except one confirmed that A.I.D. 
was immoral. They stated that the practice contravenes the personal 
character of procreation, the essential nature of marriage and the 
family, as well as the best interest of society.138 
An opposing opinion has been voiced by the American Anglican 
Church priest, Dr. Joseph Fletcher. He contends the A.I.D. is not a 
violation of the marital bonds, and lists his objections: 
1 ) 
2) 
3) 
Marriage is not a physical monopoly. 
Mutual consent by husband and wife protects against 
the accusation of broken faith. 
The donor~s relationship to the wife is completely 
impersonal. 139 
Concerning surrogate motherhood, the executive secretary of the 
American Council of Christian Churches, B. Robert Briscoe states: 
The parties involved have not sought God~s will in 
the matter. To circumvent God's law simply so that cre-
137Blais, p. 138. 
138Turner, p. 462. 
139 Tbi d. 
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ation may come about and to say it is scientific progress, 
that it is better to have a little than none (of the birth 
process) is wrong. God may have seen fit that none was 
the better part. We would raise our voice to protest the 
surrogate mother, and would pray that the Lord qive under-
standing to couples involved in childless marriaqes, and 
that scientists and practioners within the field of ge-
netics be aware of the grave responsibilities of turninq 
the events from what may prove to be God's choice for 
barren individuals to man~s choice, to which there is 
no comparison. 140 
Varying opinions of clergymen were set forth by Finegold as a re-
sult of a survey he conducted regarding A.I.D. An Episcopalian priest 
believes there is a divergency of opinion among Protestants because the 
Bible does not specifically address A.I.D. He states that the marriaqe 
is not solely to achieve pregnancy. Scripture nowhere condemns a man 
or his wife for failure to conceive and produce. The core of the mar-
riage is the love and devotion of one to the other, and a third party 
would break that bond, The use of donor semen would split the relation-
ship and the resulting offspring would be illeqitimate, 
Another Protestant minister declares A.I.D. to be adultery. His 
belief is that although a childless marriage is a misfortune for a 
husband and wife, it is compatable to the Christian life. Their love 
and partnership should not be alienated by a donor. He believes to be-
come a father by proxy is disrupting Godts order of life. Sterile 
couples must accept grief as God~ will, understand this and content 
themselves with a childless marriage. 
A Protestant scholar expressed his opinion as, "God presents a do-
nor with procreative powers, but He did not intend that morals should 
140Keane, p. 262. 
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taint this Lord-given potency to be utilized by an abnormal procedure 
such as artificial insemination. This action on the part of a supplier 
of spermatozoa, therefore, deserves severe moral condemnation,"141 
Finegold relates that the opinion of liberal Protestant Church 
leaders in the Pittsburg area was quite different. The thrust of their 
position was the intent of the couple. Science has fashioned a new 
method for infertile couples to Hfind the joy God intended them to have 
with children who are really their own. The Lord has encouraged women 
for motherhood. Science has been helped by God to find a new way to 
grant to wives the glory of conception (A.I.D.) and procreation. No 
church and no law should be permitted to take these God-qiven riqhts 
away from these women. "142 
Joseph Fletcher, author of The Ethics of Genetic Control'. is a 
strong advocate of the liberal viewpoint. He argues, "A person beqins 
not at conception but at birth. Artificial insemination and surrogate 
mothering are tasks of tenderness, Why shouldnkt we share our repro-
ductive resources, just as we share our educational and economic ones? 
We ought to love our neighbors, we ought to help them. That is an im-
portant part of our humaneness, Now we are able to give help of a far 
more intimate and personal sort. N143 
Some Protestant churches have not committed themselves on the is-
sue. The American Lutheran Church has elected to wait until more in-
formation is available. 
141Finegold, p. 87. 
143Keane, p. 261, 
142Ibid .. 
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The ethical and moral questfons of the surrogate parenting would 
involve such aspects as "celebrity seed,lI A man and wife would select 
a sperm and an egg from a favorite sports star, actor, actress, or any 
favorite personality. The egg and sperm would be cultured in vitro 
and then the embryo could be implanted in the womb of the wife, Or, 
if the wife did not want to be troubled with the pregnancy, a surrogate 
mother could be hired to carry the embryo to term, give birth and then 
surrender the infant to the adoptive parents. This would lead one to 
ask, "Who gets the Mother IS Day Card? I, 
One doctor writes: 
The moral and ethical values of both doctors and lay-
men are changing so fast that it is hard to know what will 
be accepted or condemned 10 years from now,., Until 25 
years have passed. ,. the rightness or wrongness of A.I,O. 
will not become clear ... 
. ,.r believe 0ithout reservation that the future of 
the potential child should be of first consideration ... 
Unjustified A.I.D. can lead to unhappiness and feelings 
of inadequacy on the part of the husband and may negatfve1y 
affect the marriage as well as the husbandks relationship 
with the chi1d.144 
The concern for the outcome of the child is foremost in the whole con-
cept of surrogate parenting. What is implicated is the integrity of 
that individual as a unique entity. How will that person relate to his 
own physical being and to his history? A human individual to some ex-
tent, believes himself to belong to himself, to be responsible to him-
self, to be determined by things that are uniquely his own, 
" .But this sense of individuality is related not only 
to uniqueness but to randomness, to the unpredictable ma-
terialization of that particular one out of a great many 
144Herbert W. Horne, Jr. "Artificial Insemination, Donor~ An Is-
sue of Ethi ca 1 and Moral Values, II New Eng1 and Journa'l of MeMci ne 293 
(October 23, 1975):873,874. 
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possibilities which both produces and expresses the unique-
ness. These concepts converge to make up the notion of an 
individual as a "self" who had not been totally programmed 
or fabricated, who is unique. 145 
"What is becoming of the human race?" is a questi on whi ch coul d 
become a real concern for future generations. With the scientific 
knowledge now available and the attitudes of some of those (indivi-
duals and organizations) herein mentioned it is possible that humanity 
could become so depersonalized that the human life would be of no va1-
ue. It is conceivable that the demand for surrogate mothers, reqard-
less of the fertility status of the couples, could be ~reater than the 
in vitro intramarita1 process. 
Leon Kass made the following argument before the Ethics Advisory 
Board of the Department of Health, Education, and ~Jelfare: 
The principle truly at work here is not to provide 
married couples with a child of their own, but to provide 
anyone who wants one with a child, by whatever possible 
or convenient means. 146 
Kass' main concern is that "making babies" this way will further 
deva 1 ue the "humanness U and change the meani ng of "our embodiment, our 
sexual being, and our relations to our ancestors and descendants." The 
child would be uncertain about his IJfather" and his Hneage, "Clarity 
about our origin is crucial for self-identity, itself important for 
self-respect. A donor egg or sperm makes for confusion for the child. II 
Kass contends that the use of surroqate mothers severs the covenant 
145Charles Fried. "Ethical Issues in Existing and Emerqing Tech-
niques for Improving Human Fertility,1I Law and Ethics of AID and Embryo 
Transfer. (New York: Ciba Foundation Symposium 17, Tne Netherlands by 
Movton & Co., 1973), pp. 42-43. 
146Moore, "Human In Vitro Fertilization," p. 444. 
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which united sexuality, procreation and love. Beyond the issue of 
the commercialization of the procreative function is the deeper denial 
of the meaninq and value of one~s own body, the using of ft as a mere 
incubator for another, and the breaking of the bond among sexuality~ 
love and procreatfon. 147 
said: 
The outcome of the child is a real concern fn A.I,D. one donor 
They Ire not my chil dren. But, they are in a way, I 
guess ... 11m Catholic. I was going to be a priest ... 
I believe in God. I belteve in Jesus Christ ... I don~t 
te 11 my male fri'ends. I don ht trust them enough. It 
mtght come out at a party ..• I always wonder how many 
babies live produced, but I"ve never asked. After this 
fi rs t time 1 was here, the gi rl in the 1 ab said, tlWe I've 
had a success. 1I Wow, I didnlt think in terms of myself 
as a father ... Later, you~d be sttttng down and wonder-
ing, "How many times have I been a father?H I wish one 
day I could see them, If you have a child, even if itls 
just an affatr, you want to return to see. I always 
wonder if my son or daughter will turn out to be a great 
athlete. 148 
The concern of a father for a child ts present in the donorhs thinkinq, 
There will always be that psychological ~spect which wtll bear upon the 
question of the moral tty or the ethics of surrogate parenting. 
Another area of the surrogate parenting ethics involves the sinqle 
person. Single parenthood is becoming a real tty as unwed pregnant 
young women decide to keep their children rather than offer them for 
adoption or to have an abortion. The divorce rate is addtng to thts 
total because the seperating husband or wife, for some damaging reason, 
has been IIturned off ll to marriage but not to parenthood. 
147Ibid. 
148Fleming, p. 23. 
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One divorcee in California, a thirty-seven-year-old nurse, de-
ctded she wanted a child and has been looking for someone who would 
inseminate a single woman. She is now doinq herself with the help of 
the Feminist Women IS Health Center in Los Angeles. She pays thirty-
eight dollars for a syringe frozen in dry ice at the Southern Califor-
nia Cryobank, a commercial sperm bank. She relates: 
Every time I make this trip, 11m terrified of being 
stopped by the highway patrol. What could I say? "Gee 
officer, live got this sperm here and its melting and 
I've got to get home. 1t But I like doing it at home, in 
my own bed.149 
Another single woman, Joyce Newton, who is a principal of a 
school in California has a son who is the product of donor insemina-
tion. 
I would like women to know that this is definitely 
an alternative to marriage. I never rule out marriaae, 
but I don~t need to be married, I own my own house, I 
maRe over $30,000 a year ... I am going back to try a-
gain ... I don~t care if its the same father. Ihd just 
feel comfortable if my son had a brother or sister brouaht 
into the world the same way, That would give them some-
thing to share. 150 
Artificial insemination provides parenthood for almost anyone, 
Single women can become pregnant without the act of sexual intercourse. 
Single men may become fathers without sexual intercourse by hiring a 
surrogate mother who will submit to the A.I. But, A.I. has also open-
ed the moral and ethical situation for homosexuals to become parents, 
It is estimated that more than one-hundred, fifty lesbian women 
conceive through A.r.D. each year. Although many clinics will not 
I49Ibid. I50rbid. 
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perform the operation if it is known that they are homosexual. A 
group of lesbians in Northern California formed a support organiza-
tion and produced two ci rcul ars entitl ed, II~Joman Controll ed Concep-
tion" and "Artificial Insemination, an Alternative Conception for 
the Lesbian and Gay Community. II These pamphlets were distributed 
to others with instructions of how it could be done with turkey ba-
sters and eyedroppers. They have had Npositive N results and many 
are pregnant from the sperm of homosexual men. The men have aareed 
to be available should the child ever want to see them. 
One homosexual man tells of his feelings about A.I. and his do-
nating sperm. 
The most important reason to me is that, being a 
homosexual man, I donht want to feel that I~m not part 
of procreation. It I,S very exci ti ng to me to think my 
attributes can continue and in a very exciting way, not in 
the traditional nuclear-family context, but at the fron-
tier of new kinds of famiHes. Also, some day I hope to 
have children, if it becomes more acceptable for lesbians 
to become mothers, then perhaps the next step is for homo-
sexual men to be fathers. Perhaps in the f~ture some wo-
man will donate her womb for my child.150 
If there were a public policy controlling these types of arrangements, 
would it be considered a violation of his rights to be a parent? It 
is evident that in his definition, the family is a community project. 
From what he has said, one could conclude that homosexuality is a 
Ilrace" of people rather than deviant people. His idea is seeminfjly to 
procreate homosexual men with homosexual women, thus, keepinq the 
blood line pure. 
150Ibid. 
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Some lesbians argue that they would like to experience the joy 
of giving birth and motherhood just the same as II straight ll ladies do. 
Artificial insemination has made it emotionally easier for them. One 
Oakland couple, a black woman named Bobbi, and a white woman named 
Lynn secured donor sperm from Lynnls brother and inseminated the II wife" 
Bobbi. Lynn says, IlTherels just no way I would ever be able to have 
a baby. That IS for women, I mean for Bobbi. But T knew I wanted my 
own blood."152 
Regarding the ethics of single parenthood through A.I" the Ameri-
can Medical Association has not taken a stand. However, for most doc-
tors, the question of the childl.s well-being is of the utmost concern, 
Dr. Wayne Decker, New York Fertility Research Foundation, says, 1I, •• to 
me, the kind of family community the child will be born into is more 
important than the mother I s or father I'S sexual preference. 11153 
Another physician, Dr. Simon Henderson, Chief of WomenLs Health 
and Fertility Clinic at San Francisco General Hospital, states, III have 
personal reservations. We donLt know enough about the rearing of chil-
dren in a lesbian household. N154 
Medical science has unleashed upon this world an alternative to 
procreation as lethal as the atom bomb. The sad part is that a nation 
can stop the production of bombs, but there may be no means by which 
surrogate parenthood, artificial insemination, single parenthood. or 
in vitro fertilization can be stopped. The demand is so greatl Leqis-
152Di ane K. Shah wi th Linda Walters, "Lesbi an Mothers, II Newsweek. 
12 February 1979, p. 61. 
153Ibid. 154Ibid. 
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lation may be too little, too late, 
Legislative Proposals 
Noel Keane, the Detroit attorney, has stated that he intends to 
press the issue of surrogate parenting in the courts until the Supreme 
Court of the United States makes a ruling. The legislators, both state 
and national, would be compelled to formulate and adopt laws for the 
regulation of the procedure. He even advocates that people want this 
so badly, that each "state would make it widely available by paying 
for it and by regulating it. "155 
Mr. Keane may well get his wish. One lawyer says that the law 
will not be forced into a hasty, premature decision. He states that 
lias with all other scientific achievements, the law response to arti-
ficial insemination has been, and will be, 'perfect horror; skepticism; 
curiosity; and then acceptance I ."156 
The Yale Law Review has stated: 
... Donor insemination comes to typify a broad prob-
lem for church and court and leqislating men, It is a 
case study in the techniques of change. The hap-hazard 
legal treatment it has received illustrates the need for 
creating some system for measuring the effectiveness of 
our social regulation and for better adjusting it to the 
phenomenon of change. " Clearly the ensuing struggle will 
be rife with danger for doctor and for patient until arti-
ficial insemination shall have made its peace with the 
law. 157 
For many legal authorities the lack of legislation in these early 
stages is positive. They feel that science would not be free to prove 
its hypotheses if it were regulated by law. Neither would it be allow-
ed the opportunity of quiet failure and abandonment. Some contend that 
155Keane, p. 264. 156Finegold, p. 65. 157Ibid., P. 64. 
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the only guide necessary for this procedure is the conscience of the 
husband and wife and the attending physician. 
A few years ago during a joint session of a joint medical-legal 
conference in Chi cago, a 1 awyer stated, IIWe need no special 1 aws. The 
less said about it the better. If people want children and are satis-
fied with them, whose business is it how and when they were begot-
ten?1I158 
At present, the illegal procedures resulting from surrogate par-
enting are mountainous. Falsified medical reports, falsified birth 
certificates, falsified hospital records. and falsified insurance 
claims have all been produced to cover up the surrogate parenting, ba-
by-selling phenomenon. 
Dr. Stuart Abel has suggested various steps to create adequate 
legislation and suggested the following: 
Any child conceived and born as a result of the im-
pregnation of his mother by artificial insemination by a 
duly licensed physician or under his advice and direction, 
and upon the written consent of herself and her husband, 
shall have all rights, privileges. and obligations of a 
child conceived and born as the result of impregnation 
through sexual intercourse of the husband and wife; and 
no evidence concerning such artificial insemination shall 
be received in any action at 1 aw, inequity, or other 
legal proceeding which in any way may impair his rights, 
privileges, or obligations. 159 
Another legal expert, Dr. Alan F. Guttmacher, favors the adoption 
of legislation. He states: 
.. . But since there is no sanctioning statute the 
threat constantly hangs over the head of patients and 
doctors that according to the interpretation of some 
158Ibid., p. 65. 159Ibid., p. 66, 
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antique statute, even as old as the Ten Commandments, 
some reacti~nary jurist will rule that an illegal aci 
is being performed. If so, the woman becomes an adul-
teress, the child illegitimate and perhaps the doctor 
an accomplice in an illegal action. 160 
In any discussion of the legal questions of A.I.D, and surrogate 
mothering, the pre-eminent issue is that of the child. The concern 
centers around the legitimacy: who is the real father, or who is the 
real mother. In the U.S., California, Georgia, and Oklahoma have 
passed legislation which declares the child to be the legitimate child 
of the wife and her husband provided the husband has given his written 
consent. Legislation for this purpose has been rejected in Indiana, 
Minnesota, New York, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Ohio rejected a bill 
which declared the whole process to be a criminal act.161 
Many European countries have begun to adopt legislation for both 
A.I. and surrogate mothering based on medical research: England has 
already made declarations which could provide guidelines for U,S, dec-
larations. In England, a child born to a married woman by A.I.D. is 
declared to be the child of the wife and a man, whose identity is un-
known except to the doctor, and not of the husband and wife. The birth 
certificate will state that the child is illegitimate and the husband 
and wife must apply to adopt. However, this cannot be done immediately. 
The mother cannot give consent for adoption until the child is six 
160Ibid., p. 67. 
161This Bill was introduced in 1955 and was tabled. It read as 
follows: "No woman shall undergo donor artificial insemination, nor 
shall any person execute artificial donor insemination or assist in it 
with any woman in this State.. Any chil d so born is ill eqitimate. Who-
soever violates this law shall be subject to a fine of not more than 
five hundred dollars and to a term of imprisonment of not less than one 
year and not exceeding five years. (Finegold, p. 71). 
107 
weeks old. Also, the adoptive parents must have the child in their 
continuous posession and care for at least ninety days after the child 
is six weeks old. In this situation, the child is nearly five months 
old before the adoption can take place. When the child is older, he 
must be told that he is adopted.162 
In America, the outstanding case attempting to legitimize A.I.D. 
children is People v. Sorenson. This was the nation's first case in 
which a divorced woman's former husband was charged with the criminal 
non-support of their A.r.D. chi1d. 163 This case was tried in Califor-
nia. 
Another state, Oregon, has adopted what is possibly the most com-
prehensive legislation of any state. Under ORS 677.360, only licensed 
physicians or persons under their supervision may select semen donors. 
The semen must be analyzed at the outset to determine the quantity, 
normality, and motility of the sperm cells .. 
ORS 677.370 provides that no person who suffers a known 
disease, genetic defect, or venereal disease may donate se-
men to be used in artificial insemination. 
ORS 677.365(1) The written consent of a woman and her 
husband, if she is married, is required before she may be 
artificially inseminated. 
ORS 677.365(2) Upon the birth of the child the atten-
ding physician must file this consent with the State Regis-
trar of Vital Statistics. 164 
The most significant Oregon artificial insemination statute is 
1620liver M. Stone, "English Law in Relation to A.I.D." Ciba 
Foundation Sympos ium 17: p. 71 .. 
163Turner, p. 466. 
164Harris, pp. 927, 928. 
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ORS 109.243, which provides as follows: 
The relationship, rights and obligations between a 
child born as a result of artificial insemination and the 
mother1s husband shall be the same to all legal intents 
and purposes as if the child had been naturally and le-
gitimately conceived by the mother and the mother1s hus-
band if the husband consented to the performance of arti-
ficial insemination. 165 
Another important aspect of the Oregon law is Section 109.243 which 
makes the child as legitimate to the consenting husband as one of his 
natura 1 offspri ng. It prov ides for the chil d the 1 ega 1 protecti on as 
a natural child. 
ORS 109.239 serves to sever any and all legal relationships be-
tween the donor and the offspring. It negates any rights, obligations, 
or interests the one may have in the other. This is done because no 
chil dis entitl ed to the parental support and nurturing of two sets of 
parents. Oddly, even though this Oregon law is quite thorough, it does 
not provide any guidance where the insemination of an unmarried woman 
is evident. However, it is implied in ORS 677.365 which reads: HArti-
ficial insemination shall not be performed upon a woman without her 
prior written request and, if she is married, the prior written con-
sent of her husband.166 At the time of this writing the Oregon State 
Law herein stated is receiving proposed statutory amendments. 
Concerning surrogate mothering, Oregon has no laws expressly ad-
dressing the issue. There is one case of note in Oregon, however, 
which involved the surrogate~s registration in the hospital under the 
165Harris, p. 930. 
166Ibid., p. 934 .. 
109 
adoptive wife "s name. In thi s case, Cutts v. Cutts, the coupl e had 
paid for all medical expenses and the child was turned over to them. 
They later divorced and when the origin of the child was revealed, the 
custody which had been granted Mr. Cutts, was revoked, and the child 
was made a ward of the court. Custody was later returned to him.167 
It should be noted that Oregon law does not address itself to 
the contracts which may be drawn between the surrogate and adoptive 
parents. Once the surrogate is obtained, however, nothing prohibits 
an attorney from handling documents which pertain to adoption. 
As for compensation, Oregon does not presently have a statute 
that forbids payment to any person involved in an adoption. However, 
based on the rulings of the Michigan Courts and the opinion of Kentuc-
ky's Attorney General, Oregon's public policy demands that no compen-
sation be paid to the surrogate mother. Any payment to the surrogate 
impairs her initial consent to adoption. Therefore. compensation for 
the surrogate induces baby selling and damages the adoptive couple~s 
rights to the child. 168 
Oregon is probably making the greatest efforts to establish legis-
lation. However, California is also examining proposals for regulation 
of surrogate parenting. 
Until 1981, there were no completed surrogate arrangements known 
in California. Early in that year there was an increase in the public 
interest. It was brought to full attention when a surrogate mother 
167Ibid., P. 942. 
168Ibid., p. 947. 
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living in Los Angeles, refused to relinquish her baby to the New York 
couple for whom she bore the child. Again, the court decision in Ken-
tucky and Michigan greatly influenced the California legislature. 
Under California law, the surrogate mother, as the natural mother, 
may place the child for adoption by the donor~s wife. In Kentucky and 
Michigan a donor can establish himself as the father, but, in Califor-
nia, the laws not only fail to provide a means whereby he can declare 
himself the father, but effectively preclude him from doing so.169 
Because he is not married to the surrogate and does 
not intend to be, the donor can establish his paternity 
by only one method. Subsecti on 7004 Ca)( 4) presumes him 
to be the natural father of the child if he receives 
the child into his home and openly holds out the child as 
his natural child. This method invokes two potential 
dangers ... First, the surrogate may refuse to relinquish 
custody at birth so that the donor may not be able to 
receive the child into his home ... Second, despite the 
fact that the donor does receive the child openly into 
his home as his own, if the surrogate is married or was 
married within 300 days prior to the birth, her husband 
is also presumed the natural father. 170 
Another obstacle which would hinder a donor's adoption of a child 
through a surrogate relationship is that California's artificial insem-
ination statute denies parental rights to the donor of semen used in 
the artificial insemination of a woman other than his wife. This may 
be circumvented if the surrogate~ husband did not give written consent, 
or, if after the birth he denied the child was his, the donor could 
then establish his paternity.17l The existing California statutes are 
now being revised to accomodate surrogate mothering. 
169Ellen Lassner Vanltoften, USurrogate Motherhood in California: 
Legislative Proposals," San Diego Law Review 18 (March 1981): 347., 
170Ibid., p. 357. 171Ibid., pp. 367,368. 
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Compensatiun for surrogates in California amounts to selling ba-
bies. However, as long as the donorhs payment to the surrogate is in-
dependent of his wifeLg adoption procedure, it would be permissable. 
This involves California Penal Code Section 273{a) and Section 181. 172 
Since neither the Constitutional nor judicial precedent calls for 
permitting payment to surrogate mothers, Amending sections 273{a) and 
181 could cast judicial and social dissatisfaction upon surrogate mo-
therhood itself. 173 The surrogates presently volunteer for a variety 
of non-financial reasons. Legislation providing for their compensa-
tion may encourage a host of women to become surrogates simply for the 
money. 
Van Hoften suggests the following in regard to the California Pe-
na1 Code: 
Although a number of legal obstacles presently 
discourage surrogate motherhood in California by ham~ 
pering the semen donorLs efforts to establish his pa~ 
ternity, minor legislative modifications would enable 
infertile couples to have children through the use of 
a surrogate. The repeal of Evidence Code Section 621 
would remove a major barrier to the donorLs claim to pa~ 
ternity, while its policy objectives would be met by the 
rebuttable presumptions of Civil Code Section 7004(a), 
The donor should be given standing to rebutt those pre-
sumptions and the opportunity to introduce appropriate 
evidence to do so. Under a new section of the Uniform 
Parentage Act, he could acknowledge his paternity be-
fore or after the child~s birth. Under an amendment to 
the artificial insemination statute his written agree-
ment with the surrogate would manifest their intent that 
in this case the semen donor be treated as the legal and 
natural father of the child. Modifying Penal Code Sections 
273(a) and 181 is neither necessary nor desirable. Be-
cause the current practice of surrogate motherhood sug-
gests new, as yet unanswered questions, the legislature 
172Ibid., p. 372. 
173Ibid., p. 379. 
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should leave the details of each transaction to the parties 
involved. The proposed amendments are sufficient to permit 
surrogate motherhood as a legal childbearing option. 174 
The Commonwealth of Kentucky, through the office of the Attorney 
General, Steven L. Beshear, has been involved in a long, standing 
battle with Surrogate Parenting Associates over the legality of IIsell-
ing babies. H Mr. Beshear has provided a brief survey of those Kentucky 
statutes which may be interpreted to pertain to surrogate mothering. 
He contends that the contract between the surrogate and the adoptive 
parents is illegal and unenforceable as a result of three Kentucky 
statutes. 
KRS 199.500(5): NIn no case shall an adoption be granted 
or a consent for adoption be held valid if such consent 
for adoption is given prior to the fifth day after the 
birth of the child. Nl75 
This statute would negate any contract which is processed during the 
arrangement stage of the procedure prior to the insemination or any 
time prior to five days after the birth. Although a contract drawn 
up prior to the five day waiting period might be considered, the strong 
public policy would prevent it from being enforceable. 
The parties concerned may choose another avenue which has been 
followed by Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc. This involves a con-
tract in which the surrogate and her husband agree to terminate their 
parental rights at the end of the five days. This is covered under 
I74Van Hoften, p. 385. 
I75Steven L. Beshear, Attorney General, Commonwealth of Kentucky, 
"An Opinion Concerning the Legality of Surrogate Parenthood," (See 
Appendix n. 
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KRS 199. 601-199.617. However, there is a penalty clause which is 
found under KRS 199.900(5), and which states that in case of willful 
violation there is a fine of not less than twenty dollars nor more than 
two hundred dollars or imprisonment for no more than thirty days. 
Mr. Beshear believes that the strongest legal prohibition aqainst 
surrogate parenting in Kentucky is the strong public policy aqainst the 
buying and selling of children. He cites several cases in other states: 
Barwin v. Reidy, 307 P.2d 175 (N.M. 1957); Matter of Adoption of a 
Child by LT., 307 P 2d 341 (N.J. 1978); In re Shirk"s Estate, 350 P.2d 
1 (Kan. 1960); Rennche v. First National Bank of Nevada, 512 F. 2d 187 
(9th Cir. 1975).176 
In Kentucky, much of this public policy has been 
embodied in statute. KRS 199.590(2) states: 
"No person, agency or institution not licen-
sed by the department may charge a fee or 
accept remuneration for the procurement of 
any child for adoption purposes. N 
The penalty provision for violation of KRS 199.590 is 
found in KRS 199.900(4) and states that any person who 
violates the statute shall be fined not less than $500 
nor more than $2,000 or imprisoned for not more than 
six months or both.177 
Accordingly, Mr. Beshear points out that no business, person, or organi-
zation can advertise children for adoption. Included also is the warn-
ing that if they carry ads for such, a newspaper or publication which 
is published in Kentucky, they are in violation of statute KRS 190.590 
(1). His conclusion is: 
... It is the oplnlon of this office that because 
of the existence of the above-mentioned Kentucky sta~ 
176Ibid., p. 4 177Ibid. 
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tutes and the strong public policy against the buying 
and selling of children, contracts invo1vinq surrogate 
parenting are illegal and unenforceable in the Common-
wealth of Kentucky.178 
A proposal for the leqa1ization of surrogate parentina contracts 
submitted in the California Law Review .. 
... Contracts to bear a child, if properly requlated, 
pose no serious threat to social interests and should be 
permitted ... 
As a cond it i on of 1 ega 1 ity and enforceabil ity, a 11 
contracts should be required to provide for adequate life 
and health insurance. A copy of the contract, a doctor~s 
report on the physical condition of the carrier, and the 
results of a blood test, should then be presented for re-
view to an official of the State Department of Health, 
This official should witness the signing of the contract 
and ffie it with the court. Once the agreement is sign~ 
ed, the consent of the mother to the u1 timate pl acement 
of the child according to contract terms could not be 
withdrawn except by court approval or by mutual consent., 
After the baby~s birth, the court could order a 
finding of the parent-child relationship between the con-
tract couple and the child. A copy of the order which 
would be sent to the State Registrar, who, upon app1ica~ 
tion of the contracting couple or the carrier, would is-
sue a new birth certificate. 
The proposed system wou1 d not require extensive 
statutory modificati·on. If the contract was provided 
for in a independent enabling section, that section 
could also provide that the contract, conforming to 
the statutory requirements would be valid and enforceable, 
not withstanding conf1 icting provisions of law, In order 
to facil itate proof of parentage ~ the conclusive presump-
tion of secti on 621 of the Evid91ce Code shou1 d be modi-
fied to except the baby contract situation, and section 
700s of the Parentage Act should be modified to exclude 
situations where the donor provides semen specifically 
to father the child, 
The proposed modifications could also be implemen-
ted with minimum expenses by using the existing proce-
dures and personnel of the State Department of Health 
to supervise the contracting process~179 
178Ibid., p. 7. 
179Elizabeth A. Erickson, "Contracts to Bear A Child,1I California 
Journal t 1978) : 621-622. 
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California is not progressing in legislation pertaining to surrogate 
parenthood as rapidly as the phenomenon is growing. 
The state of Michigan, on the other hand, is making some proqress 
in the legislature. Noel Keane states that there is now support to 
draft bills on surrogate parenting in both houses of the Michigan Leq-
islature. He has been asked by State Senator George S. Hart (Dearborn) 
and State Representative Richard Fitzpatrick (Battle Creek), as well 
as the Family Law Section of the Michigan State Bar Association to 
help draft proposed legislation,l80 
On October 16, 1981, Representative Fitzpatrick introduced House 
Bill No. 5184 to the Michigan House of Representatives. 181 He noted. 
"We know that passage of such a law will be controversial, but it is 
time to begin." House Bill No. 5184 is proposed to amend existinq leg-
islation as it pertains to adoption. The specific legislation to be 
amended is sections 44 and 54 of Chapter X of Act N. 288 of the Public 
Acts of 1939, Act No, 296 of the Public Acts of 1974. sections 710.44 
and 710-54 of the Compiled Laws of 1970. 
The Bill establishes that the ages of both the surrogate mother 
and the biological father must be at least eighteen and either of them 
can be single or married. It provides guidelines for the examination 
by an agent of the adoptive parents to guarantee a proper home for the 
child. 
180Keane, p. 267. 
18lSee Appendix No.8. 
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Section 75(1) (C), liThe Permanence As A Family Unit Of The Peti-
tionerls Home," seems to be an area which in itself will provide con-
troversy for the Bill. Section 76(1) establishes that a Nsing1e natu-
ra1 father II may enter into a surrogate parenthood agreement. Does 
this mean that the courts will be forced to define a Ifami1y"? Will 
the "family unit" be established as a single parent household? It is 
foreseeable that this section could create as much furor as the con-
cept of surrogate parenting. The Bill could be interpreted as a 
double threat to the sanctity of the traditional family by (1) allow-
ing for the legality of surrogate parenting, (2) allowing the court 
to define what constitutes a family, and (3) allowing the court to 
determine what would constitute a "home l'. 
Section 77 of the Bill provides for a deed to be drawn between 
the surrogate and the natural father acknowledging the paternity of 
the child in the same manner as a deed is drawn for the exchange of 
real estate. This would seem to define the child as a piece of mer-
chandise to be bartered. 
Section 81 states that: 
At the completion of the surrogate's sixth month of 
pregnancy, the judge of probate shall issue an interim 
order granting custody, care, and control over the child 
to the natural father ••. The interim order shall grant 
to the natural father and his spouse the exclusive author-
ity to consent to all medical, surgical, psychological, 
educational, and related services for the child. The 
interim order shall be effective immediately upon the 
birth of the child. 
This section poses three questions: (1) Does it imply that the surro-
gate maintains the exclusive right to make decisions concerning the fe-
tus? (2) If, upon birth, the child required immediate medical atten-
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Hon of some nature -:- toe adoptive parents not being present and un.,. 
avatlab.le for consent - is the surrogate then permitted to make the 
decision or is it toe responsibility of the attending physician? (3) 
Does this imply that the adoptive parents will assume full responsi-
bility, immediately upon birth, of toe child regardless of its physi-
cal, emotional, or mental condition? These questions will be of vital 
concern in any surrogate parenting situation, 
Section 87 establishes toe medical guidelines to be followed by 
the surrogate. These include complete medical and psychological eval-
uations. The surrogate. in this section, is also required to assume 
all ri'sks, medical, physical, psychological, which accompany pregnancy. 
It allows for abortion, only upon the recommendation of the insemina-
ting physician, if her health is threatened. 
Section 88 establishes the guidelines for the natural father and 
states that the surrogateks fee is to be deposited in eScrows on the 
date the agreement is signed by all parties. The fee, plus all inter-
est, will be paid to the surrogate upon birth of the child, However, 
this section does not state whetoer the condition, at birth, of the 
child will have any bearing upon the fee. 
The coverage of all expenses for the surrogate is to be the res~ 
ponsibility of toe natural father. But, tois also allows that the 
surrogate's present medical insurance may be charged for all or part 
of the expenses. It becomes the primary source, 
Section 91 gives the natural father the legal responsibility for 
any child which is born to the surrogate. This section also states: 
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(c)That if the natural father or the adoptive parent, 
if the natural father is married, di es prior to the term-
ination of the surrogate~s parental rights, the surrogate 
parenthood agreement sha 11 remai n in full force and effect 
with respect to the surviving party: That if both the 
natural father and the adoptive parent, if the natural fa-
ther is married, die prior to termination of the surro-
gatels parental rights, the surrogate shall be entitled 
to her full compensation and expenses and may elect to 
keep the child or execute a consent to the adoption of 
the child or a release of the child for adoption. 
It is implied by this section also that the child is only a commodity 
which may be disposed of in any manner by the surrogate or natural 
father. It would seem that, since the documents ackn~l~ging the 
child to be born to the surrogate is indeed the child of the natural 
father have already been made a matter of legal record (Sec. 75 (2)) 
and the adoptive parent has already been approved and is a matter of 
legal record (Sec. 75 (3}), in the event of the death of the natural 
father, the child would be a legal heir to the natural father~s estate. 
Also, in the event of the death of both the natural father and the 
adoptive parent, i'f there were no other children from the marriage, 
the child would seem to be the sole surviving heir~ 
House Bill No, 5184 is not adequate for the situation and could 
create more problems for tne legal system. Any legislati'on which is 
proposed would be useless unless it provided for the child, Also, the 
proposed legislation would need to define natural father, adoptive par-
ent, family, and home, in a manner which is acceptable to the public, 
This Bill does not. 
Summary 
At the present time, there is. a concerted effort among those attor-
119 
neys and doctors who are involved with surrogate parenting for mean-
inful legislation to be formulated and adopted, Many of these are 
not sure that what they are doing is moral and ethical. They are 
looking for legislation which might help to ease their conscience, 
Conservative religious leaders view it much in the same way as 
abortion. They feel it is an intrusion into GodLs creative process 
for humanity and as such, must be abandoned. 
Liberal theologians view it as an aid to childless couples to 
help them find happiness. Their motives lie in the social gospel 
philosophy. They believe that the means justifies the results. 
Legislators are not sure what to do. Of those states which have 
enacted legislaUon regarding A.I,O" the laws are extremely porous 
when interpreted. There is no uniformity among the states regarding 
legislation to control and regulate surrogate parenting. 
Before legislation is proposed, each existing law pertaining to 
adoption, A.I.O., and the proposed legislation for surrogate parenting 
shoul d be thoroughl y researched.. The arguments from the re 1 i gi ous 
viewpoint should be closely adhered to, and the potential harm to the 
enUre human race should be the deciding factor. 
CHAPTER V 
Conclusion 
The issues presented herein will present counsellors, both bibli-
cal and non-biblical, with numerous situations in the Christian con-
text and secular setting, where informed direction may result in the 
saving of a marriage. Infertility is becoming more and more prevalent 
in society and an uninformed public, in its effort to alleviate the 
problem, will become more and more tolerant of those llalternatives" to 
childlessness. At present, an estimated twelve to seventeen percent 
of the married couples in America are involuntarily childless and the 
medical experts say it is increasing. 
Inferility, in most cases, is the result of the freedom of choice. 
Today many couples are postponing parenthood until they are past the 
age of optimal fertility. Also at fault is venereal disease, birth 
control pills, complications from abortion and the use of IUDs, which 
are nothing more than abortive devices rather than contraceptives. 
In addition, the sharp decline in the number of available infants 
for adoption has also left couples childless. However, it is known 
that fifty percent of those couples who are treated (medically) for 
infertility eventually have children.181 
Medical science seems to be burning the candle at both ends. They 
18lDan Kaercher, flWhat Can Be Done About Infertility?" Better 
Homes and Gardens, September, 1979, p. 86, 
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are conducting extensive research into human reproduction under the 
guise of seeking better ways to alleviate the problem of infertility. 
But, according to a recent news clipping, they are striving to find 
ways to control and reduce fertility. 
The \AJorld1s population - about 4.5 billion last 
year -- is expected to grow over the next two decades 
to between 5.9 billion and 6.5 billion, according to 
a congressional study. 
Improved birth control methods and greater support 
of international family planning programs could keep to-
tal population toward the lower projected figure, an Of-
fice of n echnology Assesment report on the study says. 
The report, released Sunday, (March 28, 1982) said 
that during the next decade more than 20 new or improved 
contraceptive methods will become available. They in-
clude safer oral contraceptives, improved intrauterine 
devices, new hormonal chemicals, long-acting steriod in-
jections and implants and better barrier devices for 
women, including disposable, one-size-fits-all diaphragms, 
the study said.182 
The thought of spending tax money (and many of the research pro-
grams are underwritten by government grants) to decrease infertil ity 
while at the same time spending vast amounts to decrease fertility is 
ridiculous. According to the above mentioned article, family planning 
assistance will have to increase 10-fold by the year 2,000 -- to $10.7 
billion annually -- to supply needed levels of the contraceptive meth-
ods and services which are now being developed. 
It appears that the above research is in contrast to surrogate 
parenting efforts. Could it be that surrogate parenting actually has 
an ulterior motive, (a forerunner of medical scientific efforts to pro-
duce a super-human race)? The major concern about surrogate parenting 
should be its ultimate effect upon the human race. Francoeur expresses 
182 11 Population Explosion May Be Slowed," The Daily Advance, 29 
March 1982, p.3. 
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his concern in the following manner: 
... That mankind, men and women together, are stan.,. 
ding on the brink of a major revolution far more serious 
than that which began a century ago with the emancipation 
of woman from the hearth and nursery. The eternal mysti-
ques of masculine and feminine that have guided Western 
men and women for centuries are evaporating. Their death 
1's bei'ng accelerated by a very short-fused, ready-to-ex-
plode biological 50mb: mankind"s newfound ability to con-
trol, manipulate, and direct his own reproductive pro-
cesses. Techniques of arti'ficial insemination, frozen 
germ cell s, the artificial womb, embryo transpl ants, pre-
natal monitoring and mani'pulations, genetic engineering, 
and asexual cloning of human beings: these developments, 
many of them already a reality, will have great psycholog-
ical, emotional, and religious repercussions. After thou-
sands of years during which reproduction depended on the 
union of male and female, man stands ready in the next 
decade or two to reproduce his own image independently ... 
More than any other modern technology, the research 
into new modes of hUman reproduction now going on in 
thousands of biological and medical laboratories around 
the worl dis creating a dil emma for man. It stri kes at 
the very heart of human society because it cuts to the 
quick of the human family and the relationship between 
husband and wife. 
The Creator has somehow shared with us his omnipo-
tence. Having created us in his own image, he now asks 
us to share with Him in the ongoing creation of mankind 
and man. But we are mere neophytes in the task of cre-
ation. We lack wisdom and experience and thus often end 
up as bumbling, confused gods. 183 
Has God allowed man to gain the power over the procreation of humanity? 
Thi s woul d seem then that God had contradicted Himself. Has God failed 
in His process of procreation and is now going to allow man to improve 
himself? Romans 9:20 states: 
" .... Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, 
Why hast thou made me thus?" 
ManIs improvement of his kind rests in the finished work of Christ! 
Francoeur mentions that the scientific reproductive processes will 
183Francoeur, p. vii, viii'. 
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cause psychological problems. In Chapter II, the Psychological Moti-
vations for Surrogate Parenthood were discussed. The primary "exuse" 
given for support of the surrogate mother is the Biblical account of 
Abraham, Sarah, and Hagar. In every instance Hagar is portrayed as 
the willing handmaid of Sarah who wanted to do nothing but bring happi-
ness to her mistress. To quote this story and use it as a motivating 
factor for surrogate mothering is a "psycho10gical" farce. 
The Genesis 16 account is a beautiful story. Filled with sin: 
adultery, anger, hatred, bitterness, and malice, it is a real motiva-
tion for compassion. Hagar did not willingly surrender to Abraham. 
She was a slave and had no recourse but to obey Sarah~s wish. Hagar 
was not motivated by love. Sarah was not motivated by a desire to 
have children. In verse four, Hagar became angry when she found that 
she was pregnant and hated Sarah. Sarah had her driven from the home. 
Those who support surrogate mothering with this verse should read the 
whole story. 
Some of the surrogate mothers expressed that they felt they were 
giving the childless couple a gift. One described the surrogate preg-
nancy as Hharboring a gift". Is not her own child a gift to her? 
Would she be willing to give up one of her older children to some 
childless couple just because they wanted a child and happened to like 
one of hers? The argument that they are doing it as a gift is a weak-
er motivation than that drawn from the Genesis story. Thus, there is 
more to the motivation than is being revealed. It is evident, as the 
various accounts are read that the main motivation is SELFISHNESS. 
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The Texas midwife, Carol Pavek~ makes a clear statement to the 
fact of selfish motivations when she states, ~It would be wonderful to 
keep having babies without the responsibility of raising them. Nl85 
All of mankind is basically selfish. To a mother, the reward for all 
the pain and deprivation of privacy encountered in giving birth is be-
ing able to hold her very own newborn child to her breast. Since sur-
rogate mothers forego this privilege, they must have a substitute re ... 
ward. To have done a good deed for others can only be a surface ex-
cuse offered to cover up her selfish desire for money and recognition. 
Another motivation for surrogate mothers is to rid themselves of 
guilt brought on by abortion or having given up a child for adoption 
as the result of a teenage pregnancy. This is viewed as a weak moti-
vation because one wrong cannot be corrected by doing another wrong, 
The surrogate mother is going to compound her guilt after the baby is 
born and she has to give it up. Her guilt needs to be dealt with 
scripturally and she needs a fresh outlook on life which can only come 
from God. 
The psychological motivations for becoming a surrogate mother are 
far outweighed by the psychological effects the surrogate must endure 
during and after the pregnancy. One surrogate relates, IIPm not kid-
ding myself that I will give up the baby without qualms ... That's what 
my fri ends are worried about.. 11186 
The premier example of those aspects of surrogate mothering which 
traumatize the surrogate and those close to her was exemplified in the 
185Seligmann, p. 72. 
186Fleming, p. 24. 
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case of Elizabeth Kane. Mrs. Kane had replied to Dr. Levinls ad 
without the approval or consent of her husband. In fact, he knew 
nothing of it. Her husband, David, was totally opposed to it but she 
managed to convince him. His first reaction, "It will tear our family 
apart-" Surrogate mothering is wrong because of the negative impact 
upon the family of the surrogate. The husband will never be able to 
reconcil e himsel f to the fact that hi s wife had another man IS baby. 
The husband alone has exclusive right to his wifeks body because in 
the sight of God the two of them are one. 
Ephesians 5:31 - Genesis 2:23,24: And Adam said, This 
;s now bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh: she shall 
be called woman, because she was taken out of man. There. 
fore shall a man leave his father and mother and shall 
cleave unto his wife: and they shall be one flesh. 
The sin against the family and against the husband goes further. 
Mrs. Kane relates, liThe day 1 was inseminated, it was a strange feeling 
in bed that night watching ~Johnny Carson~. There were three in the 
bed that night." 187 Even the surrogate cannot escape the psychological 
fact that the sacredness of the marriage has been altered and the in-
timacy of the husband/wife relationship has been violated, 
Ephesians 5 :22: Wives. Submit yourselves unto your own 
husbands, as unto the Lord: 
Colossians 3:18: Wives. Submit yourselves unto your own 
husbands. 
I Peter 3:1: Likewise, ye wives be in subjection to your 
own husbands ... 
Genesis 3:16: .. "and thy desire shall be to thy husband, 
and he shall rule over thee. 
187Anna Quindlen, I'Surrogate Mothers: A Controversial Solution 
to Infertility,fI Hie New York Times, 2] May 1980, p. B12. 
126 
However, the psychological trauma goes beyond tile husband/wife 
relationship. The impact on the children of the surrogate is an unfor-
gettable experi~nce. In the movie, "A Gift of Life," one of the chil-
dren of the surrogate mother asked her if she would sell her also. If 
she could have one child and give it up for a price, it would follow 
that her other children would question the sincerity of her devotion 
to them. It will be there to haunt them forever, "Did my mother really 
love and want me?" 
Elizabeth Kane found it even more traumatic for existing children. 
Her four-year-old son suddenly found himself witll no one to play with. 
Her two daughters, aged thirteen and eleven, were ridiculed in school 
and taunted because, °your mother is selling babies." Further, Mrs. 
Kane rel ates after the birth of the chil d, that her chil dren "are sad 
because they never got to see their brother - and he is their bro-
ther."188 This statement proves that Mrs. Kane finally awoke to the 
evil of what she was doing. During the first few months after the 
insemination she had a different attitude toward the baby. She sta-
ted, °1 never think of it as mine. It's the father's child. 1 am 
simply growing it for him. "189 
Being a surrogate mother is a psychological sin against the hus-
band and the children, both those of the marriage and the one which is 
to be given up. But, the effect does not stop with just the immediate 
188"Surrogate Mother Explains Why She Had Baby For Couple," The 
Daily Advance, 4 December 1980, p. 6. 
189Quindlen, New York Times, p. B12. 
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family. Mrs. Kane says that her family, father, mother, sisters, bro-
thers, inlaws, cut her off. When the surrogate in the movie. IIGift 
of Life,1I informed her family, she was ridiculed for her thoughtless-
ness. Her sister reminded her that, although she was pregnant by ano-
ther man other than her husband, when she gave the baby to the other 
couple, she was giving away something that was a part of all of them 
and had a genetic link to everyone in the family. This is a true 
statement. The child remains a descendent of the surrogate mother1s 
fami 1y. 
There is a snowballing effect with surrogate mothering. The trau-
ma reaches beyond the family setting. Mrs. Kane relates that only one 
neighbor in her home town of Pekin, in Central Illinois, will speak to 
her. The people she worked with were horrified and some reacted with 
hostility when she told them what she was doing. Many of them consid-
ered what she was doing as lIadultery of a heinous sort,lI Another one 
invited Mrs. Kane to her home, then announced that she was going straight 
to hell. Mrs. Kane says, IIShe accused me of selling my body. That real-
ly shocked me. 11190 
It is a form of prostitution. A man has allowed his wife to per-
form with her body those services which are reserved exclusively to him 
and has received compensation for it. This is clearly the meaning of 
Noel Keane1s statement: lIThere~s not a baby there when we start the 
process. r think the surrogate is being paid for the use of her bod-
y. ,,191 The service which she is going to perform is basically a sexual 
190Quindlen, B12, 191Casti110, B6. 
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service and historically falls into the realm of adultery. 
One couple in Detroit has used a surrogate to bear two children 
for them. Both times the infertile wife has done the inseminating. 
This has resulted in a broken relationship between the couple and their 
inlaws. With these growing conflicts they sought help from their 
priest. He told them "Your children have not sinned but you have. 
You have used Michael's sperm in another woman IS body, II The priest 
labeled their act as adultery.192 
The psychological effects will never cease for the surrogate mo-
ther. Her problems are not only within her family and her friends 
but her personal trauma begins immediately at birth. One surrogate 
mother says, "Tt I S not easy. I feel the baby ki ck and move, yet I 
know the baby is not mine. M193 
Although it may sound simple to have a baby and qive it up, it is 
something that is never forgotten. Testimony after testimony has ap-
peared in columns like "Dear Abby" and others, from women who have done 
so. Many still remember the child they gave up fifty or sixty years 
ago. But, those women were not doing so for the sake of financial gain. 
Again, Elizabeth Kane relates that during the labor, while on the 
delivery table she asked herself why was she going through with this. 
She also says: 
Three days after the birth tears started flowing. I 
decided to go to the nursery and say a final, private fare-
well to him. I didn~t want to hold him. I thought lid 
192Markoutsas, p. 74. 
193Ibid., p. 73. 
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better not. .. In 18 years if they a 11 (her chil dren and 
the baby) want to get together someday, that~s fine. 
His parents that he has now said if he wants to see me 
in 18 years, that~s fine. 194 
One aspect which is almost totally overlooked which will have a 
great psychological effect on womanhood is the fact that women will be 
lowered to the status of "breeding stock." No one has made mention 
that several years ago this procedure was introduced among farmers as 
a method of improving the livestock breeds, 
There are always plenty of second-rate cows around 
a herd, so that with superovulation and inovulation with 
a single prize cow and frozen semen shipped from elsewhere 
a dairyman can end up with three dozen prize calves in.,. 
stead of one .•. 195 
The fact that the status of women is being lowered is clearly stated 
when Dr. Richard Levin dehumanizes the surrogate with this statement: 
III wouldnht consider this buying a baby. ILd consider this buying a 
receptacle, so 11m not sure you would have a problem with the compen-
sation per se."196 
Looking back on all the negative remarks which El izabeth Kane en.,. 
dured, she says, "pm a rather narrow-minded person myself. And if 
someone else was doing this I might feel the same way.1I197 
Equally traumatizing is the introduction of A.I.D. into the mar-
riage of a childless couple, where the husband is infertile. Many of 
the pxychological effects of surrogate mothering carryover to this 
194The Daily Advance, 4 December 1980, p. 6. 
195Francoeur, P. 96. 
196Quindlen, p. B12. 
197Ibid. 
130 
area. One woman who was impregnated by A,I.D. says the experience was 
awesome for her husband. 
When you have a baby sometimes you say ~My babyh, 
My husband would ask, ~hat do you mean, your baby?~ 
He was frequently upset... --
~She contributed 80 percent~ says that husband 
today. ~A donor contributed 20 percent, and 1 con-
tributed nothing. 1198 
Many of the women submit to A,I.D. because they want to "give" 
their husbands a child. They feel that the husband needs someone to 
carryon the family name. This psychological problem of the husband 
may not be relieved by the birth of an A.I.D, child, The child may 
serve as a constant reminder of his incapability and intensify feelings 
of resentment. Other possible psychological results include a develop-
ing affection by the wife for the donor, if the donor is known. This 
would be especially serious if the donor were a friend or relative. 
There would then be another image on the scene. The donor could poss-
ibly demand a role in raising the child or might resort to blackmail 
in order to keep his silence, 
There is also the possibility of the wife transferring all of her 
love solely to the child.. She could develop a resentment toward the 
husband and shower the child with her affection. Yet another problem 
could arise if both the wife and husband developed resentment for the 
child, The child could be viewed as an intruder and a trouble maker. 
This would be brought about by the changes which are necessary in life 
style when children are born into a home. 199 
198John Stossel, "One Answer to Childlessness - Artificial Insemi-
nation," Science/Digest March 1980, p. 23. 
199Perkins, p. 18. 
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A.T.D. is psychologically traumatizing to the woman also. A 
young wife relates: 
When you~re at the clinic being inseminated, you 
don't actually comprehend what"s going on. You see the 
syringe and you have to remind yourself, ~Gee, there"s 
a baby in there. h And then you have to lie there on 
the table for 10 minutes after they do it with this 
strange sperm in you, but you think about other things. 
It does melt out of your mind in daily living, But 
youhre going to go through your life knowing you did 
this, knowing that there~s somebody out there who·s 
part of you. Somehow. 200 
This young woman is relating this as she is trying to conceive 
her second child through A.I.D. She says it is no different than it 
was at first, and there is no enjoyment. Since A.I.D. does not gua-
rantee pregnancy with the first insemination, it is necessary for her 
to make several trips, twice monthly, which costs sixty-six dollars 
per insemination. She says that as a result of going month after 
month trying to conceive, she felt so hollow and that sex at home was 
not satisfying because her husbandHs touch reminded her of the doctor. 
The young woman adds that her children will never learn that they 
were A.I.D. children. The secret will go to the grave with her and 
her husband. 201 
There is always speculation by the wife about who the donor is. 
One states that it could be any man in her community. This is true. 
In a survey of A.I.D. Clinics, Dr. Curie-Cohen found the following 
concerning donors: 
200Fleming, p. 14. 
201Ibid., p. 20. 
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Of those who answered, most (77.1 percent) had 
never used a donor for more than six pregnancies, where~ 
as 5.7 percent had used a donor for 15 or more. One 
respondent had used a single donor for 50 pregnancies. 
Although most doctors (50.7 percent) used each donor 
for an average of one or two pregnancies, 10.3 percent 
used each donor for an average of nine or more pregnan-
cies. The multiple use of donors was usually pragmatic 
since most doctors (88.4 percent) had no policies con-
cerning the maximum use of a donor. The doctors who 
did restrict the use of a single donor usually limited 
the number of pregnancies to six or 1ess. 202 
The above survey involved seven hundred eleven physicians. This 
survey could lead to even greater psychological problems as the women 
begin to ponder if other somen have borne children of the same donor, 
who would be a sibling of their child. Since the doctors seem to have 
little regard for use of a single donor, inbreeding will be a natural 
result. 
Another young woman tells of her feelings about A,I.D.: 
I have an ideal husband. He never swears, never raises 
his voice. I love him and I wouldnLt leave him for anything 
in the world - but I do blame him. I am the one who has to 
bear the embarrassment and the aggravation of going in twice 
a month. HeLs the one with the blocked duct, I was a virgin 
for him. It hS almost as if I have been raped for him. I 
cried on the table the first time I went in for insemination, 
... 1 have been a nervous wreck at times because of this ... 
You see a guy in a white jacket (young medical students or 
interns), and you think, is he the donor? You see another 
guy - is it him? They have appeared in my dreams. You 
worry ... what if the donor belongs to some fraternity, and 
as a prank he replaces his sperm with a black guy ' s.203 
A.I.D. is a life-time choice and couples need to consider that 
what they are doing is out of the will of God for the family. Nowhere 
202Martin Curie-Cohen, Ph.D., Lesleigh Luttrell, M.S., and Sander 
Shapiro, M.D., "Current Practice of Artificial Insemination By Donor 
In the United States," The New England Journal of Medicine 300 (March 
15, 1979): 587. 
203Blais, p. 134. 
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does the Bible permit for the entrance of a third party into pro-
creation. In Abraham and Sarah's case, God had already promised them 
a child. There was no need for Sarah~s plot to have taken place. 
Childless couples should ask themselves if they are actually seeking 
God's will and could it be, perhaps, that His choice for them is child-
lessness. Should a deformed or handicapped child be born, could their 
marriage stand the strain? 
No matter how devoted and loving a couple we may be 
now, the time may come when we shall no longer love one 
another. If we should ever wish to end our marriage, 
would we, in despair and frustration, lash out at each 
other, blame one another for this decision, or use it 
as a weapon to hurt and destroy? A man may well ask 
himself, "Will she one day confront me with my inade-
quacy? Will she use it to hurt me or mock me or in-
jure our child?" A woman may wonder, "Will he one day 
reject us both because we are not truly his?H The 
decision to use A.I.D. lasts forever, and the possibili-
ties exist that may one day be regretted.204 
The use of A.I.D. is a potential t'bomb" in the midst of a happy 
marriage. There is no guarantee that everyone will be content with the 
results. The husband and wife will still have to acknowledge the fact 
of his or her infertility. The child from another source does not re-
move that fact. 
Public policy should be formulated based on the moral, ethical an 
religious standards. The fact that the backbone of our country, the 
family, is threatened should be motivation enough to outlaw surrogate 
parenthood. One writer states: 
The law should, therefore, play neither a reactionary 
role nor a revolutionary role. This means that the prac-
tice should be legally permitted but cautiously regulated, 
204Blais, p. 149. 
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and morally tolerated but carefully scrutinized. The 
psychological ramifications must be studied in the most 
rigorous scientific manner possible. 205 
I disagree! The material presented herein gives evidence to the 
fact that the practice of surrogate parenthood is highly unethical. 
At the present rate, twenty thousand births per year through A.I.D., 
incest is inevitable. Although it is not necessarily a lucrative bus-
iness, it has the potential with the right menls sperm (well known 
celebrities and professional persons). 
Surrogate motherhood raises even more subtle moral questions. It 
also has the potential for economic exploitation and psychological 
harm and moral confusion to the surrogate mother, the adoptive parents 
and the offspring. It should be banned! 
If the processes of A.I.D, and surrogate mothering are allowed to 
continue, pimps and prostitutes will become more involved and may 
change their "business" to this more profitable route. The lucrative 
aspects have already been presented with some lawyers and doctors earn-
ing in excess of three hundred thousand dollars annually just for 
arranging surrogate mother situations. Women will be exploited as 
"baby-making II machines and will be dehumani zed much as they were in 
the days of Aristotle and the Greek philosophers. 
Any legislation which is considered should be to deny its prac-
tice on the basis that it is anti-man, anti-woman, anti-family, and 
anti-God! 
205Winslade, p. 153. 
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PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION OF WOMEN IN A SURROGATE MOTHER PROGRAM 
By: Darrell D. Franks, M.D. 
Each of the 10 applicants was interviewed by me before insemina-
tion in a freely structured interview and was given the MMPI. 
I found no specific profiles or patterns in these women other 
than routine trends. Of the 10 women, 9 had been married at least 
once, 4 were divorced, and 1 was a single parent. Their average age 
was 26 years. Each subject had from one to three living children, a 
requirement for acceptance into the program. 
Nine of the women were of modest to moderate financial means. 
All were either self-supporting or maintained by husbands or boy-
friends. One was the wife of a professional and also held employment 
of her own. 
All had discussed the program in detail with close friends, boy-
friends, or husbands. Most had major difficulties and conflicts when 
presenting the plan to parents and other older family members. All 
gave similar reasons for entering this program: a history of easy 
pregnancies and labor, love for their own children, the desire to 
share this love and pleasure with others who had not been able to 
conceive their own child, and a need for the financial remuneration 
to stabilize their personal lives and to provide for their own chil-
dren's needs. 
All had given serious thought to the difficulty of signing over 
custody to the biological father, and all understood that this act 
was essential to their participation in the program, In this way 
the fee becomes a custody settlement between the biological mother 
and the biological father, and the problems of baby selling are 
avoided. 
Most viewed this process somewhat like that of an unwed mother 
placing her child for adoption, but these women felt assured that 
the background and characteristics of the family who would be rear-
ing the child were good. Almost all wished to see the infant one 
time to assure themselves that the child was normal. 
The average education of these 10 women was slightly more than 
high school. Their intelligence appeared normal, and little psycho-
pathology could be detected during the initial interview. 
Individual MMPI profiles revealed that they had little additional 
underlying psychopathology. One woman had a hypomania score elevated 
above the upper limit, but she showed no signs of other difficulties 
either on the test or during the interview. She had the only abnor-
mal score. Indi'vidual profiles showed a high degree of honesty in 
answering the questions and generally showed high feminity scores and 
high social extroversion scores. 
The composite MMPI profile was not notable; all scores were with-
in one standard deviation of normal (see table 1). Of special interest 
were the low scores on the hysterical and psychopathic deviate scales, 
The subjects appeared to be feminine women with slightly increased 
energy levels and social extroversion tendencies. The hypomania scale 
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By: Darrell D. Franks, M.D. 
score was probably elevated because of the one abnormal score already 
mentioned. 
Discussion: 
This initial survey suggests that women applying for the surro-
gate mother program have relatively normal personalities. Their rea-
sons for wishing to enter such a program seem to be an interesting 
mixture of financial and altruistic factors. This study does not re-
flect any follow-up on the women~s role as surrogate mothers, and it 
does not address the issue of their adjustment to the process during 
or after pregnancy. These areas will require additional stud~ 
Reference 
1. Ashman A.: Family 1 aw ... natural father IS ri ghts. American Bar 
Association Journal 66:381-382, 1980. 
TABLE 1 
ComQosite MMPI Scores of 10 Women Who Applied to be Surrogate Mothers 
Score 
MMPI Scale ~1ean Median SO Standard 
Lie 4,3 4.5 2.1 4.0 
Infrequency 2 .. 8 2.2 2.5 3.0 
Correction 14.6 15 .. 2 4.3 12.5 
Hypochondriasis 10.8 10.5 2.4 13 .0 
Depression 20.4 19 .. 5 4,4 19.5 
Conversion hysteria 19.1 19,5 2,6 23.0 
Psychopathic deviate 22.4 22.3 2.3 19,0 
Mascul inity-femininity 39.3 40 .. 5 4,0 34.5 
Paranoia 8,6 9.0 2.3 9.0 
Psychasthenia 26.2 27.0 4.3 25.0 
Schizophrenia 24.3 22.5 3.7 22.5 
Hypomania 20.5 20.0 4 .. 2 17.0 
Social introversion 24.5 20.5 8.2 25.0 
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COUNTER-STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS INVOLVED 
1.* WHETHER THE ACTIONS PROPOSED BY THE DOES AND 
MARY ROE OF PURCHASING/SELLING AN ADOPTION 
CONSENT MAY BE PROHIBITED BY THE STATE OF 
MICHIGAN? 
11.** 
III . 
Defendant-Appellee Attorney General answers 
"Yes. 11 
Plaintiffs-Appellants answer "No." 
The trial court answered "Yes." 
The Court of Appeals answered "Yes." 
WHETHER THE PROBHIBITION AGAINST PAYING A 
NATURAL MOTHER FOR CONSENTING TO THE ADOPTION 
OF HER CHILD IS SUFFICIENTLY NARROW IN I'rS 
SCOPE? 
Defendant-Appellee Attorney General answers 
IIYes~" 
Plaintiffs-Appellants answer "No." 
The trial court answered "Yes." 
The Court of Appeals did not address this 
issue, having concluded that the transaction 
proposed by the Does and Mary Roe did not 
involve fundamental interests protected by 
the right of privacy. 
WHETHER THE PAID-FOR ADOPTION AGREEMENT 
PROPOSED BY THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS IS VOID 
AS BEING AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY? 
Defendant-Appellee Attorney General answers 
IlYes .. " 
Plaintiffs-Appellants do not address this 
question. 
The trial court answered "Yes." 
The Court of Appeals did not address this issue. 
NOTE: Plaintiffs-Appellants' proposed issue I alleging 
gender discrimination was not argued in the Court of 
Appeal~ and, thus, has not been properly raised by Appellants. 
Proposed issue III of the Plaintiffs-Appellants appears 
to restate in other words their proposed issue II. 
* Relates to Plaintiffs-Appellants issues II and III. 
** Relates to Plaintiffs-Appellants issue IV. 
iii 
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Counter-Statement of Facts 
Appellants seek to have the Adoption Code sanction the 
deliberate conception and relinquishment of children outside of 
wedlock for money by a declaration that §§ 54 and 69 of 1939 PA 
288, Ch X, as added by 1974 PA 296, § 1, MCLA 710.54 and 710.69; 
MSA 27.3178(555.54) and 27.3178(555.69) are unconstitutional. 
Copies of these provisions are attached hereto as Exhibits A and 
B respectively. The trial court upheld the constitutionality of 
the foregoing statutes in its order of summary judgment of 
February 19, 1980. The Court of Appeals affirmed on May 5, 1981. 
This Counter-Statement of Facts is based on answers to 
interrogatories supplied by the Appellants, John Doe, Jane Doe, 
and Mary Roe. Those answers fall into four categories: 
1. Answers to the Attorney General's interrogatories 
dated April 6, 1979, which were filed on approximately May 17, 
1979 ("Initial Ans\o/ers"); 
2. Affidavits of the Appellants, John Doe, Jane Doe, 
and Mary Roe, referred to on page 1 of each of their Initial 
Answers (the "Affidavits"); 
144 
3. Revised answers to the Attorney General's interroga-
tories dated April 6, 1979, which were filed on approximately 
June 6, 1979 ("Revised Answers"); and 
4. Answers in response to Memorandum on Behalf of 
Defendant Kelley Regarding Additional Discovery dated June IS, 
1979, listing various unanswered questions on pp 6-11, which were 
filed on approximately June 27, 1979 ("Additional Answers"). 
John and Jane Doe have been married for fourteen years 
and have two sons, ages twelve and eight. (Affidavits of the 
Does. ) The Does would like to have a third child, but Mrs. Doe 
is physically incapable of having further children due to a tubal 
ligation (endometriosis). (Revised Answers, No.7, page 1.) 
Although the Does have made no effort to adopt a child, 
they do not believe children are avail~ble for adoption; and they 
want a child related to one of them. (Additional Answers, No.8, 
page 2.) 
Mary Roe has worked for John Doe for three years and 
draws a monthly salary of approximately $1,400 from John Doe. 
(Revised Answers, No.8, page 1; and Additional Answers, No.3, 
3rd subpart, page 2.) The Does propose to have Mary Roe conceive 
a child with John Doe through artificial insemination administered 
by a physician. (Additional Answers, No.2, page 1.) After 
birth, the Does would take custody of the child once he or she 
leaves the hospital; and Mary Roe would consent to the adoption 
of the child by the Does. (Revised Answers, No. ll(q) (4), page 
, 
4.) Mary Roe would receive $5,000, plus medical expenses, from 
the Does for surrendering custody of her child to the Does and 
for consenting to the adoption. (Additional Answers, No.1, page 
1, and No.5, page 2.) In addition, Mary Roe will be covered by 
sick leave, pregnancy disability insurance, and medical insurance 
from her employment while she is off work having the child and 
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recuperating from the delivery. (Revised Answers, No. ll(s), 
page 4; and Additional Answers, No.3, 4th subpart, page 2.) 
To date, the Does and Mary Roe do not have a proposed 
written agreement specifying the exact mutual obligations of the 
parties. (Revised Answers, No.9, page 2.) 
Mary Roe, a divorcee, would be having her third child. 
Her children are nine and twelve. (See Roe Affidavit.) 
Mary Roe would retain rights to visit her child at the 
Does both before and after the adoption by the Does. (See 
Revised Answers, No. ll(g) (4) and No. ll(r), page 4.) 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
THE ACTIONS PROPOSED BY THE DOES AND MARY ROE 
OF PURCHASING/SELLING AN ADOPTION CONSENT MAY 
BE PROHIBITED BY THE STATE OF MICHIGAN. 
The Appellants privacy claim is based on the argument 
that the proposed arrangement is their individual prerogative, 
free of any State interference, to bear and beget children and to 
have and raise a family. On various occasions, as noted by the 
lower courts in this case, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that 
the having of children and the raising of a family are fundamental 
personal rights. 
However, an examination of the proposed transaction 
discloses that the Appellants seek to engage in other activities 
which go far afield from the having of one's own children and the 
raising of one's own family. To briefly review what each of the 
Appellants desires: 
1. John Doe 
He wants to deliver his semen to a doctor, not to 
beget a child. l He wants to pay Mary Roe for an 
adoption consent severing all legal ties to her 
child. 
2. Jane Doe 
She wants to pay Mary Roe to give up her child by 
adoption. 
3. Mary Roe 
She wants to be paid by the Does for her agreement 
to consent to their adoption of her yet unborn 
natural child before the child is conceived. 
lThe cases on whether artificial insemination outside of the 
married couple (where an anonymous male donor's sperm is used 
when the husband is sterile) are divided as to whether adultery 
is involved. Exhibit C is a list of references to the legal 
literature on artificial insemination. No Michigan cases were 
located on the question. 
4 
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Appellants argue that in matters of marriage, sexual 
intimacy, and family life, a constitutional right of privacy or 
"personal autonomy" should permit them to be "let alone" to do as 
they wish without any interference by the State. In fact, 
however, Appellants are not complaining of interference by the 
State. Rather, Appellants seek the intervention of the Probate 
Court into their relationships - to legitimitize the natural 
child of John Doe and Mary Roe, to declare that this child is 
adopted by the Does, and to sever Mary Roe's legal ties as the 
natural mother. The adoption process with its applicable rules 
(including the prohibition against consideration) in no way 
involves uninvited state interference in areas of sexual intimacy 
or family life in which there is a legitimate expectation of 
State non-involvement. 
There is no fundamental right either to adopt or to 
specify the terms of adoption of one's child. Adoption laws 
provide an orderly mechanism for the care and protection of 
children and their. natural parents in those cases where the 
natural parents are unable or unwilling to assume the parental 
obligations and privileges of caring for and raising one's children. 
These laws are a proper exercise of the State's police power for 
health, safety, and the general welfare. The constitutional 
standard for laws enacted in the exercise of the police power has 
been summarized as follows: 
" ... Insofar as the police power is utilized 
by a State, the means employed to effect its 
exercise can be neither arbitrary nor oppres-
ive but must bear a real and substantial 
relation to an end which is public, specifi-
cally, the public health, public safety, or 
public morals, or some other phase of the 
general welfare." (Footnote omitted) . The 
Constitution of the United States of America, 
Analysis and Interpretation (Library of 
Congress, 1973), P 1318. 
This rational basis test has been applied to statutes 
outlawing homosexuality. Doe v Commonwealth's Attorney for City 
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of Richmond, 403 F Supp 1199 (1975), aff'd United States Supreme 
Court, 425 US 901, 96 S Ct 1498, 47 L Ed 2d 751 (1976). The 
district court held that the practice of homosexuality was not a 
fundamental constitutional right. The opinion also noted, in 
dicta, that adultery and fornication are not within th~ scope of 
fundamental rights protected by the constitution. 
The following purposes, interests, and goals are served 
by the prohibition of payments to the natural mother in connection 
with her consent to an adoption; and these public purposes can be 
shown to be applicable to the transaction proposed by the Appellants 
as well: 
1. Prohibition against a commercial market for babies _ 
whether involving an unwed mother facing the agonizing 
decision of retaining or svrrendering her child, a 
woman arranging to conceive a child anticipating a sale 
of that child or in performance of an agreement to 
conceive a child, or as a result of a contract for her 
participation in an extra-marital union to bear the 
proposed adoptive father's child. 
2. The best interests of the child. 
natural parents should decide what is best for the 
child, with adoption as an option of last resort, 
without being influenced or coerced by offers of 
money. 
avoidance of any economic incentive or reward for 
giving up a child for adoption. 
avoidance of possibly traumatic discovery by the 
child of his being separated from his mother by 
adoption under the terms of a monetary arrangement 
agreed upon before his conception. 
3. Recognition of the inestimable, intrinsic worth of each 
person. 
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4. Protection of family and marriage relationships -
mother and children, wife and husband - from disruption 
through the wife and/or mother becoming involved in 
conceiving and bearing a child for some adoptive father 
in a monetary arrangement, or in anticipation of a 
commercial market for adoption. 
5. Avoidance of conflicting claims of parental rights and 
custody. 
natural mother might renegotiate the fee by with-
holding consent to adoption, or resist if the 
probate court reduces the fee to be paid to her. 
natural mother might resist adoption either before 
or after it is ordered out of guilt or out of the 
strong bond which quickly develops between parent 
and infant. 
conflict and uncertainty of those caring for the 
child over the status of the child would be detri-
mental to the child's development. 
The system of having court approval of payments to the 
natural mother permits the payQent of reasonable hospital and 
medical expenses connected with the birth of the child, as noted 
by Judge Lincoln in his memorandum of March 2, 1977 concerning 
these matters. (See Exhibit D.) At the same time, § 54 of 1939 
PA 288, supra, authorizes the probate judge to disapprove any 
payment to the mother which would improperly influence her or 
make the child an object of commerce. Such statutory regulation 
is neither oppressive nor arbitrary, and it has been correctly 
declared to be constitutional by the lower courts in this case. 
Appellants also argue that while the adoption code 
prohibitions "are gender-neutral on their face" (page 4 of 
Appellant's brief), the prohibitions have a disproportionate 
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impact on Appellant Roe and other women who want to surrender 
their children to adoption for a stipulated fee. Appellants 
attempt to base this argument, not presented in the Court of 
Appeals, on cursory speculation as to the prevalence and legality 
of the sale of sperm to sperm banks which then disseminate it for 
physicians for artificial insemination. However, Appellant Roe, 
as the proposed natural mother in the transaction described by 
Appellants, is not seeking to sell ovum to some sort of "ovum 
bank," but rather she is seeking to conceive and bear a child and 
then turn over that child of hers for adoption by others for a 
fee. Accordingly, this argument of Appellants as to gender 
discrimination should be rejected as being without merit. 
II 
THE PROHIBITION AGAINST PAYING A NATURAL 
MOTHER FOR CONSENTING TO THE ADOPTION OF HER 
CHILD IS SUFFICIENTLY NARROW IN ITS SCOPE. 
Even if Appellants were correct (which is not conceded 2 ) 
in asserting that the proposed transaction involved fundamental 
rights, the applicable constitutional test as set forth in 
Zablocki v Redhail, 434 US 374, 388; 98 S Ct 673, 54 L Ed 2d 618 
(1978) involving the right to marry would be satisfied: 
"When a statutory classification significantly 
interfere? with the exercise of a fundamental 
right, it cannot be upheld unless it is 
supported by sufficiently important state 
interests and is closely tailored to effectuate 
only those interests." 
The Adoption Code does not interfere with the right of 
the Does to have a child or to raise a family. In fact the 
Does already have two children. The Adoption Code does not 
prevent the Does or any couple from having their own children, 
through their own intimate union with each other. The Does' 
inability to have further children arises from Mrs. Doe's physical 
condition, not from anything in the Adoption Code. 
2 The trial court indicated on pp 10-11 of its opinion dated 
January 28, 1980, that Appellants' allegations did not involve 
any fundamental rights. The Court of Appeals reached the same 
conclusion at p 3 of its opinion of May 5, 1981, affirming the 
trial court's opinion. 
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Likewise, Mary Roe is not prohibited from having further 
children, even out of wedlock, by the Adoption Code. 
Thus, whatever fundamental rights may be found here, 
they are not substantially interfered with by the Adoption Code. 
Mary Roe states that she will not consent to the adoption of her 
proposed natural child unless she is paid to do so, but this 
adoption consent is subject to important State interests. The 
interests of the State in prohibiting the payment of money to 
Mary Roe to induce her to give up her child have been demonstrated 
above - the prevention of a commercial market for babies, the 
best interests of the child, a recognition of the child's intrinsic 
worth, the protection of family and marriage relationships, and 
the avoidance of conflicting claims of parental rights to custody. 
Further interests of the State are in the protection of 
the mother from duress and overreaching - such as would be 
potentially involved in the employer/employee relationship as in 
the proposed transaction or in any case where one party has 
influence over the other. Another consideration is that the 
child would already be brought into the world before any of the 
terms of this type of transaction would be reviewed by the probate 
court, so that the probate court would be presented with an 
accomplished event. 
The challenged prohibitions in the Adoption Code are 
sufficiently tailored in that they are applicable only to those 
persons involved in adoption proceedings and relate only to 
payments and expenses connected. with adoption. 
In light of the various State interests advanced by the 
prohibition against fees for adoption consents, and the absence 
of any State interference with fundamental rights, Appellants 
argument that §§ 54 and 69 of 1939 PA 288, supra, are unconsti-
tutional should be rejected as being without basis. 
9 
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THE PAID-FOR ADOPTION AGREEMENT PROPOSED BY 
THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS IS VOID AS BEING 
AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY. 
A discussion of public policy serves to demonstrate the 
strong State interests which are involved in this area, and the 
absence of any fundamental rights of the Does and Mary Roe 
implicated by their proposed transaction. As noted in Appellants' 
brief at page 12, the right to privacy is seen by the courts as 
including only personal rights "implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty." Paris Adult Theatre, Inc v Slaten, 413 US 49, 
65; 93 S Ct 2628; 37 L Ed 2d 446 (1973). The following discussion 
of public policy demonstrates that the transaction proposed by 
Appellants is contrary to the "concept of ordered liberty" in 
Michigan and other states as well. 3 
The general doctrine that contracts against public 
policy are void is well summarized in Mahoney v Lincoln Brick Co, 
304 Mich 694, 705; 8 NW2d 883 (1943), which quotes from 12 Am 
Jur, § 167, p 664, as follows: 
"The question whether a contract is against 
public policy depends upon its purpose and 
tendency, and not upon the fact that no harm 
results from it. In other words, all agree-
ments the purpose of which is to create a 
situation which tends to operate to the 
detriment of the public interest are against 
public policy and void, whether in the par-
ticular case the purpose of the agreement is 
or is not effectuated. For a particular 
undertaking to be against public policy 
actual injury need not be shown; it is enough 
if the potentialities for harm are present." 
In applying this general rule, the Michigan Supreme 
Court has held, for example, that marriage broker contracts are 
void as being against public policy. Attorney General v Marital 
Endowment Corp, 257 Mich 691; 242 NIV 297 (1932). In that case 
the court refused to recognize the handling of marriage promotion 
It should be noted that the Kentucky Attorney General has ruled 
that a transaction of the type proposed by Appellants is contrary 
to the law and public policy of that state. See 7 Family Law 
Reporter 2246 (February 17, 1981). 
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corrosive effect of involving monetary considerations in matrimony 
at 257 Mich 694-5 as follows: 
" ... The plan is calculated to promote and to 
induce on financial grounds marriage of the 
members. This commerce in marriage is, on 
the part of the defendant, in practical 
effect, the promotion of marriage between 
third persons, its members and others, and 
tends to marriage through ~ercenary consid-
erations. This is against public policy. 
Antcliff v June, 81 Mich. 477 (10 L.R.A. 621, 
21 Am St. Rep:-533). 
* * * 
"'Anything which induces parties to enter 
into the marriage relation through mercenary 
considerations strikes at the very foundation 
of human society, and is necessarily injurious 
to the community .... '" 
Another application of the public policy doctrine in 
the area of marriage is found in the case of Graham v Graham, 33 
F Supp 936, (ED Mich, 1940) , wherein an agreement by the wife to 
support the husband in exchange for his agreement to quit his 
employment so as to be able to travel with his wife was held to 
be unenforceable as contrary to public policy. The court relied 
on the Restatement of the Law of Contracts, § 587, which states: 
"A bargain between married persons or persons 
contemplating marriage to change the essential 
incidents of marriage is illegal." 
Certainly the obligations of the parties to mutual fidelity and 
exclusivity in sexual relations are as essential to matrimony as 
is the obligation of the husband to support the wife. Accordingly, 
an agreement by the Does whereby Jane Doe would permit John Doe 
to go outside of matrimony to conceive a child would likewise be 
contrary to public policy.4 
4The Revised Probate Code, § 111(1) , 1978 PA 642, MCLA 700.111(1); 
MSA 27.5111(1) states in part: 
n ••• A child conceived following artificial 
insemination of a married woman with the 
consent of her husband shall be treated as 
their legitimate child for all purposes of 
intestate succession. Consent of the husband 
is presumed unless the contrary is shown by 
clear and convincing evidence." 
This provision clarifies the legitimacy of such children born in 
wedlock, but it does not constitute a basis for a married couple 
altering the fundamental terms of their marriage as a matter of 
enforceable contract right. 
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Another public policy consideration is the fundamental 
principle that children cannot be bought and sold. This elemcmtary 
rule is stated in 67A CJS Parent and Child, § 16, P 201-202, as 
follows: 
states: 
"Parents have no property rights, in the 
ordinary sense of that term, in or to their 
minor children, and, accordingly, a parent's 
right of control or custody of a minor child 
is not a property right which may be bargained, 
sold, or otherwise disposed of." (Footnotes 
omi tted) 
15 Williston on Contracts, 3rd Edition, § l744A, p 88, 
"The sovereign has an interest in a minor 
child held superior even to that of the 
parent; hence, there is a public policy 
against the custody of such a child becoming 
a subject of barter." (Footnote omitted) 
In discussing the related problem of in fertiliza-
tion and implantation of the embryo in a second woman, the Executive 
Director of the Program in Law, Science and Medicine at Yale Law 
School, speculates that contracts for "surrogate gestation" are 
likely to be held non-enforceable and among her reasons cites the 
following; 
"In any case, the sale of children is illegal 
in all states; therefore, any contract by 
which a host-mother is paid a fee in excess 
of expenses to gestate the unborn child is 
likely to be held unenforceable as against 
public policy. That being the case, the 
'foster' or gestating mother would presumably 
be considered by most courts the natural 
mother of the child since she and not the 
donor-mother was willing to go through the 
inconvenience, discomfort, and dangers of 
pregnancy and childbirth. 
"It is highly unlikely that a judge, faced 
with a conflict between two women, one of 
whom has delivered the child and the other of 
whom 'should' have done so by normal means 
but who was too busy or disinterested, would 
resolve the issue of which is the true mother 
in any way other than by awarding parental 
status to the host-mother, contracts to the 
contrary notwithstanding. 
"Second, by statute in many states any adop-
tion release executed by the natural mother 
before the birth of a child is invalid. Even 
in those states that do not declare prenatal 
surrenders to be absolutely void, courts 
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appear to take a dim view of the validity of 
an adoption release signed prior to the birth 
of the child." Holder, Legal Issues in 
Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine (John 
Wiley & Song;-1977) pp 7, 8. 
Appellants often refer to Mary Roe's role as being that 
of a "surrogate Mother." This jargon serves to gloss over the 
fact that Mary Roe is the real mother, and Jane Doe would be a 
substitute (or surrogate) mother if she were permitted to adopt 
the child. 
Appellants attempt to distinguish their case from baby 
selling situations by pointing out that John Doe would be the 
natural father of the child, who is the subject of the monetary 
transaction. The fallacy in the Appellants' argument is that at 
the time of the formation of the contract, John Doe will not be 
related to the child, since the child does not yet exist. Appellants' 
calculated, clinical proposal defies comparison with situations 
where the custody and care of a child must be worked out by the 
parents, married or unmarried, who had the child in the course of 
their human non-commercial relationship. 
A third reason from a public policy standpoint why this 
agreement would be unenforceable is its potential for duress and 
overreaching through the exploitation of various relationships, 
such as the employment relationship in the case presented by the 
Does, and any other situation where one party has some control 
or authority over the other. See In Re Allon, 356 Mich 586; 97 
NW2d 744 (1959), wherein the court upheld the consent of a mother 
to the adoption of her child where there was no showing of the 
mother being subject to duress or overreaching. 
The proposed contract is likewise unenforceable because 
the subject matter is beyond the Court's competence to adjudicate. 
For example, if Mary Roe refused to perform, no court would grant 
specific performance by ordering her to accept artificial insem-
ination and to conceive and bear a child as a result. Nor would 
a court order John Doe to deliver his semen to a physician and to 
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arrange for artificial insemination of Mary Roe. Matters of 
custody and adoption after the birth would be determined by the 
Probate Court without respect to the proposed agreement. Thus, 
specific performance of the agreement would not be available to 
the parties. 
Actions for damages would lead the court into a welter 
of confusing relationships and claims. For example, if Mary Roe 
after several unsuccessful artificial insemination sessions, 
refused to continue, would she be liable to the Does for the in-
calculable loss of a child not yet conceived? What liability for 
damages would Mary Roe have if she deliberately terminated her 
pregnancy, or refused to give up the child to the custody and 
adoption of the Does after the birth? What damages/orders if one 
of the Does insists on custody and ado~)tion while the other 
refuses to perform - due to divorce, separation, abandonment, 
etc? \\lhat if either the Does or Mary Roe remove the child from 
the State and resist participating in any Michigan litigation 
concerning the child? 
Without specific legislative authorization of this type 
of transaction setting forth the legal rights and obligations of 
the various parties, the proposed transaction violates Michigan 
public policy. 
14 
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RELIEF REQUESTED 
For the reasons set forth herein, it is submitted that 
the proposed transaction is not based on constitutional rights of 
the Appellants and that it would violate the public policy of th~ 
State of Michigan. It"is further submitted that Appellants have 
failed to establish any of the criteria for review by this Court, 
e.g. major significance to the jurisprudence of this state, 
material injustice, or clear error on the part of the lower 
courts which upheld the constitutionality of the applicable 
statutes. Appellee Kelley therefore requests that the Court deny 
Appellants' "Application for Leave to Appeal to this Court. 
Dated: June 15, 1981 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANK J. KELLEY 
Attorney General 
Robert A. Derengoski 
Solicitor General 
Eugene Krasicky 
First Assistant Attorney General 
George M. Elworth 
Assistant Attorney General 
Suite 3, Plaza One Building 
401 S. Washington Square 
Lansing, Michigan 48933 
(517) 373-9100 
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su\t~eQucnl conviction !-'llalJ It(' ~l1ilty of :3 fdnn:.. 1'.A.l~39. 1'0. :!SS. c. X. ~ 6~. "cJ,l!·tl \'.' I'.A.l~7-!. :\i .. :!!I{;. ~ 1. ElL .lan. 1. }!17~ 
J Sections 1)(1.41. 7l0.5~. 
Tile t;UD.1cct matter of 1hn= f'ectlon 
covered by Janner ;;ection ";)U.H.. 
EXHIBIT B 
For dfcctl'\"(' UIlH' prO\"!!'<lon of 1·.A.19?~ 
~o. 2Si., f'lI;!e nole. (n1I(l ..... ·I111' l'EC'unn 71V.:: 
160 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 
Books, Articles -'\ 
Annotation, Legal Consequences of Human Artificial Insemination, 25 ALR3d 
1103-1112 (1969) 
Clark, Domestic Relations (West, 1968) 
Comment, Artificial Insemination - A Model Statute, 24 Cleveland State 
L Rev, 341-355 (1975) 
. Comment, Contracts to Bear a Child, 65 Cal L Rev, pp 611-622 (1978) 
. Hol der, Legal Issues in Pediatrics and Adolescent r~edici ne, (John Wiley & 
Sons, 1977) 
Kinney, Legal Issues of the New Reproductive Technologies, 52 Cal State 
Bar Journal, Nov/Dec 1977. pp 514-519 
Schlemer, Artificial Insemination and the Law, 32 Michigan State Bar 
Journal, pp 44-51 (March 1953) 
Smith, A Close Encounter of the First Kind: Artificial Insemination and 
an Enlightened Judiciary. 17 Journal of Fami Law, 41-47 (1978-79) 
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JAM!:!;;. H. LINCOLN 
1025 E. FOREST AVENUe 
DETROIT. MICHIGAN 4!32C'7 ERl"EST C. 80eHM 
IRA G, E,;UFf.iAN 
FRANK S. 52Y/.I"""SI 
JOSEP},1 J. Pi:R;.JICK 
WILUS F. WARD 
Y. GLADyr· BARSAMIAN 
THOMAS A. t.lAHEF< 
JUPC:;:[!j. or PilOOATE 
JVV[NILC DIVISION 
JUDC[S OF pnOZlA 
PRENTIS EDWARDS 
"I.eISTeR 
Harch 2, 1977 
To: Niss }Iarr,aret Pfeiffer 
From: JudGe James H. Lincoln .1 
Re: hrtificial insemin~tion case. 
Mr. Noel K~~ne, attorn2Y. 
Here is the sit~ation. 
""e '\,'cre requested by }!r~ Keune to respond to the following questions: 
Ansl,'er: 
Second: 
A murried couple suitable for udoptive parent~ wish to ado?t a child. 
The wife cannot hcve u child. The husband would be uscd to ~rtificial 
inseminate a non-related woman. 
Would the child born as a result of this arrangement be con~idered =s 
related to thc adopting p~rcnts so that the adopcinz parents could file 
with the Court for adoption without going to an adoption agency? 
:~y ans" .. er i::; yes! After considerable study and cunsultation I \·JQuld 
hold that it make::; no'difference ~hat mcans is used to i~?regnatc a 
woman. The father is the person who produced the spe.n that i~prcgna~cc 
t~e woman. He could even be held liable for support. 
Could the ~dopting par~nts pay the woman for having the child or consentiz 
to its adoption? 
No! The law clearly forbids this. 
Co~ld the adoptina parents pay the expenses of the ?re~nancy deliv~ry -
medical - h05pital - doctor - transportation to hospital - attorney 
fees, etc.7 
Ye5! lhe la~ permits this and it has bcen the custom of all Michi~an 
Probate C0urt to allow the payment of such expenditurcs. 
I personnlly ,~uld not be concerned ~ith p~rmittinG pa~nent of reasonable costs of 
transportation to hospital, etc., etc. ] do not care about the canner of :racs?o::, 
ation as 10~S as the expense was actually incurred. 
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Of course I ~ould not npprove ~iving a car, etc. That could be reGnrdec as 
payin3 the ·I.JO:r.::IIl. l\or would I permitp<l}"llent: of lost ""<lGes. 
~r. Keane vants me to approve expe~ditures as t~ey arise. 
COr.1.-:lcnt: 
1 will probably· not bl:: the Juc!ge' I,-ho· handles' this adoption. The petition raay 
not be filed until nfter the child is born - this ""ill be early in 1973. 
The Juc[.e \,ho handles the case will r.l3ke all the rulin£S nnd will deterrr.inc 
I.Jhat expenses to approve or disapprove. 
All that 1 c.:.n do is to give my opinion on all of these matters. 
Hy opillion is not bindi;).g on the Judge I~ho \,rill hear the petition. 
I 2ppreciate the [<lct th<lt Hr. Keane wishes to clear all matters for his clients 
prior to proceeding and I wish I were in a position to give him something·other 
than what I ~ould do if 1 were handling the petition. 
JHL:gm 
/l 4D ----fl 
. _ .. -. - '-)fr,. ~Yl ~Ji/j{.t '\ ~·L.~/l 
. ~!:\ 11. Ln:COU; , . 
~XECD'~VE JUDG~ 
. JUVENILE DIVISION 
EXHIBIT D 
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STATE OF MICHIGAN 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF WAYNE 
JANE DOE, JOHN DOE, and MARY ROE, 
JANE x., JOHN x., JANE Y., JOHN Y., 
JANE Z., and JOHN Z., pseudonyms 
,for actual persons, 
plaintiffs, 
-vs-
I 
FRANK J. KELLEY, Attorney General 
,for the State of Michigan, and 
WILLIAM L. CAHALAN, Wayne County 
Prosecutor, 
Defendants. 
HONORABLE ROMAN S. 
GRIBBS P-14369 
CIVIL ACTION 
NO. 78 815 531 cz 
OPINION DENYING PLAINTIFFS' HOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRAN'fING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
r • 
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STATE OF MICHIGAN 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF W1WNE 
JANE DOE, JOHN DOE, and MARY ROE, 
JANE X. I JOHN X., JANE Y., JOHN Y., 
JANE Z., and JOHN Z., pseudonyms 
for actual persons, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs--
FR~NK J. KELLEY, Attorney General 
for the State of Michigan, and 
WILLIAM L. CAHALAN, Wayne County 
Prosecutor, 
Defendants. 
________________________________1 
HONORABLE ROMAN S. 
GRIBBS P-14369 
CIVIL ACTION 
NO. 78 815 531 cz 
OPINION DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
On May IS. 1978, plaintiffs filed a Complaint for 
Declaratory Judgment in the Wayne County Circuit Court. Motions 
for summary judgment are brought by plaintiffs and defendants 
pursuant to GCR 1963, 117.2(3). 
The facts in this case are not in dispute. 
Plaintiffs, Jane and John Doe, are husband and wife. Jane Doe 
is biologically incapable of bearing children. The Does are 
joined in their complaint by Mary Roe. 
-1-
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The Does propose to have Mary Roe conceive a child 
with John Doe through artificial insemination administered by a 
physician. After birth, the Does would take custody of the 
child once he or she lea"es the hospital; and, Mary Roe would 
consent to the adoption of the child by the Does. Mary Roe 
would receive $5,000. plus medical expenses, from the Does for 
surrendering custody of her child to the Does and for consenting 
to the adoption. In addition, Mary Roe will be covered by sick leave 
pregnancy disability insurance, and medical insurance from her 
employment while she is off work having the child and 
recuperating from the delivery. 
The statutes whose constitutionality is involved 
in this matter are MCLA 710.54 and MCLA 710.69. The former 
provides, "as fo"llows:",; 
"Sec. 54. (1) Except for charges and fees 
approved by the court, a person shall not 
offer, give, or receive any money or other 
consideration or thing of value in 
connection with any of the following: 
"(a) The placing of a child for adoption. 
"(b) '1'he registration recording or 
communication of the existence of a child 
available for adoption or the existence of 
a person interested in adopting a child. 
"(c) A release. 
"(d) A consent. 
"(e) A petition. 
"2. Before the entry of the final order of 
adoption the petitioner shall file 'VIi th the 
court a sworn statement describing money or 
other consideration or thing of value paid to 
or exchanged by any part¥in the adoption 
proceeding, including anyone consenting to 
the adoption or adopting the adoptee, any 
relative of a party or of the adoptee, any 
physician, attorney, social worker or member 
of the clergy, and any other person, corporation, 
association, or other organization. The court 
shall approve or disapprove fees and expenses. 
-2-
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Acceptance or retention of amounts in 
excess of those approved by the court 
constitutes a violation of this section. 
"(3). To assure compliance with limitations 
imposed by this section, by section 14 of 
Act No. 116 of the Public Acts of 1973, being 
section 722.124 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, 
and by section 4 of Act No. 263 of the Public 
Acts of 1913, as amended, being section 
331.404 of the Michigan Compiled La,vs, the 
court may require sworn testimony from 
persons who were involved in any way in 
informing, notifying, exchanging information, 
identifying, locating, assisting, or in any 
other way participating in the contracts or 
arrangements \vhich, directly or indirectly, 
led to placement of the person for adoption." 
MCLA 610.69 provides: 
"Sec. 69. A person who violates any of the 
provisions of sections 41 and 54 of this 
chapter shall, upon conviction, be guilty 
of "a misdemeanor, and upon any subsequent 
conviction shall be guilty of a felony." 
Plaintiffs' suit seeks to have these statutes 
declared unconstitutional by this Court and to enjoin defendants 
1: from prosecuting plaintiffs for proceeding witl) the plan outlined 
above. 
Discussion 
Plaintiffs' constitutional challenge is basically 
two-pronged. Plaintiffs first urge that MCL..li. 710.54 is void for 
vagueness. Second, that the arrangement proposed by plaintiffs is 
within the constitutional "right of Contained YJithin 
'I 
that second contention are the propositions that the government 
does not have a compelling interest to invade that area of 
privacy and that the statute as drawn is not narJ.ow. 
-3-
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1. 
This Court does not agree with plaintiffs" first 
I contention that MCIJ\. 710.54 is void for vagueness. Plaintiffs 
are correct in asserting that a statute is violative of due 
·1 
" 
,! process if it proscribes conduct in terms so vague that a 
,j person of common intelligence must guess at the statute's 
meaning. connally v. General Construction co., 269 US 385, 
70 L Ed 322, 46 S ct 126 (1926). 
The dangers involved in the existence and enforce-
ment of a vague statute are set forth by Mr. Justice Marshall 
in Grayned v City of Rockford, 408 US 104, 33 L Ed 2d 222, 
92 S ct 2294 (1972) as follows: 
"It is a basic principle of due process that 
an enactment is void for vagueness if its 
prohibitions are not clearly defined. Vague 
laws offend several important values. First, 
because we assume that man is free to steer 
between lalrlful and unlawful conduct, we insist 
that laws give the person of ordinary intelli-
gence a reasonable opportunity to know what is 
prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. 
Vague laws may trap the innocent by not 
providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement is to be 
prevented, laws must provide explicit standards 
for those who apply them. A vague law 
impermissibly delegates basic policy matters 
to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution 
on an ad hoc and SUbjective basis, with the 
attendant dangers of arbitrary and d 
application. Third, but related, where 
vague statute abuts upon sensitive areas of 
basic first amendment freedoms, it operates 
to inhibit the exercise of those freedoms. 
Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens 
to steer far wider of the unlawful zone 
than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were 
clearly marked." 
-4-
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'I In Grayned, Justice Marshall also enunciated a 
,I 
I ~; problem involved in all statutes I even those not void for 
" 
ii vagueness. "Condemned to the use of words, we can never expect 
,l 
,I 
! 
mathematical certainty from our language." 
In a footnote to Grayned, the Court cited 
:i Communications Assoc. v Doreds, 339 us 3.82, 94 L Ed 925, 
70 s ct 674 (1950), in which the Court stated: 
"There is little doubt that imagination 
can conjure up hypothetical cases in which 
the meaning of these terms will be in nice 
question. The applicable standard, however, 
is not one of wholly consistent academic 
definition of abstract terms. It is, rather, 
the practical criterion of fair notice to 
those to \lIhom the statute is directed. 
The particular context is all important." 
The statute in the instant case is as specific as is 
necessary to give fair notice to those to whom the statute is 
directed. 
Plaintiffs question the of the phrase 
"or other consideration or thing of value" used in the statute. 
Even standing alone, this phrase is sufficiently specific to 
give fair notice to persons of reasonable intelligence wha'c 
things may not be given in connection with the acts or items 
listed in (a)-(e) of MCIJ\ 710.54(1). The meaning of that phrase 
is even more specifically defined when it follows the only 
specific item listed, money. The well-established 
of ejusdem generis is pertinent to plaintiffs' contention of 
, statutory vagueness. As the Court stated in :::"==:......:~.-:::;~:.o::.~~=.::::~, 
541 F 2d 949 (1976): 
,I 
:1 
" 
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"Where general terms in a statute follovl an 
enumeration of terms with specific meaning, 
the general terms can be expected to apply 
to matters similar to those specified." 
(Citations omitted) 
It is not necessary that the statute list all 
conceivable items of value to be constitutionally specific. 
II. 
Plaintiffs' second basis for urging the constitu-
tional infirmity of the statutes is that they invade plaintiffs' 
constitutional right of privacy and further that the statutes 
do not comply with the requirements of compelling s·tate interest 
and the narrow drafting required of statutes regulating an act 
within the right of privacy. Before addressing the latter two 
points, it must first be determined that I proposed 
agreement is within the constitutional right of privacy. 
That there exists a fundamental right of privacy is 
well established. The origins of this right were set forth in 
Roe v. Wade, 410 us 113, 35 L Ed 2d 147, 93 S Ct 705 (1973), as 
follows; 
"The Constitution does not exp1ic mention 
any right of privacy. In a line of decisions, 
however, going-back perhaps as far as 
Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 us 250, 
251, 35 L Ed 734, 11 S Ct 1000 (1891), the 
Court has recognized that a of 
privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or 
zones of privacy, does exist under the 
Constitution. In contexts, the Court 
or individual Justices have, indeed, found at 
least the roots of that in the First 
Amendment; in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 
in the penumbras of the Bill 
in the concept of the 
first section of the Fourteenth AmendmenL 
(Citations omitted) 
-6-
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In stating that only "fundamental" rights are 
included within the right of privacy, Roe acknowledged that 
,; activities relating to marriage, procreation, 
:j 
!: 
relationships and child rearing and education are included in 
:: guarantee of personal privacy. 
" 
, 
" 
II 
j 
II The right which plaintiffs assert is specific, 
the 
narrow and is not of the same personal nature that the constitu-
tional right of privacy protects. Plaintiffs only attack the 
sections of the Michigan Adoptive Code that prohibits the 
exchange of money or other valuable cons idera tion. Although 
'I 
:; plaintiffs seek to exclude governmental interference with 
reference to a portion of the adoption statutes, they do not want 
to exclude the government altogether. They vlish to avail them-;: 
selves of other portions of the Code in order 
i, to effect a legal adoption. Plaintiffs intend to utilize other 
protective provisions of the adoption law; i.e., total control of 
the child's welfare as legal parents, preserving the rights of 
'i 
'I 
inheritance of the child, etc. The right to adopt a child 
based upon the payment of $5,000 is not a fundamental personal 
right and reasonable regulations controlling proceed 
that prohibit the exchange of money (other than and fees 
approved by the Court) are not cons infirm. 
It is this Court's opinion that a contract to use the 
statutory of the Probate Court to effect the 
of a child wherein such contract ij for valuable compensa-
tion, is not deserving of, nor is it within the constitutional 
-7-
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:protection of the right of privacy as defined by the many cases 
i 
i 
:I of the United States Supreme Court. 
III. 
Although the foregoing makes further discussion 
unnecessary, this Court will assume, arguendO, that the consti-
q. . . d 1 1 . I tutJ.onal rJ.ght of prJ.vacy oes app Y to the p aJ.ntiffs and proceed 
to the ancillary issues. 
First, even if the constitutional right of privacy 
is applicable, such right is not absolute. It must be considered 
iagainst important state interests in regulation. Roe v. Wade. 
supra. In determining the constitutionality of l:egulations, the 
. Roe Court set forth the following test: 
"Where certain 'fundamental rights' are 
involved, the Court has held that regulation 
limiting these rights may be justified only 
by a 'compelling state interest,' and that 
legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn 
to express only the legitimate state 
interests at stake." (Citations omitted) 
The State's interest expressed in the statutes at 
issue here is to prevent commercialism from affecting a mother's 
'decision to execute a consent to the adoption of her child . 
.' ,. 
I Al though the case is distinguishable on the facts from the 
: present case, the statement of the rule by the Supreme 
Court of Kansas in In re Shirk'S Estate, 350 P 2d 1 (1960). is 
applicable here. 
-8-
.; f 
I 
, 
.j 
ii 
:1 
i 
174 
"consequently, this controversy resolves 
itself down to the question whether the 
contract with respect to the mother's 
rights violated public policy. It is 
fundamental that parents may not barter 
or sell their children nor may they demand 
pecuniary gain as the price of consent to 
adoptions. This is so inherent in the 
fabric of American lav, that citation of 
authority is unnecessary." 
"Baby bartering" is against the public policy of 
this State and the State's interest in preventing such conduct 
is sufficiently compelling and meets the test set forth in Roe. 
Mercenary considerations used to create a parent-
child relationship and its impact upon the family unit strikes at 
the very foundation of human society and is patently and 
" injurious to the community. 
!! 
It is a fundamental principle that children should 
not and cannot be bought and sold. The sale of children is 
illegal in all states. The brief of the Attorney General cites 
this elementary rule in 67A CJS §16, P 201-202, 
as follows: 
"Parents have no property rights, in the 
ordinary sense of that term, in or to their 
minor children, and, accordingly, a parent's 
right of control or custody of a minor 
child is not a property right which may be 
bargained, sold or otherwise disposed of." 
(Footnotes omitted) 
The leading and recognized authority on Contracts, 
Professor Samuel Williston, writes that for a child is 
I~ and has been t public He states in 15 
~ontracts, 3rd Edition, Section 1744A, p 88: 
-9-
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"The sovereign has an interest in a minor 
child held superior even to that of the parent; 
hence, there is a public policy against the 
custody of such a child becoming a subject 
of barter." (Footnote omitted) 
" The Attorney General cogently argues t11at contracts 
'I 
:j for "surrogate gestation" are against public policy" He quotes 
the Executive Director of the Program in Law, Science and 
!i 
Medicine in Yale I,aw School, who stated: 
"In any case, the sale of children is illegal 
in all states; therefore, any contract by 
which a host-mother is paid a fee in excess 
of expenses to gestate the unborn child is 
likely to be held unenforceable as against 
public policy. That being the case, the 
'foster' or gestating mother would presumably 
be considered by most courts the natural 
mother of the child since she and not the 
donor-mother was willing to go through tl1e 
inconvenience, discomfort, and dangers of 
pregnancy and childbirth. 
"It is highly unlikely that a I faced 
with a conflict between two women, one of 
whom has delivered the child and the other 
of whom 'should' have done so by normal 
means but who'YJas too busy or disinterested, 
would resolve the issue of which is the true 
mother in any way other than by awarding 
parental status to the host-mother, contracts 
to the contrary notwithstanding. 
"Second, by statute in many states any adoption 
release executed by the natural mother 
the birth of a child is invalid. Even in 
those states that do not declare prenatal 
surrenders to be absolutely 
appear to take a dim view of 
an adoption release signed 
of the child." Holder, 
Pediatrics and Adolescent 
Wiley & Sons, 1977} pp 7, 
" 
, f 
void, courts 
the validity of 
to the birth 
! ' 
176 
The evils attendant to the mix of lucre and the 
adoption process are self-evident and the temptations of 
"in "money market babies" exist whether the be strangers 
'I 
'or friends. 'fhe statute seeks to prevent a money market for the 
i , 
adoptlon of babies. The defendant prosecuting attorney concedes 
'that the plaintiff natural mother (Roe) and the plaintiff couple 
II 
I C (Doe) are free to "conveive a child, bear it, and raise it as 
they agree among themselves because these acts are guaranteed 
! 
by the right to privacy." The defendant prosecuting attorney 
argues perceptively when he asks: 
i 
How much money will it t,ake for: 
" 
'a particular mother's will to be overborne, and when does her 
decision turn from "voluntary" to "involuntary." 
In their brief and in oral argument plaintiffs 
vigorously argue that they are in this Court motivated 'by good 
will and with the best of intentions seek the Court' s approval of 
·their proposed course of action. The at.torney 
pointedly responds as follows: 
"Plaintiffs seek to convince this court that 
the 'surrogate' mother would [act] out'of 
altruistic rather than pecuniary motives. 
If that were so, no monetary payment would 
be necessary because under MCh~ 710.54 she 
can still be reimbursed for fees and expenses. 
What plaintiffs seek is t.o provide her "lith 
a sum of money ($5,000) over and above the 
reasonable expenses she has incurred. Even 
if some of this money goes for 
expenses unrecognized by MCLA 710.54, the fact: 
remains t.hat the primary purpose of this money 
is to encourage women to volunteer to be 
-11-
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'surrogate' mothers. Plaintiffs have 
initiated this lawsuit because few women 
would be willing to volunteer the use of 
their bodies for nine months if the only 
thing they gained was the joy of 
someone else happy by letting that couple 
adopt and raise her child. Thus, contrary to 
plaintiffs' exhortations, in all but the 
rarest of situations, the money plaintiffs 
seek to pay the 'surrogate' mother is 
intended as an inducement for her to conceive 
a child she would not normally want to 
conceive, carry for nine months a child she 
would not normally want to carry, give birth 
to a child she would not normally want to 
give birth to and then, because of this 
monetary reward, relinquish her parental 
rights to a child that she bore. " 
The personal desires and intentions of 
are not in question, and their good faIth is conceded. None the-
less, public policy is established to guide all of the people 
of this State, of whatever intent. 
A desire to change the established stated public 
policy that meets constitutional muster is addressed to I 
the legislature and not to the courts. 
IV. 
As to the second part of the Roe test, it is the 
opinion of this CO\lrt that the statutes here in question are 
drawn sufficiently narrmv so as to comply with the test. The 
statute must be drawn so as to express only the timate 
interest of the State and no other. If other interests, as 1rJell 
as the State's compelling interest, are by the statute, 
then the statute must fall. Here the statute is aimed at 
compensation as consideration an adoption 
-12-
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Plaintiffs urge that their arrangement is not the 
type of action which the statute contemplated or intended to 
proscribe 0 The fact that this is not a contract among strangers, 
or that one of the adoptive parents would also be a natural 
parent, does not alter the fact that the action prohibited 
compensation in an adoption proceeding; that money, 
beyond court-approved charges and fees, must be paid to the 
biological mother before the parties ,""ill strike an agreement. 
The statute is clear in expressing the public policy 
of this State that all persons involved in offering, giving or 
! receiving anything of value in connection with an adoption are 
controlled by the statutes proscriptions. Neither the relation-
of persons involved nor the arrangements between the 
are an exception but clearly all such actions are 
proscribed. 
Conclusion 
For the above-stated reasons, it is the conclusion 
of this Court that MCLA 710.54 and 710069 do not violate the 
provisions of the Constitution. In addition, it is clear that 
! 
i 
there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact Accordingly, 
: pursuant to GCR 1963,11702(3), plaintiffs' Motion for Summary-
I 
Judgment must be DENIED and defendants' Motion for Summary 
J"udgment must be GRANTED as a matter of lawo 
! 
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:1 
Pursuant to the provisions of GCR 1963, 522, counsel 
I, 
·'are to present a proposed judgment consistent with this 
:j 
within ten days of this date. 
;\ 
,j 
,I 
!f 
i 
:1 
_"' DATED: January 28, 1980 
Detroit, Michigan 
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JANE DOE, JOHN DOE, and FlARY ROE, 
JANE X., .:JOHN X., JANE Y., JOHN Y., 
JANE Z., and JOHN Z., Pseudonyms for 
actual persons, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
05 
v No. 50380 
FRANK J, KELLEY, Attorney General for the 
State of Michigan, and WILLIAM L. CAHALAN, 
Wayne County Prosecutor, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
Before: V.J. Brennan, P.J., and M.J. Kelly and D.C. 
M. J. Kelly, J. 
, JJ. 
In this case, we are asked to declare unconstitutional 
those sections of the l'iichigan .Adoption Code, MCL 710.54; 
MSA 27.3178 (555.54) and MCL 710.69; MSA 27.3178 (555.69). which 
prohibit the exchange of money or other consideration in 
1 
connection with adoption and related proceedings. The plaintiffs 
v 
appeal of right from a January 29, 1980 opinion of the lower court, 
denying their motion for sOOilllary judgment under GCR 1963, 117.2(3) 
I 
and granting the defendants' own motion under the same rule. The 
parties are in agreement as to the pertinent facts in this decision. 
Jane Doe and John Doe are pseudonyms for a married couple 
residing in Wayne County. In response to posed by 
the Attorney General concerning the Doe's and whether any 
children were born of the marriage, the Does filed virtually 
identical affidavits stating the following information: 
"2. That he [shel was married in the of 
Michigan, on August 20, 1965. 
"3. That he [she] is the father [mother] of two sons 
ages eleven and seven years." 
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From the nonresponsive answer to question #3, we are unable to 
say whether the two children were born of the Does' marriage or 
are adopted. 
It is alleged that Jane.Doe has undergone a tubal ligation, 
rendering her incapable of bearing children and that 
the Does "wish to have a child biologically related to JOHN DOE". 
Nary Roe is employed as a secretary by John Doe and also resides in 
vvayne County. The complaint alleges that these parties contemplate 
and intend to enter into the following agreement: 
"(a) That JANE DOE and JOHN DOE will pay ~1ARY ROE a sum 
of money in consideration for her promise to bear and deliver 
JOHN DOE's child by means of artificial insemination. 
"(b) That a licensed physician will conduct the artificial 
insemination process. 
"(c) That prior to the delivery of said child, JOHN DOE 
will file a notice of intent to claim paternity. 
(d) That at the time the child is born. JOHN DOE will 
formally acknowledge the paternity of said child. 
" (e) That r'lARY ROE will acknowledge that JOHN DOE is the 
father of said child. 
" (f) That AARY ROE will consent to the adoption of said 
child by ,JOHN DOE and JANE DOE". 
The agreemen"t also provided that would pay to t1ary Roe 
the sum of $5,000 plus medical expenses. In addition, tiary Roe 
will be covered by sick leave, pregnancy disability insurance, and 
medical insurance from her employment while she is off work having 
the child and recuperating from the delivery. 
The 
I 
allege that the disputed statutory provisions 
impermissibly infringe upon their constitutional right to privacy. 
This right, first recognized in Griswold v .:::.:::.:::::c:.:.-=-:=-:":::':::: 381 us 479; 
85 S Ct 1678; 14 L Ed 2d 510 (1965), was more recently described in 
v 431 US 678, 97 S Ct 
2010; 52 L Ed 2d 675 (1977). In the Court specifically held 
that the decision "whether or not to bear or beget a child" "VJas 
2 
among those protected by the constitutional right of 
See also v us S Ct 65 L Ed 2d 784 
(1980) {'"The constitutional underpinning of Wade was a 
-2-
" 
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that the 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment includes not only the freedoma: 
mentioned in the Bill of Rights, but also a freedom of personal 
choice in certain matters of and life". ) 
While the decision to bear or beget a child has thus been 
found to be a fundamental interest protected by the right of 
see v . 432 US 464; 97 S Ct 2376; 53 L Ed 2d 484 (1977), 
we do not view this right as a valid to state interference 
in the plaintiffs' contractual arrangement. The statute in question 
does not directly prohibit John Doe and Mary Roe from having the 
child as planned. It acts instead to preclude ffs from 
paying consideration in conjunction with their use of the state's 
adoption procedures. In effect, the plaintiffs' contractual agree-
ment discloses a desire to use the adop-tion code to change the legal 
status of the child--i.e .• its right to support, intestate 
successsion, etc. We do not this goal as within the realm 
of fundamental interests protected by the right to from 
reasonable governmental 
The plaintiffs also allege that the state has no compelling 
interest sufficient to j the prohibitions embodied in the 
disputed statutes and, in addition, that the are drawn 
too wide to reflect any l~gitimate state interests in this area. 
Our disposition of the foregoing issue however, renders consideration 
of this issue unnecessary. 
Affirmed. 
3-
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1 The statutory provisions sought to be declared invalid 
provide: 
"Sec. 54. (1) Except for charges and fees approved by 
the court, a person shall not offer, give, or receive any money 
or other consideration or thing of value in connection with any 
of the fdllowing: 
"Ia) The placing of a child for adoption. 
" (b) The , recording, or communication of 
the existence of a child available for adoption or the existence 
of a person interested in adopting a child. 
Ii (c) A release. 
(d) A consent. 
"(e) A pe"tition. 
"(2) Before the entry of the final order, the petitioner 
shall file with the court a swon1statement describing money or other 
consideration or thing of value paid to or exchanged by any party in 
the adoption proceeding, including anyone consenting to the adoption 
or adopting the adoptee, any relative of a party or of the adoptee, 
any physician, attorney, social worker or member of the clergy, and 
any other person, corporation, association, or other organization. 
The court shall approve or disapprove fees and expenses. Acceptance 
or retention of amounts in excess of those approved by the court 
constitutes a violation of this section. 
" (3) 'ro assure compliance with limitations imposed by this 
section, section 14 of Act No. 116 of the Public Acts of 1973, 
being 722.124 of the IiJichigan Compiled Laws, and by section 
4 of Act No. 263 of the Public Acts10f 1913, as amended, being 
section 331.404 of the Michigan compiled Laws, the court may require 
from persons who were involved in way in 
f exchanging ill formation f , locating I 
assisting, or in any other way participating in the contracts or 
arrangements which, directly or indirectly, led to placement of the 
person for adoption." 
* * * 
·Sec. 69. A person who violates any of the provisions of 
sections 41 and 54 of thi~ chapter shall, upon conviction, be guilty 
of a misdemeanor, and upon any subsequent conviction shall be guilty 
of a felony." 
2 Court summarized those previous decisions in 
which 0 privacy prohibited unwarranted governmental 
interference or regulation and which compelled the Court's conclusion 
as to the right to bear children: 
"Although '[tlhe constitution does not mention 
any of privacy,' the Court has recognized that one aspect of 
the • I protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is 'a of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain 
areas or zones of privacy.' Roe v Wade, 410 US 113 152, 35 L Ed 2d 
147, 93 S Ct 705 (1973). This-right of personal includes 
'the interest in independence in making certain 
decisions.' 429 US 589, 599-600, 51 L Ed 2d S 
ct 869 (1977). outer limits of this aspect of 
not been marked by the Court, it is clear that among the 
that an individual may make without unjustified government interference 
: 
184 
! '. 
are personal decisions 'relating to marriage, 
338 US 1, 12, [lB L Ed 2d 1010, 87 S Ct 1817] 
Skinner v 316 US 535, 541-542, [86 L Ed 
1110] (19 Eisenstadt v Baird, 
, 454, [31 L S Ct 1029]; id., at 460 
Ed 2d 349 ' 9] '(White, J., ; 
v , 166, [ 88 L Ed 
~"""',....-,~ 4) and education, v 
US 510, 535, [69 L 1070, 45 S , 
v Nebraska, [262 US 390, 399 (1923)1, [67 
~~.~ ALR 1446].' Roe v at 152-
147, 9 S Ct 705. See also 
414 US 632, 639-640, .~-=~~~~~,-~.-
126 (1974)." 
,\, 
, ,-j. 
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STATE OF MICHIGAN 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF WAYNE 
GEORGE SYRKOWSKI , 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
CORINNE APPLEYARD, 
Defendant, 
and 
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE 
OF MICHIGAN, 
Intervenor. 
and 
ROGER APPLEYARD, 
Intervenor. 
____________________________ 1 
OPINION 
HONORABLE ROMAN S. 
GRIBBS P-14369 
CIVIL ACTION 
NO. 81 122 683 DP 
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STATE OF MICHIGAN 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF WAYNE 
GEORGE SYRKOI.;rSKI, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
CORINNE A PPLE'"fARD , 
Defendant, 
and 
ATTORl'l"EY GENERAL FOR THE STATE 
OF MICHIGAN, 
Intervenor, 
and 
ROGER APPLEYARD, 
Intervenor. 
OPINION 
HONORABLE ROMAN S. 
GRIBBS P-14369 
CIVIL ACTION 
NO. 81 122 683 DP 
The Attorney GeneraL as intervening party, has filed, 
pursuant to GCR 1963, 116,1(1) and (2), the motion sub judice 
for a summary dismissal of these proceedings on the basis that 
the Court lacks jurisdiction over the parties and the 
matter of the plaintiff's complaint. Intervention by the Attorne 
General was permitted because the issues raised by the 
party's pleadings involve significant matters of State interest 
and public policy. See GCR 1963, 209.1, 1919 PA 232, Sec li 
MCLA 14.101; I>1SA 3.211. R.S. 1847, ch 12, Sec ~8; MCLA 14.281 
MSA 3.181. 
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Summary disposition of plaintiff's complaint is 
warranted under the circumstances presented to the Court. This 
1 Court, today, decides that the Paternity Act was not intended, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
! 
'I I' 
,I 
IJ II II 
II I I, 
I, 
'II 
'I II 
II 
Ii 
I 
I 
I 
! 
and cannot be used, as a mechanism to establish the 
rights of a semen donor in a "surrogate parent arrangement". 
Neither the laws nor the public policy of the State of 
permit the direct or indirect judicial recognition and enforce-
ment of "surrogate mother" contracts. The social wisdom and 
recognition of such agreements are matters of 1ative 
concern and not for judicial pre-emption. 
In June, 1981, plaintiff filed a 
under the Paternity }\.ct, MCLA 722.711 et seq, alleging that 
defendant Corinne Appleyard was pregnant with a child conceived 
by him on March 23, 24 or 25, 1981. 
In July, 1981. defendant Corinne Appleyard (the 
surrogate mother) admitted the allegations of the complaint, 
and asked the Court for an appropriate order of filiation 
adjudging the plaintiff to be the natural and father of 
her child. 
Thereafter, the parties proposed a consent order of 
filiation which requests the Court to declare that: (1) tiff 
Syrkowski is the natural. legal father~ (2) 
is awarded custody and is responsible for care, support and 
education of the expected child; (3) the expected child's birth 
-2-
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I ,I certificate shall show plaintiff Syrkowski as the father; and 
(4) plaintiff Syrkowski may specify the child's surname. 
In support of the proposed consent order was an 
affidavit of a physician verifying the artificial insemination 
of defendant Corinne Appelyard and an affidavit of Mr. and Mrs. 
Appelyard relative to the artificial insemination and their 
abstention from sexual intercourse during this period. 
In support of the motion for accelerated judgment, 
the Attorney General argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction 
over these parties under the Paternity Act because the pleadings 
indicate that a child is being born to a married couple through 
artificial insemination of the wife with the husband's consent. 
Pursuant to the Michigan Public Health Code, MCLA 333.3821(6) 
and Michigan Probate Code, MCLA 700.111(2), the Attorney General 
argues that the child born to Corinne Appleyard as a result of 
artificial insemination is presumed to be the legitimate child 
of her marriage because Roger Appleyard consented to the 
insemination. The Attorney General contends that the consent is 
manifested in the affidavits filed in this matter which assert 
voluntary and willing abstention from sexual intercourse by 
defendant and her husband for six weeks before and four weeks 
after insemination. 
Though the Attorney General's claim for summary relief 
has merit. this argument advanced in support thereof is untenable. 
Basically, his position is that the child conceived by and 
-3-
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I 1 
il born of the defendant during marriage is conclusively presumed 
/1 to be the legitimate child of the defendant and her husband. 
Neither the law nor the facts in this particular case support 
this proposition. The statutes cited raise presumptions that 
are clearly subject to rebuttal. 
Upon the initial filings, counsel for plaintiff and 
defendant advised this Court in chambers that substantial sums 
of· money were to be paid by plaintiff to defendant for bearing 
the child and, upon birth, relinquishing custody to plaintiff. 
To the extent that money or other consideration is being 
furnished by plaintiff Syrkowski to defendant Appleyard in this 
"surrogate parent arrangement", the Attorney General argues 
that I'Hchigan public policy is being violated. In support of 
this contention, it cites this Court's opinion in 
Attorney General et aI, Wayne Circuit Court No. 78 815 531 ce, 
dated January 28, 1980, Affirmed, 106 Mich App 169 (1981). 
Based on the foregoing arguments, the Attorney 
General submits that the petition for order of filiation filed 
by plaintiff in this matter is beyond the scope of the Paternity 
Act. 
1. The Court has been apprised that the defendant gave 
birth to a female child On November 22, 1981. 
-4-
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To the contrary, counsel for plaintiff argues first 
" :I that the Paternity Act permits the Court to determine paternity 
I under these circumstances. Secondly. it is the plaintiff's 
II 
position that MCLA 333.3821(6) and MCLA 700.111(2) were designed 
for an infertile husband who submits to his wife's insemination 
I so that the child shall not be designated as an illegitimate 
I child. Plaintiff argues that he did not consent to his wife's II insemination and in support of this contention offers his 
! affidavit and "Statement of Non-Consent". 
I 
At the outset, it should be noted that this appears 
plaintiff and defendant is whether the Paternity Act may be 
utilized as a procedural device to validate a contract for a 
I 
I 
I "surrogate parent arrangement". Stated another way, was the I Act intended to establish a procedure to determine and legalize 
II II 
II 
II 
II 
I 
I 
the paternity of a child born to a "surrogate mother" who was 
voluntarily impregnated with male semen solely for the purpose 
of relinquishing the child to the semen donor and his wife 
under a pre-existing agreement. The Paternity Act is silent 
on its face with regard to such a situation. Thus, this Court 
is obligated to ascertain and give effect to the intention of 
the Legislature in determining whether the Paternity Act was 
intended to encompass such circumstances. 
-5-
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Under the general rules of statutory construction, 
Ii it has been said: 
'I Ii 
II 
II 
II 
Ii 
Ii 
Ii 
II 
II 
"There is always a tendency * * * to construe 
statutes in the light in which they appear 
when the construction is given. It is easy 
to be wise after one sees the results of 
experience. The true rule is that statutes 
are to be construed as they were intended 
to be understood when they were passed. 
Statutes are to be read in the light of 
attendant conditions and the state of the law 
existent at the time of their enactment. 
The words of a statute must be taken in the 
sense in which they were understood at the 
time when the statute was enacted." Wayne 
County Commissioners v Wayne County Clerk, 
293 Mich 229 (1940); Powers v City of Troy, 
380 Mich 160 (1968). (Underscoring supplied) 
Accordingly, the Court must determine the purpose of the enactment 
in light of the circumstances existent in 1956 when the 
Act was enacted. 
II The Paternity Act and its predecessor the "Bastardy 
I; Act" were enacted to impose financial responsibility of 
" Ii illegitimate children upon those who fathered them and to 
I 
If protect the children from becoming a public charge. People v 
I' 
\1 Stoeckl. 347 Mich 1 (1956); Sutfin v People. 43 Mich 37 (1880); 
I I Waite v Washington, 44 Mich 388 (1880). This intention is 
manifested in the preamble to the Act, which provides: 
"An Act to confer upon circuit courts 
jurisdiction over proceedings to compel 
and provide support of children born out 
of wedlock; to prescribe the procedure for 
determination of such liability; to 
authorize agreements providing for furnish-
ing of such support and to provide for the 
enforcement thereof; and to prescribe 
penalties for the violation of certain 
provisions of this act." 
-6-
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Pursuant to the Act, this Court has jurisdiction over 
paternity proceedings for the limited purpose of determining 
financial responsibility for a child "born out of wedlock". 
Plaintiff's petition requests this Court to go beyond this 
limited purpose--it asks this Court to recognize and endorse 
the terms of a "surrogate parent arrangement" by declaring 
that plaintiff is the legal and natural father of a child 
conceived through artificial insemination of a surrogate. 
A careful reading of this Act reveals that there is no indicia 
of legislative history or intent that when the Paternity Act 
was enacted (1956), or any time ?rior thereto, the Legislature 
intended it to apply to the situation presented herein. 
Further, no amendment to the Act has altered the general 
purpose and intent of the Act to such a degree that it encom-
II passes the circumstances in this case. 
I' 
II 
'I 
I 
II 
'I 
The legal and public policy considerations associated 
with the relief requested by plaintiff, and from surrogate 
arrangements in general, clearly go beyond the scope of the 
Paternity Act and the jurisdiction of this Court. Existing 
authority demonstrates that "surrogate parent arrangements" 
are contrary to public policy. See, discussion in v 
Attorney General et ai, supra, wherein the Court held that any 
contract by which a mother is paid a fee to bear a child is 
violative of public policy. If changes in the law and changes in 
the established public policy are warranted, such changes are 
il 
II 
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II primarily within the province of the legislative and executive 
II 
'I branches of the State of Michigan. 
Ii If the State of Michigan is.ultimately going to 
recognize "surrogate parent arrangements", comprehensive 
legislation is needed to resolve profound societal concerns 
relating to the rights, obligations and interests of all parties 
affected by the arrangements. In passing, it may be observed 
that steps have been taken to introduce legislation dealing with 
the subject of surrogate parenthood 2 . This Court cannot circum-
vent by jUdicial fiat the legislative process by enlarging the 
intended scope of the Paternity Act to encompass circumstances 
never contemplated thereby. 
Based on the foregoing, it is the opinion of this 
Court that the relief requested in plaintiff's petition is 
I beyond the scope and purpose of the Paternity Act in light of 
I the factual setting upon which the complaint is based. 
I Accordingly. this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction in 
I 
l.thiS matter and intervenor's, the Attorney General, motion for 
i 
I accelerated jUdgment is granted. 
I 
I 
2. House Bill 5184 was introduced on October 26, 1981, 
and seeks to amend the Probate COde to "govern 
surrogate parenthood". 
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il 
:1 Pursuant to GCR 1963. 522, counsel for intervenor, 
iI II Attorney General. is to present an oreer for entry by thi~ 
II Court consistent with the above opinion. 
I 
I 
I 
DATED: November 25, 1981 
Detroit, Michigan 
~/ , / ./ 
-r{ ~ _ ~ ; L-;CW;~U~T JUDGE 
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FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT 
DIVISION NO. ~ 
CIVIL ACTIOH NO. 
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, EX REL. 
STEVEN L. BESHEAR, ATTORNEY GENERAL 
and STEVEN L. BESHEAR, ATTORNEY 
GENERAL 
vs. 
SURROGATE PARENTING 
ASSOCIATES, INCORPORATED 
COMPLAINT 
Serve: Karen M. Zena 
Suite 222 
Ji;IUED 
MAR 121981 
Doctors Office Building 
250 Eas t Liberty Street EUN'CE MOORE 
Louisville, Ken~ucky 40Q'11I franklin Circuit Court 
PLAINTIFFS 
DEFENDANT 
Comes now the Plaintiff', Commonwealth of Kentucky, ex rel. 
Steven L. Beshear, Attorney General, and Steven L. Beshear, 
Attorney General, by counsel, and pursuant to KRS 271A.470 and 
415.010 brings his complaint for the involuntary dissolution 
of the Defendant, Surrogate Parenting As'sociates, Inc. and states 
as follows: 
(1) Plaintiff, Steven L. Beshear, is the duly elected, 
qualified and acting Attorney; ·General of the Commonwealth of 
Kentucky, and brings this act~on in his· official capacity as 
chief law officer of the Commonwealth and for and on behalf of 
the Commonwealth, its citizen$, residents and taxpayers. 
I 
(2) The Defendant, Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc. 
! 
is a domestic corporation doing business in Kentucky and organized 
, 
pursuant to KRS Chapter 271A.: (A true and correct copy of the 
Articles of Incorporation are· attached hereto,made a part hereof 
and marked Exhibit A). 
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(J) The Defendant, Surrogate Parenting Associates, 
Inc. ,Lit fllrthc~rance of its stated business purpose of operating 
il wcdical clinic designed to assist infertile couples in ob-
taining a child through the process of artificial insemination 
of a surrogate mother has in the past and continues to enter 
into contracts for monetary consider~tion to the president of 
the Defendant, Richard M. Levin, M.D., with couples who arc 
seeking a surrogate mother for the selection of a suitable sur-
rogate mother to be artifically inseminated with the semen of 
the infertile wife's husband. (A true and correct copy of a 
sample contract is attached hereto and made a part hereof and 
marked Exhibit B). 
(4) The Defendant, Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc., 
has in the past and continues to prepare and furnish contracts 
to be entered into by and between the surrogate and the surrogate's 
husband and the natural father by which the parties agree that 
the surrogate will be artifically inseminated with the semen of 
the natural father by the president of the Defendant, Richard M. 
Le~in, M.D., and further that the surrogate and her husband agree 
that on the fifth day after delivery, or as soon thereafter as 
is medically possible, the surrogate and her husband will insti-
tute proceedings to terminate their parental rights to the child. 
The agreement further states that monetary consideration will 
be paid to the surrogate by the natural father upon entry of 
judgment terminating the parental rights of the surrogate and 
-2-
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the surrogate's husband, such consideration to be in an escrow 
ilccoul1L at the Lime of the signing of the agreement until the 
duties anu obligations of the surrogate and her husband are 
fulfilleu. (A true and correct copy of,a sample contract is 
attached hereto and made a part hereof and marked Exhibit C). 
(5) The Plaintiff, Steven L. Beshear, Attorney General, 
for the Commonwealth of Kentucky hereby states affirmatively 
that said contracts heretofore designated as Exhibits B ilnu C 
are in contravention of the laws and public policy of this 
Commonwealth as enunciated by and through the duly elected legis-
lative body of this Commonwealth. 
(6) The Plaintiff, Steven L. Beshear, Attorney General, 
for the ComE10nwealth of Kentucky, hereby further states affirma-
tively that regardless of the approach taken, or type of contract 
or agreement drawn for use and executed, that one or more of the 
following statutory provisions ~vill be violated: KRS 199.500(5), 
KRS 199.601(2), KRS 199.590(2), KRS 199.990(4),(5); that these 
violations are in addition to the proscription engendered by a 
strong public policy against the buying and selling of children; and 
that no 3l1Ch contract or agreement relating to surrogate parent-
hood in Kentucky is legal and enforceable. 
(7) The Plaintiff, StevenL. Beshear, Attorney General, 
has rendered an official advisory opinion regarding the legality 
of the surrogate parenthood process in Kentucky, OAG 81-18. (A 
copy of this advisory opinion is attached hereto and made a part 
hereof and marked Exhibit D). The defendant through such process 
will thereby abuse and misuse its corporate power to the detriment 
of the interest and welfare of this Commonwealth and its citizens. 
I 
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(8) The Plaintiff states that the Defendant, Surrogate 
ParcntLngifsi\ssociates, Inc., is guilty of an abuse and misuse of 
iLs corporate power, privilege and franchise which is detrimental 
to the interest and welfare of the Cormnonwealth of Kentucky and 
its citizens pursuant to Article II, Section 1 of its Articles 
of Incorporation, to-wit: "To form and operate a medical clinic 
designed to assist infertile couples in obtaining a biologically 
related child through the process of artificial insemination of 
a surrogate mother." 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff, Cormnonwealth of Kentucky ex 
rei. Steven L. Beshear, Attorney General, and Steven L. Beshear, 
Attorney General hereby prays this court to revoke the corporate 
powers and charter of the Defendant, Surrogate Parenting 
Associates, Inc. or in the alternative that this court grant a 
permanent injunction against the plaintiff to prohibit it from 
engaging in any business in connection with the surrogate 
parenthood process. 
/-Respectfully submitted, 
/ ) / .. , 
( f (. I' ~ .-!~ j irf;tJ~~ -'--'._-._ ~rt L. Chehbweth 
Deputy'Attorney General 
/ .dY3, 
J s R. Jo nson 
H sistant Attorney General 
Capitol Building 
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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VERIFICATION 
Stcvcn L. Bc'silear, Atto 1_-ncy General, C0I1Il11011WeaLLh of 
Kentucky, states that he is the Plaintiff in the foregoing action 
and that he has read the foregoing Complaint for declaration of 
rights and the statements contained therein are true and correct 
to the best of his knowledge and .b-,lief. ,_ 
~ ./") / ~><:1f -' /7 ' /-- / ~)G/~~-L 
Steven L. Beshear 
Attorney General 
Subscribed and sworn to before me by Steven L. Beshear, 
Attorney General, Commonwealth of Kentucky, this IJ c.L day of 
Mar c h, 1981. 
'1 ~ ~I cf}g ~I ~~/l~ Ul0L Y} I,u.f:# 
~otary Public - State at Large 
My Conm1ission expires: ~~2f; tit'l 
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1\i(','lCLE5 OF lrJC()HP()I~I\TION 
QF ,,' 
SUHROGATE PARENTING ASSOCIJ\'fES, INCOHPOHA1'£D 
'h, J,',", " , I J1: 
Ii I 
l 
, J' , 
.. ~ !. I ' I<NOI-lN BY ALL I'IE~ :~~ Tll~SE PHESf~TS: 
, , 
The undersigned, pelnn a natural person of the age of I,,;, (\ , , ':,,' : 
,~ \ ' , 
eigh teen (18) years or n,10r.1~ Ii pps,ir,ing J~ : form a corpora t ion, [or" 
, , j: ~ l'l L ", profit, does hereby certify. I 
' , I, ~ L '.1 j' "f ' I. ' 1\'; 
, ,\' 
I 
ARTICLE I 
" 
I "1 
'" 'f 
,. I';; 
The name of the c~rporation shall be Surrogate Parenting 
I '", (' ! !:: y : I'! ! ,I' I ' , , \ 
Ass 0 cia t e s, Inc 0 r par ate d, ' f ~\ \ ' 1 " ! \ ; 
JI~,,, ,\ , ii"I \ AHTICLE II" ,'\, I ' 
\ 
" The purpose for which the corpora tion 1.S formed is 'I 
'I :p, ' '~J. .'1 ',; , 
.' ' as [011 ow s : \' , ~ I " :, , , " , \ ," 
, '~~~' ,:" ' . t' i t" ~ " 
I,,' " ':,'.1:'\ 
" I:' (1) To form and ',?p,~ra,~e,a medical clinic designed .': jli" 
'4,' ,) t r " '1 1\ .}, , 
to as 5i s t i nf er ti Ie couples :~+.n ,ob~ainirywa biolog ically re 1a ted, "I': '/ 
.,~ ,~ f, ' ' '\ ' , " : • ' 
child through the process ~f' artifiqia~Yinseminatioll of a ",: :~"::,II, 
1 ' i I ~ 
surroCJate mother. ; t"'! :".!, I, I"I"~~': 
, " IJ" 1, ' , ,t.,'1 
(2) To rnanufacture I purchas~ or acqui,re in. ~ny,; ;!", : ~i.ii!,i},::: 
lawful mtllll1Cr and to hold,' o~n,V'm~~':~aCJe:,\I~led~e: sell,,<trans.fer,'J~~!;:::~ 
I" ' ". 'J' ' : ' . ~ I :' . 
or. in ullY mallner dispose of.'l 'and to deal and trade in goods,· .,:~i:,' 
war e s, III e r c I w n cl i SC, and pro P l2, r t y 0 fan y and e '( e r y c 1 ass , i::l n d 
" i l~, ,~ 1 ' ~, " () i,·' 
description, i::lnd i.n cJny par,,~jof' the '·world. ":.' i 
!I :; 
EXHIBIT A 
" ' 
, . ~ 
1\ 
I,", 
.. ' 
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(J) TI) :I('quirc Llle ,~,ll()d \-1ill, rigllts and pruperLy, and 
Co ulldt'l"t;d~~ LIJ(~ ""hulL: or any pan: of lhe <ls!;eLs or ii;lu.i.iici.cs 
tll'a slltne in cash, the fltock of ,t;his company, bonds or othenvise;. 
to hold or in any n1clnl1er to dispose of the whole or any part of, I' 
I 
the propc r ty so purchas ed i to . ,~onJuc t in any lmvf u 1 malme r the 
whole or any part of any business so ,acquired) and to exercise 
all the POi-f(o! r s necessary or convenient in and about the conduct , 
, , 
and management of such .* ' bus iness .,1 
(4) To apply for, purchase or in any manner to acquire, 
• r 
, 
and to hoi d, mvn, use and 0 per ate, <:m d to s e 11 0 r ina n y r:1 ann e r 
'(1, . 
dispose of, and to erant license:.o~ other rights in respect of, 
and in allY manner dea 1 with, any, and alI r igh ts, inven t ions. 
, .. 
improvements and processes used~·.in connection;; i-lith or. secured 
under letters patent or copyrights of the United States or other 
,. 
countries I or otherwise I and to;,;Hork, 0rJerate or develop the 
same and to carryon any business; 'manufacturin~ or otherwise, 
I. 'I a', 
which may directly or indirectly,!'"~ effectuate these objects or 
., it 
. . ~J ' " ., ,I, I. ,I ~ "J , 
any of them. ,.n·r 
(5) To Guarantee, purchase, hold. sell, assi3n , 
transfer, mortgage, pledge, or otherwise dispose of the shares 
. ;'" '~"'''' I . any~bonds, secu~ities or evidences 
( '. of the curltal stock of, or 
, . 
, 
, , 
.. 
of indebtedness created by any ,other corporation or corporations 
I 
of this C(JllUllOllvlcalth or any other Commonv:ealth or State, country, 
'1,1 ' t: 
nation or government, and 'vhile~'o\vncr of said stock may exercise 
all the r ighls, pOvlers and privileees 
'. 
of ownership. including; the 
a(' yi r' 
. " 
. .1: 
.,' 
,; 
" 
, " 
• I", 
" ,J 
\ .... 
. '. 
j' 
, , 
, 
: 1 • 
" 1 
" 
, , 
' .. :' ~ 
" 
, : 
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d.ght Lo voLe Lllen~()I1, to the 5illll(.! extent au natural persons Might 
or coulJ do. 
. I I (G) Toe II t e rill to, . [ll c1 k c a [l d per. f 0 nn co lit.: r ;J c t.s 0 fl .. " 
f' 'V (1 l.Y k i. H d \ lit t ~ a 1\ Y I' e t' son I f 1. rill, <l :3 s u c; i aLi uno reo r p 0 1.' a t ion, 
l\Iuldclpality. botly politic, country,' t~rritory. State, Govarnmor t 
or colony or dependency thereo~" and,.without limit as to amount: 
, 
to draw, make, accept, endors~, .. :discount. execute and i.ssue 
promissory notes, drafts, bills.,.of exchange,· warrants, bonds, 
'I' • 
deb e n t u res and 0 the r neg 0 t i a b ~ E?,: 0 r \ t ran s fer a b 1 e, ins t r um e n t s . 
and evidences of indebtedness .whether secureel by mortgage or 
. 0 therw is e, as vie 11 as to s eculju., the.;same, bYI mor t{1age or 0 the r:-; 
' .. 
, , 
, ., 
, " 
i;'.! "I 
wise, as vlell as to secure the.isame by.mor,tga0 e or ,pther-wise, ,so I.) 
, "Ii . 
far as may be pennitteel by, the:\:laHs ,of.r.,the,)C;;olTunonweL\lth 0'£ Ken.tucky.,,! 
\ . , 
, 
(7) Tol1ave .of fice~r, conquc t . :i ~p, I bl\s ines sand, r,romo te 
,.r 
its 0 b j e c t s vI i t It ina n el III i tho u t.~. Ken t u c k y " , in, 0 the r S tat c s, the 
District of Columbia, the .. tcrIji',tor ies and, ;e,o lonies .. of the Un i ted 
States, and In. foreign 
or amount.'. 
(U) To do any or ~n\.~,' of I. the' lthings .. s e t,t:y~ th ,above: 
to the S ':lIne extent as natural ~ersons m:i.ght' or could elo anel' 
'.: (9) In, ~;eneral tovc'orry ~:Jl1\any..'i other bustne~~. ~n 
connee tiOl1 l he revl i til whe tJlerol!llanuf ae turipG .. or L () clH!;rw,i..s 0" "n9 t . 
forbidden by Lhe I lavls of, Kentucky, and vlith. ,all .. the, pOVlCrs .. 
. yr' "'I' ':':';. 
, ~ I . 
'\.-,,', , 
1 ,,~,~.,r~·"'·1 " ':' t "d.l, ",.'l.t-- ''''/'/ " .... 
. r 
, 
J 'f -7 J' '" j"~'" 
",1;1; 
. '! 
'I 
,-3-
"\ 
rtF 
; , 
, 
."./ .. ';1,,: 
.,,1,11' , ./.11',: ~ ,; d.! r, .' 
" 
..' 
.: " 
,'\', 
•• 1 
,; "' 
; , 
. ':; -, ~ , 
, 
\ 
J • 
I, 
.' 
LU::> 
/\1\'1'I.CLL Ill. 
rdr!' JeLL: 1 v 
The registered office of the COl:poratiol1 in tile 
Conunonweillth ~)hC11.l be suite 2~2, [)oclor~; Off.i.ce ollilc1ill(], 
, ' 
250 East I,iberty Street, Loui~vill(), Kentucky, 40202,. C1nd the 
,', 
process agent .i.s Karen M. Zena, suite 222, Doctors Office 
I -,l I. ' . 
Building, 250 East IJiberty S~;eet, Louisville, Kentucky, 40202. 
, .' , 
l\HTICLE V 
" , 
The authorized cap~~~al of' the CorporLltion slwll be ONE 
\' . ,; I 
THOUSMlD (10 a 0) sha res of comt;'l'on stock having a no par vill ue, wi tl1 
J 1'1\11" 
" Ii. 
, " 
, , 
, .. ' i-
each outstLlncling share entitled ,to one (1) 'vote and each fractional: ,
"~fl(ff"~ . ~i.s I·.I~ 
shilre thereof to its equivalent fractional vote. 
The nc:une 
of shares of stock 
l\HTICLE VI 
" '! " 
',I, 
, '~, 
"I,"'fr,' ,I I 
and I, addre,5s, 0 ( the Incorporil tor 
, ,;' ".,.j", t.::,' ~r' 
sub s c rib e dl~ for her is: .I 'I ' 
• I ,;. ~l.tll •• 
"', ~I:' ,,'I~' ~ I·' 'j', 
ZEN/\ ,,.,;,,1,, 
Suilo. 222, Doctors Office .. ouilding, 
250 E(1st Liberty Street' 1 " 
Lou i s viII E!, , K. e n t u c ~ ~' 4 0 ~ ~ 2 'l1 f'\. \ tit' d 
l\HTICLE~VII 1'''','', ,. , 
',' 
i 
and the number,' "~I, 
, f \ ~ 
.IJ' I " ""I : I "":j" 
, I \ ~ 
• I' , j 
500 Shares 
I, 
), ,I' 
" 
The number or, qi.r~q,tJ.ol'S to be <:1t,I.e~,ted,: at ,the ~ • " .. ',II! 
first, ' 
, I 
mE.!etirFJ of the Shareholders sQp,ll'be two. Therearter, 
, I 'f ~'f",,· I' . 
, 
of [)irectors to be elected sha,' ~Ibe~at" the discretion 
I " t Jv·1? .. "'. '. III 
Iniljority vote of the ShureholcJrrs..;i::Thei~itiill 
, "tvf• ' 
\ • "I l' 
',1 'I . 
,~,~ , 
" 
'\ 
- 4 -,~, 
'I' 
,I 
" 
.,' 
I, 
i 
, r " 'JJ' 
of 'a 
, , 
, 'I 
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, 
I ' I~ "\ ~, '\ I, ," ~'I : 
•. I,' •• 
Ljl)r~rly St.rc(!L, Louisville, Kentucky, 4IJ20;l, Dnd Secrotary. 
KoHen M. ZCllu, Suite .222, Doctors Office lJuilding, 250 t:u~;1 
, 1 
Liberty Street, Louisville, K~ntucky, 40202. 
ARTICLE VIII 
The SharehoWers of the Corporation shi)ll not be 1 
., 
for the deb ts of' the ~?rporu t ion. 
" l' ! 
, " 
• , t I 
;.~"",JII 
" IN TESTIMONY ~WJlEREOF , 'wi tness the 
/ \' I "C-)'~'" \ A- ., the _~,~_dily('of (";'«( ~i I" ;' 
II \~'~ . \ ,~,' \.'\, 
'I':" \" , 
I)' 1 
, " ,'I~i 
I \.. 1~t' 
signature of the 
Incorporator, 1900. 
, , 
'" 
." " ,;1 
• ., I' \ ) 
I II''''''' , ,-
, \' ,'...... _' • II ,~ , ~-. -,-,,~. ", 
... ~ '" j \ ',''''/ 
'~) 
'\ . ~ ) 
\ ' 
I \ I I "I-: -: .~ /".. ) '/ /( ("''! .., L .~-: __ _ I .. ; _----L..:".....::....::-_..!. ,..,-c_ '-:'=-''''':''''..,--_>-0 -=~'---'..::....~..:.-______ _ 
Karen H. Zena' 
" It L .. ' " I~ 1,\1;" l: ,I. 
:,',~'~.~,~J~ " ' 
'\ !' ,,', ,I' \, i \ 
','I,' 
, , ~ 
. , 
,./ . 
~ , 
'" 
" 
\ 
", ,/,' 
\ . I': 
: , 
I I 
'I 
•• , •• 1 
" '. , 
I ,j I: I 
"I 
: 'I 
/. I I 
t . f \ 
!, I' 
, ; 
.;) 
(~ 
, 1,1 
" '",', 
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~;Tr\T!': (II-' !\l':tJ'!'UCl<Y 
r' f' 
... ) ... ) 
I, the undersiyned Notary Public, in illld fot- the 
, 
StaLe Clnd County aforesaid,:1 certify that KI\T(EN N. ZCNA did 
I 
mc." i n so. id S to. te <1 nd COUI1 ty, and she 
: 'j .1 
personally appear before 
is known to me to be the p~~son ~ho. executed, the foregoing 
instrurnent, <1nd acknow ledgefl~', the "-same to be her free ac t and 
I ~ ~ 
deed. 
day of 
I, " 
, I 
I 
I : 
This Ins LruPlen t Pre oared 
" I 
AI ~" , 
, I' f'l,~, , 
Uy::', ' 
,.r~l·' " 
'I' • I~;,~ 
, ' 
, 
,1' 
, 
,'A 
, 
" 
, ,II' 
"j. '/ \ i"" II I, 
" I 
>-,' 
?I ~, , 
t ~ ,\ , 
,) ~" , 
1'1, 
, 
, (, 
, ',' 
"I' 
'/ ' , H, 
\'t " \ I, 
, I 
,', ' 
'.' " , 
i ~ 
: I 
\ ::, 
,', h 
! 
,'" ,1\ 
", 
" .' 
, t, 
, , 
'It' " 
, " 
,,( , 
"1,\ 
",1 
'\ I 
,,'i ,::' 
1'" I" 
',' ii' 
\. I' 
,/:' :/': 
",I( " 
\ ,",~, ! 
,;, '; "~I r 
'./;;i • 
, '\'1,,1 
1 "\.1;1:: 
, .' J',~, "I, 
I 1,'l"1 
:/",:;" 
"\ 
; 
" , 
, I 
, 
: I 
I ~.1 
, I, 
, 
,I. • 
1 : 
", 
I-:r. and I,ll's. 
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. 
" 
;:E:CITl\LS 
'; 
,'j 
.\ 
, " 
~:: 
of 
'j' 
L')uisvillc, Jefferson County,;,Kentuc;ky hereby rct:ain Richard 
, 't' ., 
, , 
II. Leo/in, t-1.D. to assist them'l~n",se~cqting a suitable "Surrogate 
iI' 
l'lother" ''''Ilo wlll elltet- into a contract with Hr. and 1-11'5. 
/ 
1'4," 
, __ ~ _____ ...,___.-;.:..~~ ___ -----\.;h ere by a 
",.' I 
Surrogate Molher will be art i ti,i cia 11 y ,. ins em inc ted 
, '~ .,r', 'f' 
~," "' ' . 
. j'lf' 
with the 
semen of 1ir, 
, , 
Up 0 n del i v e r y i tis e Y. pee led i ~.h () t the Sur roC] ate 1< 0 the r il n d 
, 'I 
child by Hr. a:--.d 
Mr~. . ,
" , 
, ,I 
" 
(1) t'lr. and i'lrs. 
,4" . 
h'2reby pCly to Hichard f-1. Levin, !-1.D •. 
,t, h , .' I 
I l' \II' . ' 
s(!:-vic'2s hc:rcund~l- the sum of '$ ~--------------------------------------
a,s compen sa t ion for his 
" 1 
, , 
, , 
, ,I 
'\' 
;,,', 
1 ,.', '~, 
"I: :.,' J 'l,.;~ , 
';'1'\," ' • 1., 
e 
,I \, I ~ \' , 
"'!<: 
" , 
~ , '\ ' 
, ' 
I ' 
,I, 
, '( 
" ' 
',' Ii 
'I' :1' 
,', \ 
I 'W"1 , ... 
"'1;-" 
1 
, I 1 ~ 
,I 
, , 
. I',' 
, .. 
1'1' 
, : ' \ 
i I /. 
" ' 
I i ~ 
, :',,1,1 
. t I, f ~ , ~ 
. I, ~ 
,: ,i" 
, ,~ , 
"'fl'I" ' 
, ~ I I-
I !~ I, \ 
I""" 
','I \q,~, 
,(',40" 
", 'r'~ f , . (' 
1 I I 'I" I 
,': f;;,':j i&':, 
• ,,( ;,1'1 \ (2 ) It lS expressly un~erstood thut nichurd H. Lev.ln, /l.D·Vi:!,h 
I t'., I ... 'i 1 I' i'i \ I 
I • t' I. ~ 
does not guarulltee or wal"rant/~that 'the Surrogute 1'1othcl" will 
, '," " 
, I 
in [<lct conceive a child [uther,cd by r-lr. 
,'JI'I\'\ "j , 
[Jor does HichiHJ 1'1. Leyin, 1'1.0. gU<lrantee 
I~'" 
thut if said child is conceived it will be a he.:llthy child free of, 
)i. 
, \, 
'. i 
,~ 
, I 'j 
j.\. 
\" . 
r:XllIBIT B 
,,' 
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u~J 
(3) it 15 flJrLhcl' UnG0rstoOcJ tllilt /10 !)ortion of the fce 
paid Lo P,ichard (-j. Levin, f·i.D. is refundable fp.gard1css of 
" 
1/ 
------------------'------------
eve r r e c e i v c c1 chi 1 d i' lll' sua n t tot he COil l r (J etc n \: ere c1 i n t 0 
between /·~r. and '·lrs. 
and tile S 1I r r 0 l];l t C /·1 0 the run d her h usb llll tl . 
, ,,' 1 
i 'fi, I , 
(t;) /·1r. (lnd i'll's. 
if' 
[ u r the r cJ 9 fee t h L1 t t. hey w ill h C'l d n i C h.1 r d ':1. Lev in, r-1. D. h tJ r m -
'",i' I: 
ll:?ss from ully and all liabi1iti~s '(I~~soc,iclted \",1ith the SurrO(,!c1te 
Hother procedure and tlle 
, I 
!. I. 
expcctedadoptioll. ' I 
i/o" \ It~ 
I ;'dl i '\', " 
',. . ~ I 
"IWL, , 
" 
, " 
( 5 ) /·1 r. t1 n cJ J.1 r 5 . ' ------------------,',-.'~I~I~~----------------------
h c1 vel:; '2 C 11 <1 cJ v .:. sed 0 [ and ace e r ~; , the • r i 5 kin h pre n tin in e (; n c1 n c y 
i1 n d chi J ubi r t h 11 n d of 1I )(' r i oS }~I~ l hilt ,t 11 c . c!l i 1 d born to' t 11 c 
5urrO~iL)te I-jollicr will pos~cs~ '~fll<Jcnit~l ab'~ormcJlities either 
(;O::1indnt or rc:c(:~;si\.'c. (Sec Attached E>:hibi t .",'~ ': ). 
, ,),," . 
(0) In lhc event oflitigntion by or bct~een Hr. and 
.... ".\' ,/,1 
. I ~'KII/li'1 '. ,- ( . I. 
t·1r s . '" ",]hd the Surrogate 
------------------------------,~J .. .' t 
llotllcr aIld her :1\lslJillld (Jlld/or their [C1milj; 'uncl/or the COl11ll1on-
I 
fl 
J +",' 
vlecJlth or l<cnt\lcky and/or any other stZltc, J1rltion, or other 
gove'!:niIFJ bocJy, HicllilrfJ f'1. Levin, M.D. will be compenslIted at 
cJn hour 1'1' ri) tc of ~, ___ _ 
I, I I L 
'1,1, 
I j I 
'I' 
, 
I,' 
'I,' 
, " 
,'I, ,I 
" , ',", ~ . 
, j 
,', 
'I' 
, ,I;! 
", . 
" 
" 
nu 
f ' .. d' d:lj' ,:,),. d I I 'HI,J i ,-, Oil'} 1 \""ud. i III.' I w: i :)1:\ Lr: S l ill,UIl:: (lrlci/or 
reI ;1 l (.' ' 1 I:. I ,)' ~ c; u r: l~ i ') r 1 • 
~x:c:·· OJ ~~ltln~ signed by all parties. 
,.'.1 
"; 
/i 
" 
;·lr. 
:1 Date 
I, 
~.,' 
Mrs. 
.. _---._------ Dcl te 
, I, 
I 
,'( i 
'I, I';, 
.) IF 
I ',t 
. J,' 
.&, .... , ••• ,r. 
--------------- --
JI' 
,'" 
DcJ to 'I, . 
--_._._---
S t i) teo f }; e n t u c k Y 
county of Jefferson 
The foregoiny 
,t ~I~'\'" 
; 
/ . 
"~r'I"" 
/JD 
, "( 
\,~t; 
, ~I/ 
;1 . , 
, . 
hi 
,~II, 
.,', J 
~, 
,. 
t/~ 
I) 
, I·, 
I 
", 
1 • 
instrument was acknowledged before me 
:r ' t y, . 
,'I" ' II I this ____ clLlY of 
_____ -'--, J.J.t1' t, 1 9 a 0, lJ Y 
unci 
, I , , , .\ 
~ I I' 
, , 
lJo L cJ ii '!ju l~ p.~c ~-:-~; i:.-~IL(!-=-ii·i.: -= Lel1:~; c',-- r;eIl t lie ky--
, \, 
fly cornm iss iO,ll I I i ~al.' 
19 
. , 
,k" 
, , 
, 
, 
CXIH res tile cluj' of 
, I 
\ , 
/ " 
II,' 
" ", 
. / 
,; \ 
\., 
<::11 
1900, lJy and bc l'..JcclI 
------_. ______ , ________ , ____ .. __ .-J. ____ (hcrr~ ,lll'l [to r rc Ee r ned 
La uS "Husbi1nd") illHI 
--_._ .. _----_._--------------
(h(!rcln<1[lcr re[crreu Lo d~; "N,ltural l'i1l1lc~r") 
!' .. 
HEC] Tf\[,~; , 1\ 
___ ,._~If 
}:ll " ' 
"/ 
(.lctS: 
TillS l\r;n[~r:;~lUH IS mLluc~y~~ll rC[,,~r.enl~e Lo the followillq 
,'I 
"1(1 1 
(1) The Nature1 Father! is r1 mar.ried inc1ividuill over the 
'flrC 
iHJC of eicjllt.een (UI) yc'tlrs wlJo is11desix'ouB of, cnLl?rincr into L1w 
",{ '/ -
[ollowinCj aCJ rcemCl1 t. 
l.I!Ilrlr'·" :' 
. /1 
( 2 ) 
biolo',llcolly rcloJLc:cl lo him. 
\ 
(10). yCill~r. who Ll1'C desirou9 of 
, f!II!~" 
clILcrinq intu thc /01101vil1'1 r1qrccfTlcnU; :in"con~jiclt:'!riltion of 
. . ,~~' 
the fiJlancldl t'C'lllllIlCl'ilLioll incident ill'l-f to • 
.,;1'''' ' 
Nuw Lherl~(or(~, ill considcrilLi,.?Jl"lot tile fTlut\lcJl I?romi~e~~ 
cOlltllincd Ilcrc~il1 ':llld \vith Llle int6;~tioJ1s o[.ucin<j lCCj<1l1y uoullcl, 
" ' 
ll(~rcuy thc~ pClrL.Lc~; iHjH'C il~) [allows: 
, 
'" , .( I 
I, 
I 
'EXHiBIT C 
, I 
';', 
: \ I';, 
. q ':, 
" 
','1 
'I' 
" ( 
\, 
.',1 
, " 
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conceive pursu.Jnt to Lhe provisions of this contract ulld shall 
[ r eel y u n cJ r e iI cJ i .1}' w i L 11 i n u r e u son u b J c U_ me, t e un i n il t c .:l 11 
ptlrental riCJllts Lo srlid child purSlIclllt to tilL; flqrecment. 
11. TIle SurroCfute und her husband have been married 
I: 
Slllce 
onl! the II\lsblllld is ill <1,:]r(2CInent ------------
with tile pllrp()~;es, inlcIIU;, u n d n r 0 vi,., ion s [) f t his i] q r e (: III c n t ~ I ' 
and uCJrec~; lIidt IllS wifc, the SurrollL11:0., shall 
:f,: - I: I 1)0 u r li [ i cia 11.,. 
ins'C?mintltcd pursuant; to Lhe pl:ovisioll:i o[ 1IIi~; 
.:,'1, 
. 'f' 
lIusbilnd 'vlill not forlll Cl fJur(,llt-c~lld' 
,'f' 
t: c 1 uti 0 n !~ hip wit 11 il II Y 
I 0'0 
TIle 
child and Lhe SIJr}'()9atc llIol)' c(Jl1c~iv(! 
o , 
1> Y <l r t.i [ i c i ,1 lin s c rl1 i 11 iJ t ion 
hel:cill illlcl olqree.s t~JI'Ll.'c(~ly LlIIU rf?ddiJy lcndl1ilte 
all [Jilrent..:il ri!j1Jl!; Lo sil.i.d child ~llld ackllOw1edqe5 he will clo 
, ~~.I' ' 
all acts 
provided 
ll!!ce s sa ry 
under KHS 
to rebu t the pre~ju/l1ption of pel lerni ly 
, ,f'l I . 4 0 J ill C 1 u ell n 9 ") 1 (l or. t cst .1 n 9 . 
,,, 
u oJ 
J II . TIlL! NcJtural Father~.Ls lJe~(!b,~~ enjterinry into w 
, I :1 1 
written contractual aCJrecment with the Surrogate wnd her husband, 
, 
w 11 e r c IJ y t h (! ,S u r r 0 9 (J t e fj h cJ 11 be a ~t i Ei cia 11 yin S C TTl ina ted, wit 11 
• ", I'~ . 
tile scmen o[ the NiltUl',ll Father,&y HICIIAIHJ M. LEVIN, fLO. Tlw 
I ~. 
SUrroqCltc, up0J) beCl)l11jrHf prCCjnilll~~fl' Sl10111 cart')' s<lid embryo/fctus (s) 
Ii e r l! i 11 (l f L L' t reI err (' d lo il S "c hi 1 d 1/) 1111 l; i 1 • de l.i v (! r y . 
"f1"" , 
The Surro<ja te 
.,~p ~ 
or ilS 1,0011 thC),C,1fl(,l" ;I!;i~j rllctlically po:,~)ihll', in!Jtit:ut,~ pr()cc(:tlincp.; 
ill LouisviLle, Kentucky to l(:rminatc lllei,r respective p<ln.!C1tal'ri'jllts 
, '" , ;',' 
l : 
'. II 
0,' 
,i"'" 
" .' 
jj i. 
'j .J 
, , 
., 
'll,/ 
. I I)· ~ ~ . 
,I' ;: 
0·,'1 
;! ,I' 
I " 
. 1,1 
~ I \ • 
. \,;) 
, :'1, 
I I 
, I 
, 
I , 
(' Lc. ill (lJder tl) fLlt-LIl!~r Llle .intcllt. clnd /lurJlf-l!;r~s of LIli5j iH-jlCl.'l11cllt. 
prior to Lhe birth of the child in ot:der to hllve th<! Natural 
FLllher'n J)alIle pLlccd (Ill sClid child's birth ccrtificate as tile 
• .&! 
biological father PU1-!iUtlllt to I<RS 21J.OSO (1) and 901 J<AH 5.070, 
Sec. 1. TIICrc.~Clttcr, UIC SUt-roCJCl~e andd1Ct: hUSIJ<l/ld sh.:d1 do <111 
acts necesscJq' Lo pennit the adoption qf said child by ,1n'/ party, 
upon reOllest by the Natutal Father. 
IV. Tile Natut:Cll FClthcrvand the SurrQC)atc and hCL-
',I 
·1 
I"i 
. II 1,~ 
" oJ: 
: , 
. ) 
huslJu nd recoy 111 ze ilncl acknow ledCJ~t~.LhCl t t~c i.l t torney (s) for the UtJ L u r ,11 
father, Yatie 13rophy, shtlll i1ct';~~~,;Ip.qcnt for,theNatural Father 111 ul1 
, . 
matters pertaining to tllis ayrc'~I~~;rt. in order to muinLaill 
,,', ! 
, ' ~ .1~. . I ffl;~:!'" l 
1,:-!r,,"I' 
C()f1lp~'Cte confidentiality. 
V. The consideration for, t.his Ilyreerncnt, in addition 
, Jt\;,r, I ",',' 
to other fJrovisions cont<1ined herein, shall be as follows: 
'I ' !,1/ ~:t.'~. '. 
<1 . $ 
, 
'.'\ 
shall be )J<1id ,to" the .surroy~te and her husuLllld 
It! .p I , 
upon entry of the jlldYll1cnt [ully'~termin<1tinq .,~he parental riq/lU; 
\' 
d g d c r i 11 e d by t lJ C Ie1 vJ i n l\entuck'~>'I'jO[ the :~ur~\o<J(1Le and'lIer hushalld, 
. " I. • ' 
purSllf1nL to the chilu to ~ "\. h ue bOrI~~,9' the l provl\~.lOI1S Cleth/een t e 
Surroqate LInd her husb,lncl uncI the. IJaLut'c11., Father. , 
: ~~!I,." . 
U. Tile consideration LO"be paid siJid Surroqate <1nu 
I, ,i4~r~1' ~ . , 
her II LI S l) Clll J, s 11 cl 1 1 b (! d cpo sit c d wit h L h e u t toni e y for L heN <1 t U t" ,1 1 
'11,1(' 
F.:lther .:lL Lhe time a[ llle sl<jlliny;,o[ this, aCjrecment and held in 
: re,' (,' 
,,1 . 
"I· 
1 
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l~~;CI()W utlli L CUllIpl('tiull of tho dut il~:' ,111d ol>li<j<lL.ions of Llll: 
c. Thu NiJturill Futllel,- 5h,"\11 pay t.1a(l £.?><PClltH]U 
, ., 
1 n cur r cub Y t iJ e S lJ r roy ute u 11 d h c r h u s IJ u n d pur s u u n t to h (~ 1-
\ 
prc'}nancy, morc sl'l~cificcllly defined as follows: 
1. 1\ 11 ll1l'd i cal, ~ 1 0 ~; pit- a 1 i 7. tl t ion I i1 n U p h u rrn.:l c e \l I. i c tl 1 I 
.,' 
Illborator'Y anu tller-upy expcn!.;cs incurreu in the ;jurroY.:ltc I s 
prC(Jn':H1CY, /lot covered Ot- allowed' by her present health und O1uJor 
fn(!u.i cal i.ll S \lr tlllCC, includil19 ull:;extt-ilol dirlilry mcdiCiJl cxpensc~;, 
but c x c 1 LI dill ~J ull Y 
problems reluted 
ex p l~ II S C !., [ 0 r C ITl 0 l i 011 u 1. / III e n t ,\ 1. C () 11 d i t 1. () II :; / 
" ~ tl I 
to said pregnancy, I.ost waqes, or other incidentals, 
~' 
2. The /'Iatllrul .futher. shull not: be rcspollsil)le 
,: .. ,1,1', 
[or lIny laLr;nL TllL'cjictlJ expenses occurring six (6) ... :ceks subsequent 
t.o the birth of Lhe chilu unless'l"tlw meclicul prohlem/ ilbnorll1ulity 
inc i u en t L her c tow (\ S k 11 0 W 11 P r .i 0 r ~ ~o ~ hoe x pi r (l t ion 0 [ 9 aid six 
1\'1:' I 
1 ')1 ~', : ,I • (6) week period. ,~1, 
I. 
J. Tho totc11 costs~of 'all paternity tostinq. 
" 
.J 
'. 
rJ • The Surrogate's .travel expenses incurred 
, . \J:\'~ ; J ~ 1· I 
" , pursuClnt to this l\Cjreernent. 
5. The Nc1tural Father shall not be responsilJle [oc 
" 
Clny lost wayes of 
ii'l 
the E1urroyato. or, her husbllnd, child care 
ox p e 11 s C S 0 f t 11 0 [:; u r roy 01 Lei s chi 1 d r en 0 r c1 ny 0 the t- ex pen s (l n [) t 
\ ,I .... ' 
spccific.:llly CrHIITH'L3tedhcrein. ',W; 
VI.' Ir!UllcrJitltely !wbsequent to tl)O birth o[ the chilLi, 
Lhe 1011owill<j tests 1IIld(~J: the directiol1 o[ c1 l:JLltho.logist design.Jtcd 
" 
" 
by H 1 C i i l\ i W ~l. L i~ V 1 N, H. (). : ", , 
, , 
.' ! 
," !\ 
,', 
.: " 
( I ) 
(,') 
1I1110r] (;'111'1' 
~ ; (' l' I I III I) r () l c .i. 11 ~; 
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( 1) 
(II) 
Ii I' rI eel I I: 11 " ',' 1111: ~; 
It/hiL.t' C(~l.J/JI,L,f\, 
(JI\II (U or more of thr..! aforcmelltionr~d tents, Ithis contract I::Jildll (':~ 
lmmccllat01y terminate, and all monies'llnd/or:':lll olher.con-
I' 
sidl:!r.ation raid to the Surrogate1and her' husbilnc1, or in their 
, t' ~ 
behLllf, or expended to screen and/o~ inv(!stiq<lte the f.iurrolJate 
Cllld/or her Ilusb,llHl ill contemplation of this Contract by tile 
Natllra~ Father shall l)e inuHcdiately returned·'by the SurrolJcJ.te 
und Iter husbund to the f'laturaliFather. I In' addition, the Surroqate 
and her Ii usb <:111 d ' ~, II i1 11 P c1 yin t ere s t _ (J 11 S Cl i d m 0 n i c sat Ll w u. S. 
pl'iml2 raLe existill<.J at the timc·Jsuid surn(s) were expended. 
! 
VII, Tile Niltutal Father~;;hall!pay the cost of a term 
life inslll'ance policy 011 the Surrbqate's life payable ·to <1 I1c1m(::-d 
'II~ . 
henef ic ienl' of the SUI: rO~Ju te wi th':' u pOl.icy· al11DLln L of $ ______ _ 
: t:~ ~ 
"iltld ~;llid\ policy' sholl remuin ill 
----~,'~:I." 
e f[ CG t [or six (6) t,-'eeks subsequen t to the bi rth 0 f the 
ji . 
child. , \ 1 1/\ addition, the'natural :father shall rnake appropriute 
./ 
i)[ rungemellts in his will [or1thcsupport of~ tl1e'infant child 
shoulll lw die prior to the birth of said child alld shall pay tile 
cost of u Lerrn life in!:;ural1ce policy on·'his life rc1yable ill trust 
, ,~ • I • 
to saicl ulluocn child. " I '~rG' ;,,':' 'JI, . ..t I , ,,1.1, 
I , I 
, !'. I;. 
V 1 1 I " The Sur roy t1 tea n II 1\ e r: ' h II S b i'H1l1 u tl dec s tan cl ; and i1 9 r e c 
" 
Lo iI~;~jUlrle all risks incll.ld.infj lIJC,~;ri!;k o[ death which arc incident 
~, !l 
to COI1CCP t i.OIl, 
l\ copy of sLlid 
prcqll':IIlCY, childbil'th lIlId postJ.-l.)rLum cOlnplicatlol1s. 
'I! I 
pos~jible r-isks <1nd/or complicatIons is attachl2d 
Ill'reto and made i) (Jclrt hereof.:' (See'i.\ttacl1ed'/~xhibit(:I'A") •. 
• I ' 
I" 
I . ~. 
I. , 
• I' 
. ' , 
1
1
" 
I' 
I 
I I 
\ 
t 1 
c.,'. 
\'," 
" 
" ,', 
'",,; 
, < 
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tI n cI'~ [ q () P!' Y c) 10 L 0</ .i cuI / p s y c II i 0 t ric C V i \ L II ,I l: .i 0 II by 
psyclli,lh-ist(s) and 
-_.- .. _--_._---------------_ .. _--
[1!lycholoqi!Jl (s) desionat(ld by tho 
fI ,I l u r () 1 F 0 tile rue 0 n ,\ <J e n t l her e 0 f. The tJlIturt11 Filther shull 
poy [01.- Llie cost of slIid psyclliiltric and p!,ychologicill reviews. 
The eVilluutiollS of 5.3id psychiatI-,lst und psychologist sll.311 be 
1 
submitted to Lhe tLlturl..ll Filtlle!:", tlbscnt i.llly in(orrnution .... ·bich 
would lend La identify or ullow idcnU(ic'-ltion o[ Lhe Sut'roCji.lte: 
cJncJ her husbc1nd. The Surrogilte and h(~r husbiJnc1 shall sirrn prior \. 
to their cVl..lluatiolls, ,1 medical r(~lC!dsC DU1.l1ol'.i.zinq the Attorney 
,/I 
t. 
[or the l~i)tur,tl J'c:ll:hc!l" to seClJre tht: rclC'u~;e ur ~;ilicJ psychicJLric 
h 
. '~, 
e v cJ 1 U (J t i 0 II ~3 :,aid evalu •. ltioll~';. 
;\ . "Child" 
I~ 
<.IS re(crrcd l to in thi:3 ugrcement shall 
include illl childr.c!ll L'orn simultaneously DllrSuilnt to the il18Clnniltiong 
ilS d cfinec1 in the terms .::md provisions of this ilgrecment provided 
III! 
the tests eTlLlmcrilteu III pilril(Jraph~lsix (VI) ure completed and 
l., 
','I 
satisfactory as to each child. 
, I 
, Ii,q. ,I" 
IgI . 
XI. In the cvent that the' child is miscClr-ried prior to 
If \ 
the fifth (5th) month of vre(fnancy, no compel1siltion as enumerated 
t 
)n Parilgruph V(a) shall be paid to',the Surroqutc. However, the 
" , !:~ I ' 
expenses cnumerated in PLll~ilgLaph V(C) shall be paid or reimoul's12<i 
Lo the Surroljutt.! and hel: husoilndJ~"'rn Lhe event Lhe child i~J m.Ls-
ccuricd, diL'!-l ot- l~; sLi LlIJOt'll subsequC'nt to tlw [oll.rLh (4th) 
, 
, . 11-1 t ' the Surro(.j.1Lc montl! of pr(~(.ll1iJl1cy ilnd ~;L1ld cI1l1c')lloL'!; Ilfl- fJUrV1V(~, 
I 
sllull recei V(~ $ ____ . ______________ . __ ~_ ..... .:~---.----- " 
C'l1l1f11P ra tc·j 
!,~ , 
\., 
6 
ill piHaq '-,lph V (il) only if 
'/"". 
" 
I • 
.1 , 
',' 
t .', I 
I." 
, .. 
.' , 
" 
" ~. 
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I 11 I: 11 I' elf C r 1 L () [ il m t ~; -
tll'I\I,ll\~'te .:mll Twithcr the Surroycll£, /lor the Nalural flltllcr rdll 
/ 
be utlucC allY further obliyution under this agreelilent. 
, '11 
Xl1. The Surroqate t.llld t.he Nilt.llrul Filther, shull underqo 
'.~ ~ . , . 
rJ complete: pllysicul ulld ycnetic eV('\.luution, u,l1dor the direction 
"/1,' l. 
ilnd supervision o[ HICl/I\IW M. LEVIN,I'1.D., to, uoLcrmine whether 
,~, 
l he 1-1 IJ y sic €I 1 h 0 u 1 L hun d we 11 b 0 i n 9 0 [ e tl chi s sa U s f tl C tOt" Y . 
I. i_> 
Suid plJysicol cXfllI:inuLion shall include test.iny for venerCJl 
ii\', ' " < 
discilses, spoci(icitlly .il1cl.\ldin~Jr!lyphilis and <,Iollorrhea. Silid 1I ,. . , ," , 
It 
vonerill diseuse tcsLin<J ~Jllilll be;c)orw pripr l.o et.lch insemination. 
~_., , I J". 1 
• 
XI1I. In the ovent thatl'.!/_p:;tody o[ the cllild is awarded 
to the S U 1 l" 0 gilt C LlIl d / 0 r 11 c r h usb il n d or l h e i r [u m .i 1 Y , or allY 
individu,ll or orqcJnj zution, Ilot.relatcll La the Ntlturul FaLher by 
/,,'(,1 - Ii' 
allY Court decision or otberwise, rthe: NtlLut'ul F.:lther shall b8 
,,. 1" ',1.. • , . 
en ti t led to s u In a y tat ion by t h c
f
• ~I~ ~ ~ ,0 9 ~ t ~ I and/or her h 1I S b Ll n d I 
both joinLly and severally, for ilny and nll monies they .:lrc required 
, ',' . , . 
to pay [or child !jupport or prcyn.:JIlcy .rcla,ted~,expenses pursu.:lI1L to 
I\" , , • l' 1'- I , , 
sa ide 0 u r tor de rail d s hall bee n tit 1 edt 0 i mm q d i il l: ere i m b U l- S e Tn c 11 t 
• .1~ l I,., 1_, • .1,'" . 
from the ~';urro9ate and her husband. [01.",a11 monies and/or olher 
t ,I \) I (., . ,~ I '.. (~t " .. ' . 
con!iic\cralion p<lid to Lhe surr.o~~~,P pur;sUil,nt'ILo this Clgreclllent or 
expended Oil bchlll_ [ of the SurroYi1.,~e t.lnd/or her husbilnd. 
t I" . 
XIV. 
learn llie iUCllli.Ly elf Lhe Surro~J8,t9. unci/or hnr· husban<l or their 
fLlmily, not advise t.he chile! of ,said, idcntity; if known. 
XV. The SllO-O~Fltc and her 11USUilnd ilvr'eo thilt they will 
,j'<l'. ' I ',' til 
" 
110t seck Lo It.~(1rllLlle i~lcl1Lity of';L!w uat-ul""l Father of the child 
ilnd will not atL:clI1pt 1.0 COlltLlct r;allH~ jf Lh(~.i.L- jd~~IlLity is learned. 
",1,1 
:-I( 
.' .~. f 
, I 
, " 
, \ 
, 
, , 
, I'i 
: : ~ 
", (.':; 
, J ; 
'.' ( 
'i', It" 
" ~I t '·1 
';',l. 
""1'), .. 
, . r, 
'/ ' I, ,.1 
, It 
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l: V I , III '-he ("j(:IIL Lilat Pl-<:(JII,]IICY Iws /lol occurred withiJ\ 
Il/VjIAHI' n, LI:VLrl, t-LO., lfli~ iHlrcf. l 1llClll shall'tclIllin.Jte 1;:/ \yriLten 
nutlco fl:om the l\ttorncy for t1H);'Nal:urCll Fat~H!r to the SurrogaLo 
iI/ld/or her husbancJ. 
, 
, ,,,, , I, i 
XVII. 1\11 purties llCretolugl'ce' tl1iJt they will not provicJe 
nor allow lheir (j~JCllt~; to provido',uIly·illfonnaLion to the public, 
1/ 
/lews medi,-l or iJlly other individual 01: group which could leiJd 
j, 
lo I: 11 e 'cJ i " c los u reo r L he the piJrties hereto or the 
, , I" 
" 
chilcJ, 
XV I 11. In Llle (.;Vellt thd Surroqute .. <.II)(J/o'r her husbancJ vi()latt~ I.' . , 
• '/1 l:i . ') I 
,1Ily,ot the provisions conLalncd :hereIn, thi!',fl<jreefllp.Tlt may be 
~, , ," , 
f' 1 ' i m rn (~d i ute 1 'I t c nn j Ilil led ,1 t t 11 cop t ion 0 f t !l c Nat u r (j 1 ' Fat her w i tJ IOU t 
any [urtllel' liiJoilily here\IIl(Jer~IiL"\ll\' the eVent the tJatural 
, ' 
Father cJoes termilJa te 1 , chis ag~eer;wntl the, Nutural Father shall 
be under /10 obli<jation to pay 
reimuurse rJllY of her expenses 
'It ; t I 
anYl1 '!1onies to the Surrogate or 
, /,,:\ 
[ , 
or\h.,'f~i" hU,sband "s expenses. In 
, ~ j I 
addition, the Surrogate and her hl-lsband, must "i-eirnburscthe Natural 
: ' 
f'aUwr and/or DR. HICIl1\HD 11. 1 LEVI~, .M.D,. ",'for'" all monies expended 
on her behalf pursuant to this aqreement"PI:.· :1':4' ", '" 
II ' 
1 
XIX. The Surroql.lte andlh~r\hllBband agree that theY,',vill 
~ ~ I I'~ ,.. \, 
pro v i cl e no i 11 t e r vie w S 0 [ iJ n y kin d'.J' w hat so (! vcr , lei tile r 0 [ a pub 1 i c 
or private Ildtll['C, willlollt tile 
/, 
[or the l'Idr)pLive PilrcnU3. 
,/-
p:dor' Wt'ittcll 
" 1,11 
" .. (" 'I,:, r.'! ' 
t I' , " I ~I I 
'c 0 fl sen t 0 f tile a t lor n c y 
I ' 'I ' 
XX. Tile ~;lll.-r()CJ(}tc Qgrc,I~,7~;"~lll1t:."She'wl11'not abort the 
child once cOlleciv~d excepl, if lr:t '1hc'ol'lnion 'Or' the ,1nsol1\inatin'J 
, :' ~ r I 
pilysician, slich <,elion i!~ IJCC(!G~j~JTY [0(; Lllu phY[iicrJl 'lwt31tll of 
, 
the Slll-ro<"jdlc 01: t:i1C chi,lf! has bc~n'dcLerr~incd'by said physician 
:n'li ~:', ' 
o ~.,. 
I ' 
, , 
, , 
, .-
,1·tI 
, 
" 
, , 
" !' 
, 
I, 
" I 
" 
1,1' 
f' ; 
to /'" 1'11'/~iJ(JI()'1j(""lJ)' ,J/.JllOrrn.JJ. 
1 II ! II (: I' II p n I: 0 r (!.i til ( ! r (") r 
XXI. 
Till' NcltUl-dl Father ,).s:-~l/m('s the legal re~iPonsiLJility 
hovo bee" i'tTViou>;ly odvisod of tlie risk of Such obnotmdlitios. 
f' (Se(] uLL1c)lCcl txllilJit "e".) 
I· 
XXll. 
III IJte e.vent that the Natural Father prec.1r~ce;,]!;(.:; 
the lJir th of Lho ch i ld, soid child "Ii" 11 be 1'loced in tho Cll 5 Loul' 
of HICIl1\/W {\1. LJ';VHJ, (\1./)., f()r.."pl.ZlC(~lllcnt throuqh <1 [JriV,]Le 
Social ilCjCIlCY. of the iJppropriute 
XXIII. 
TlJe SlIrroCjil tc ilnd her, husbulld botll dc/ree Lhu t they 
: ~ I 
; 
will not seck to vicw L'llc infc:mt,·'j.chilc1 oorn purSUlll1l to thi~; 
,~ .. , \
; 
I, • 
contrcJct iJt anytil'lC', nor will the S~l.~(Oyutc ilncl her hUsLJanc.l (!Y., ' 
see k tOil i e w 0 l' me c t wit h the Nat u r a 1. F <1 the r. ~' 
\ ~ , ' 
.... . \ 
XX I V . Tlw SUrrooa tc [urth(!r; aq rccs" to' 'ad here to all 
:; II· 
'~, /' 
medical instructions 9iv(~n to hex oy. RICllAHO M. 'LEVIN, M.D. 
" .. '. 
iJS W(~ll iJS her independent obstetriclcJn.·· The Surrogate iJlso 
' ',' i'l "" ,,' " , c1grc(~S not to mnoke ciqurettG5i -.dl:ink i:llly. illcoholic beveruges, / 
IJ.~ 
use illly i 110g.::d dru9s, non-pre3c;'~Pt.i.011;( mad ica tions or prescr ibccl 
mcdicutions without writt.en consent [rom HIClIlIIW M. LEVIN, t-l.D. 
;,.~,J . 
The tSurroyate u9rt~(!s to follow a!prc-natul rnedicu1 eXumil1C1Lion 
", "/7' I 
schedUle to cOl1si~;l of no [ewer visits thun: ,One visit pel:" month 
·.n,I. 
uuring the first .';cven months ot.,Pregnal1cy, two visits (each 
. . 
to occur at two week iIltcrv111s) cJurin9 the eighth month of 
I-n e g n iJ n c Y cl n d [ 0 U 1- vis its 
I' ~':, ' I 
( e II c 11 to, 0 c c U .t' a t wee k 1 yin t e r v iJ 1 8 ) 1/"/; 
dUl:"ing the ninth month or prC9nul1Cy. 
,:,', 
9 
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nllu ~~ ~iynin.l) lhe ~;(Ime freely LInd volulltarily and thllt lloit/1(l}; 
party has any retl~jOn to oelievc thwt the other (s) did not freely 
and voluntcJrily execute swid I\greernl~nt. 
X;<V I. III the event <lny' of tlw provisions' of tllis 
I\qrcemen t ar.e deemed to be invalid or \lllen[orceable I the [}wme 
shall be deemed severilole from the remai.nder of: this l\(jreernent 
wnd slwll not Ciluse the invalidity or 
rem,1inder of this I\'jrf!ement. IfL,uCh 
unen[orceClbility of the 
prov i s ion slla 11 be de(~med 
Invul id dlle to i ls scope or breucp:h I such prov is ion shiJ 11 be 
deemed valid La tile extent of 
the scope or breudth permitted by 
.' L 
I ' 1 ill.J • 
A 
. 
XXVII. Tllie I\(}recment may ,be executed in two (2) 01.- more 
'~I,l 
Coullterp':lrts, eelell of which 5hw11 be iln ori~rillwl but, illl of 
;1 'I 
which shall constitutc' one ']nd the SClfl18 instrulTlent. 
, 
I. 
XXVII I. 'I' T lJi ~.; 1\ <] l' C! e men t set s . for t: h t ,il e e n t i r C~ il Sf r e em C 11 t 
! 
1\11 dyrecnlC'llts, cuvenanLs, rt~prcspnti1tions, alld wurranties, 
express . 
and implic'c1, oeal and written, of the parties are contained 
' ,,\, 
tJerein. . ; lio other uyre(~II1en ts I . covellclll ts I represcn ta tions or 
Wilrrllllties, expresfJ or implieu, or']J or written, have Leen made 
" 
- ~ 
by nnyparty to the otlwr(s) with ~espect to the subject matter 
L 
of this J\y rr~C'lflelll. 1\11 prior alJd contemporaneous conversations, 
!l ego t i at i 0 11 3 I po S!1 i b 1 e till d i) 11 e 9 e, ~ i.l 9 l' C C men t S i) n d rep r e (; c n t w t i on 8 I 
covenants and wl1rrantie.'J Idth respect to the subject mutler hereof 
(Ire wuiveu, lIlere-led 11ereill ,lnd superseded hereby. 
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XXIX. 
xxx. 
'1'I1i9 l\<]rcclncnl has !Jeen drafted 1I1ld excel/teu 
in Louisville, Kentucky and shall be governed by, continued 
(Jlld enforced in ilccorcJ<1I1Ce with the laws of the COlllmonwcC:l 1 th 
:, I 
Kentucky. ',(P. 
,. 
XXXI. No provision in this l\yrcement is to be illter-
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preteu [or or against ,any party because that party or thut 
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party!:;' legal representative drafted the provisions. 
. " 
, i·,·, 
'J, 'J 
L PrepC:lrcd ,By:, '. 
I,' 
,1,1:' I 
"1" 
, , , 
1" ':1 ,11'\ t " .~ '/r11 " 
'; Ri\'l'l c-RATUI:: niioFITY 
Attorney at LclW 
Suit<.~'1\50, 710 ~Y. 1'1ain Stl'C~el 
'Louisville, Kentucky 40202 
§ 0 2 - 5·B 'jl 8 7 ZF" " 
j ,',('i,' 'S~ 13 I', I I :: 
\ I ,,1\' '. \ , , 
oJ ' f ~ \, , \ 
';: ¥:t.'" ' \,\,, " 
I., "~~p.",, , "~I , , 
. ' 
'. i 
), . 
'k", .,I. 
';'iitr 
,I •• 
,I: , 
"/ 1 )'b' 
" 
" j 
I :, ~ J r , 
", '~'/'/ ' , {, 
I' ;, .. r 
" ,( 
of 
, ' 
" 
I' 
. 
, 1 
222 
h'C, 
---_._--._-.--. -----_._-._----- -- _._- -_ .. _- -- - --------------_.-
illHJ 
--- ---- -.. - ...... _-.. -- ---------._--------... -. - -
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Uaturlll Father alld that in order to nlaintain confidentiality, 
we will never see any si(jI1Clture of sClid NCltur<Jl r<1ther, althouyh 
it is our collective intentioll to enl(~r into a llJnLlinq lC~lLll 
obligation. . L 
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siynatures o[ said iiul"rogatc and,her llusorJnd, iJlthough it is 
our collective intelltion to enter into iJ bindiny lcgcJl 
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.1. 
r·l r. J () e W <1 r d 
COil r i (~r JourllCll - Louisv iII e Times 
Louisville, Kentucky 40202, 
Dear t1r. Ward: 
Q A G 81 18 
This opinion 18 in response to your letter in which 
you inquire about the legality of "surrogate parenthood" 
in Kentucky. Specifically you have asked the following 
four questions: t· 
1. Whether' such a conti-ac t is 1ega 1 in Ken tucky • 
2. Whether ordinary custody rules would apply in 
the event one or more of the parties to the 
agreement changed their minds while the preg~ 
nancy was in progress. "1 
:~ f '. ~ . I'. 
3. Whether surrogate:';transactions can be regulated 
by the state. - "'\l" II:: 
oj;' 
4 . I"he ther the couple or the doctor cou 1 d be he 1 d 
IiClble if the surrogate died or had her health 
impaired by the pregnancy., 
, 
T1H~ surroqClte parenthood situation would typically 
arise \o!hen a couple wants children but the wife is not 
phy~Jical1y able to bear children. Another woman, the 
"s\lrro(lilte mother", is artificially inseillintlt:ed with the 
~;penn of Hl(~ hUflballd, who becomc!s t.he natlH-al father", 
When the child i8 hOLn and the paternity of· the nature!l 
fatht'r 11<'1.8 iW('J1 c~ltr1hli~;hed, the sllrrog<:lt:c mother tcnni-
nates her pell-ental riqhts; the natural father receives the 
child, and his wife then adopts it. . 
"~" ~ ~1\ . 
:'-'11 -
1 
, I') 
"1 .' 
1 \ , 
'1 ·,1 
i 
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. , 
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r-, r. \ l< )/ ~ VJd I r 1 
I'd(JI~ /. 
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III re~;p')Il~;C to yout" fir~;L 'jllCHlion, while severi'll 
d l f f 1.\ re n t app coaches may be taken, in gene.nl1 BOlDI;? t.ype 
of c'mtract br:!tween the couple desiring the child and tho 
surrofjute Tllother would he necessary. However, re<ji1rdlens 
of the uprro~ch taken, because of the existence of at least 
thn:0. Kentur.ky sLatl1lc" and a st:J~ong public policy against 
"bahy-buyiny", it i" thc opinion of this office tll,lt any 
such contract is illegal an~ unenforceable in Kentucky. 
First, KRS 199.500(5) states: 
"In no case shall an adoption be granted or 
Cl consent [or adoption be held v,1lid if such 
consent for adoption is given pr.ior to the 
fifth day after the birth of the child," 
The question artsos whether, prior to the establishrnent 
of the surro(jate arrangement, the couple can legally con-
tract with the surrogate mother that for a stated consi-
deration from the couple to'the surrogate, the liJttcc con-
8ent~; or wil] consent to the wife I s adoption of the child. 
Inhf~rellt in tll(' f;urrogc'lte's prolnise is that she a<Jn~es 
to br~ artificially inseminated with the natural father's 
sperrn and to carry the fetus to delivery. 
',' 
ObviousJy, prior to the birth o[ the child the surro-
'I ya tIC' 1110 ther canna t 9 i ve 1ega 11 y bind ing con sen t for i1dop tj 011 
of t.he future child; such consent would violate KRS 199.500(5). 
The purpose of this statute1is to give the mother time Clfter 
the birth o[ her child to consider whether or not to give 
it up [or adoption. The addition of (5) to KRS 199.500 by 
the 1978 General l\ssembly indicates that the legislature 
as a matter of public policy intended thal the mother, not 
be rushed into making a dec~sion to give consent for 
adop t: ion; rather she shou Id Ihave at leas t five days to 
think it over. "I' : " ' , ' 
If 
Even if the contract might he written to provide 
that the surrotJate mother would qive consent in the future, 
fivl:! di1ys after the child is' baril l in Oll,r. opinion the ' 
contr~act would sLill be illego.1. Even though such c1 con-
trllct might not fail for laok of consideration, it would 
nnt be en[orceo [or reasons of puhlic policy, for it is 
oiJV.lnl18 that stlcll a contr~:\Ot is mercly a subtcrfugc to Slct 
n r 0 u n d the 1<'1 n 9 tW tJ e 0 f K R S 1 9 9 • S 0 0 ( 5) , by w hi c h the sur r 0-
.gllte has in effect given consent before the pregnancy even 
has begun. ' !~r 
nt', ,JIl(~ \'Idrd 
['a()I~ J 
I 1\ 0 n 1 e r t n 01 1/ (} i d (' h 0. d i f' fit: \l 1 tit:' IJ 0 f c () n l.r- act j l) Y [ <) r 
CPIl:-lont tor: adopt.ion, <1n altc['nlltive method haB Oo6l011 d"vieod. 
This involves the formation'of II contract:. for the termina-
tion of parental d,qhts by'the surrogate mother anel her , 
hushand, Under ~;lICI1 a contract, the termination aqreement,1 
is made bebJecn the natural father and the surrogate mother 
(and her husband if she is'married); the natural father's 
wife is not involved in thisl agreement. 1.1 The surrogate agrees 
to he artificially insemina~ed with the semen of the natural 
father and to carry the fetus to delivery. The surrogate 
and her husband also agree that on the fifth day after the 
birth or as soon as possible' afterward,' they will in[;titut:c 
proceedings to terminate their parental 'riCjhts to till: child, 
The rwtura 1 father" a(Jn:~es to pay a stated monctary cOflsi-
c1 era t ion i.l t1 d to pay medical J a 11 d other e x p e flf; e s . I li r~ our 
undcr~3t.llldinq LllCll: this is the method used by Surrogllte 
Parenting l\ssociates,Inc."'qf Louisville, Kentucky. 
: I ,,/. I'" II I 
Termination of parentai"rights 'is differelltiated from 
consent for adoption and is covered by different statutes; 
these are found at KHS 199.601-199.617,"The penalty pro-
vision is found at KHS 199.990(5)., The penalty for willful 
violation of the statutes or/"rules promulgated under them 
is a fine of not less than 1$20 nor more than $200 or im-
prisonment for not more than,30, days' or both, 
, • I. ~.! ,t.r ,J "'. • . • I '., I I I I I 
1\ parent may file a petition for the voluntary terminCl-
tion of his or her parental1kights.KRS 199.601(1). However, 
according to KRS,199.601(2)" "No petition may De f,il0.d 
~Jlder th~"0 chapter prior to five _ (5) days after tfle birth 
of a child'" " ,- "'~"l' ; _ ",:,' /" " ' '-';" i 
.. , " \'!;It,!, .Jl'l: ,~' '~J."" ,,'; 'I ~,t . \ t ~:. .i l·,) l .. l,· I,; . 
" -I 
Once again, the publici'policy behind'sllch'a"provision 
].8 apparent. The lcgislature1intends that the mother have 
time to consider her decision;' to terminate parental rights. 
Therefore, the same legal roadblock appears here as in the 
sitUAtion concerning consentiflfor adoption. Even though such 
a contract might noi fAil foi lack of'consideration, in our 
Clpin ion the courts of Kentuqky"would not enforce such contrr:Jct 
or find such contract legal:' because of its obvious intont to 
c ~ rCUlT1v(~ 11 t I: H~; , 199 . 6? 1 (,2) f~QI\~ tl~e pu~,~ f c ,j p~,l ~c;:y" b~!l ind ~he 
flve day waltlng Pjerlod.;, I:~~, I :i';,\,~i', ~,~,:i- ' ; ,', F 
, t ~ \ 
\-.JhiJe either of t.he abOVe discussecl"statutes"is sufficient 
in and o[ itself to declare the surrogate' parcntin~l process 
iller]'11 ill Kentucky, in ourl'opinion the stroflgest'legal pro-
hibition against surrogate parenting ,in Kentucky is found in 
! ' 
I I 
, , 
't I. 
" 
Mr. Joe vJard 
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the strong public policy against the buying and sed 1 inq o[ 
children. Courts in many states have held that as ,1. maLb'r 
of public policy children are not to be bought and sold~ 
that is, monetary consideration other than for medical 
expenses is not to be made to the natural parents who have 
placed their children up for adoption. Barwin v. Reidy, 
307 P.2d 175 (N.M. 1957); Matter of Adoption of a Child by 
I.T., 397 A.2d 341 (N.J. super. 1978). Self-seeking on the 
part of the natural mother is condemned. See In re Shirk's 
Estate, 350 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1960); Reimche v. First National 
Bank of Nevada, 512 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1975). 
In Kentucky, much of this public policy has been embodied 
in statute. KRS 199.590(2) states: 
"No person, agency or institution not licensed 
by the department may charge a fee or accept 
remuneration for the procurement of any child 
for adoption purposes." 
The penalty provision for violation of KRS 199.590 is found 
in KRS 199.990(4) and states that any person who violates 
the statute shall be fined not less than $500 nor more than 
$2,000 or imprisoned for not more than six months or both. 
It is the opinion of this office that this statute pre-
cludes not only the surrogate mother from receiving pay~ents 
for giving up her child for adoption but also includes all 
who are involved in the surrogate transaction, since each 
of them is involved "in the procurement of a child for adop-
tion purposes". As pointed out in Petrilli, Sec. 29.6, 
"It is ... clear legislative policy that no one shall 
profit economically from the adoption process". 
Even though there is not a statutory equivalent to 
KRS 199.590(2) for termination of parental rights, there is 
the same puhlic policy issue. In addition, even in the termina-
tion of rights approach, it is expected that the wife of the 
natural father will adopt the child. It is our opinion that 
the courts of this Commonwealth will not allow persons to 
receive monetary consideration for the procurement of a child, 
regardless of whether it is referred to as an adoption pro-
ceeding or as a termination of parental rights. 
, " 
: , 
/" 
11r. ,jlle Ward 
PulJ(~ 5 
III addi.Liol\, KHS 199.590(1) provider>: 
"No per,ion, corporation or (lsGociation shall 
advertine in any manner that it will receive 
children for the purpose of adoption !lor shall 
ony ncw,3[Japer published in the commonwealth of 
Kentucky nor (lny other 'pUblication which is 
pn~fl(Hed, fiolcl, or .distributed in the common-
w(~alth of Kentucky contain af.1 advertisement 
which solicits children for 'adoption or 
solicits th~ custody of children."~~ 
I 
The puhlic policy behind 
Commonwealth of Kentucky does 
sal e 0 f chi I d r en. . j ,I ~p ~ 
tllese statutes is Clr'i1L: Tile 
not',condone the purchiH,e and 
,r 
In YO\lr second qucstion'you:ask about the consequences 
of (l breach of contract by any of the parties. As wc have 
just stated abovc, we do no;~believe'there can be a lcg~l 
and enforceable surrogate parenting contract in Kentucky 
under our present laws. This being the case, there is no 
reason to discuss the possible consequences of a breach of a 
contract we believe cannot legally exist'! 
... : 'f""" { ,,11. 
I'le do no te, however, there may be non-contrac tUrl.l 
remedies if parties to a surrogate arrangement back out. 
. I f the surrog (l te mother decides to keep'the chi 1 d I the 
',' natural father could institute! a custody' proceediny. The 
Etlther vlou.ld need to prove' that he is' the nCltural father of 
the ~hild and that it would L~e'in the best interest of the 
child to be. in his custody:Ht.IEvt:!l1 though .4he natural father 
is not married to the mother'of the·child, he still has the 
riqht to seek custody of his"child. The court in Swc.lL v. 
Tu;-ncr, 547 S.W.2c1 435 (Ky. :1976), concluded that ~bi~ 
logi.c;\l father of a child born out of wedlock has the ri9ht 
to petition and obtain custo~y of his child if he is suited 
to the trust, CIne! i.f such is·lin·'the best"interest of the 
child." It!. at 437. An unWed father 'has' the same ri.ql1t to 
a custodyl1ea.l·ing as do oth,er-p'ar~nts. \ Stanley v. Illinois, 
405 U.S. 645 (1972). .i . '-, t1'l~~I':":" ': 1- ': - , 
I' J J '~f: I :: ! 'r. i. J 
Kns '10J./'lO(l) ~;I:i1tes~:in"par-t:I'''"Th'ecourt shall deter-
mine custody in (lccordancc with the best~interest8 of the 
child and equal considerati~f:,shc1l1 bo, giycn ',to each parent". 
, 
, ,. 
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(J\lth(luqh h)lllld ill Ul'.~ Cll'lll\('I~ ()Il div()t:ce, tll~ cu!;t:()dy 
ata,tllto& havo been applied to non-divorce aitu.4iltiof)kl, a,9, 
Swca tv. Tu~_~~er, surra.) "So long as a I father can produce 
reliable evidence that he is the father and is not a stranger 
to the child, and that ,the best interest of the child would 
result, the putati~e father may petition the circuit court 
for custody". Sweat v. Turner, supra~ a~ 437. 
'I • , : "I •• I ", ~ 
If the natural father~'iand' his wj,fe, df~cide they do not 
want to have custody of or adopt 1 the"child r thus leaving the 
child with t:h~ surrogate mother, the surrogate has Cl remedy. 
She could institute a paternity action. ,KRS 406.021 (1) 
states i.n part: "Paternity~maybe determiner! upon the 
complClint of the mother, child, person or agency substan-
tially contributing to the support of the child." There is 
a presumption that the child born"duringlawful wedlock or 
within ten,,{lO) rnonths afte:r;:wards is, a child of the husband 
and wife. KRS 406.0ll~ Du~ithis pres4rnptioncan be overcome. 
After the surrogate mother prov:es(,that the child was born ' 
out of wedlock, she could seek~to impose liability on the 
natural father for: the payment of!l~e,ta~PI,expen~es. 
, ' ~"",,,: I., I" ~ 
"The father of a child'which is or may be born 
out of wedlock is liablo to the~ same extent as 
the father of a child ',born in w~dlo~k, whether 
or not the chi ld is 'born alive, for: the reason-: 
able expense ,of the mother's:p~egnancy and 'con- , 
finement and fat" the ed)..J.cation, nep~ssary supportj 
and funeral ex~ense~,J ?1':\~~1!: c?i~d ~1~~.~;,~R~t1, 40,p:~.o~ 1. -," 
In response to your th,ird'guestion,l,the state:would 
have the ~uthority to enactlJaws regulating"surrogate ,~rans­
actions so 10n9 as suchl laws dO;I:10,t,.':yiol~te ,at:lY,'lofi'lther" 
parties' ! cons ti tu tional') ~i~o.r\:s .~I", I,; ",~(.ll ,,} :, I, ~I:: (,', Ii' j 
tl 1"' , ",' I " 
The f i n<1 1 quc~s tion you !have presented concerns po ten tia 1 
liClbility of the nCltural father qr the physician"lif the 
sur roy a te dies or I has "he~t:'~JT",~'~PI !impaire.9,:?Yl tpe v' pregn'f.~;y, 
\'1,:, nre ,1Wi1re that Surrogate Parenting J\ssociates hClS 
delll t wi th this problem thro,tlgh severa 1 provisions in the 
"contract" between the natural~father and th~ surrogate 
moth(~r. 'I'll(! surrotJute andlherhusband agree to assume~all 
risk!; illcic1ent to the pregnancy, includin9 the risk of 
death. The naturul father buys, a 'term insurance policy on 
the ,,\l r rog a te 's lite a.nd ag ~ee s to pay, for her rned ica 1 
n ,.' , expe ses. ;'10"/" , 01 
'itl~ 'I ' 
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t,r" , 
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BatTill(J allY such provi!'don8 <15 Iloted nhove, the natural 
(t\tner would not appear to havt~ any liab.ilitiea for injurif'lf.l 
done to the surrogate mother hecause of her pregnancy, 
except if his paternity is shown, he'could be liable for the 
"reasonable expense of the ~cither's pregnancy and confine-
ment" pursuant to KRS .406.011. A:negligence action would 
not be appropriate; it is u~Flear what t~e father's duty to 
the surrogate would be, and "in any event, the surrogate 
would have entered into ~~t91 "arfa~gE1~~nt. kno~ing wha t risks 
she wou ld be e~posed to. ., f;~ . ~". ,~." IIj r" ,I.' I, ' .. , 
. "I.; . If any of the harm don~n to the· surrogate mother was a 
result of some action by the physician, the surrogate could 
bring a medical malpracticefaction .. Such a suit could be 
brought as a tort action in:negligence or asa breach of a 
contract, express or implied'.~ Hackworthv. Hart, 474 S.W.2eI 
377 (Ky. 1977). lethe surrogate dies, 'her family or her 
es ta te could bring a wrong f~'~ dea th action, against' the 
physician. The standard of~eare which the physician would 
be under is set out in f31ai~v.,Eblenl 461 5 .. \'/.2d 370 (Ky. 
1970). The physician would be "under ac1uty to,lIse that 
degree of care and skill which is expected of a reasonably 
competent practitioner in the'isame class'to which,he belongs, 
acting in the same or s.imi lar circums tances . ~, Id. at 373. 
Sef2 al~,o Seaton v .. ~o~e'nber;g~:'!J 573. S·j~'~i~~~~,~~3'(K~.1978). 
r, . . } .'., '/' iii I ~ , . I· I . " ..J; ti n .' 
'\ ,',,' ' . : .. " 'rj!~ I, j' ~ -".' I 
, .. ,CONCkU.SIQN ,'i '1 jl""lq ·l'~·.' ' 
, "A I I r . .vj I 1\, ~ \" .. ,," f' 
. , i • I • ~ ,f '.. " ,. :,J 
In conclusion, it is t~e~opinion'of'this o~fice that 
because of the ~xistence'ot' ·the above-:-mentionea 'Kentucky 
statutes and the strong public~policy against the buying and 
sel1111g of children, contracts involving ~:~urrogate parent-
hood Rre illegal and unenfo~ceable~in··the·Commonwealthof 
k . , .: .:,I.tI.~'k"'Al\~~""·l"'. "\'.11 "'I~';"~~ . Ken t u c y. . " " I. ~J ~ir,i..,. , , "t: . 
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APPENDIX 8 
HOUSE BILL NO, 5184 
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E ILL 1 
October 26, 1981, Introduced by Rep. Fitzpatrick and referred to the 
Committee on Judiciary. 
A bill to amend the title and sections 44 and 54 of chapter 
X of Act No. 288 of the Public Acts of 7939, entitled as amended 
"An act to revise and consolidate the statutes relating to the 
organization and jurisdiction of the probate courts of this 
state; the powers and duties of such courts, and the judges and 
other officers thereof; the statutes of descent and distribution 
of property, and the statutes governing the probating of estates 
of decedents, disappeared persons and wards, change of name of 
adults, the adoption of children and the jurisdiction of the 
juvenile division of the probate courts; to prescribe the manner 
and time within which claims against estates and other actions 
and proceedings may be brought in said courts; pleading, evi-
dence, practice and procedure in actions and proceedings in said 
courts; appeals from said courts; and to provide remedies and 
penalties for the violation of this act," 
as added by Act No. 296 of the Public Acts of 1974, being sec-
tions 710.44 and 710.54 of the Compiled Laws of 7970; and to add 
sections 77,73,75, 76,77,79, 87, 83, 85, 87, 89, 97, 93, 95, 
97, and 99. 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN ENACT: 
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1 Section 7. The title and sections 44 and 54 of chapter X of 
2 Act No. 288 of the Public Acts of 7939, as added by Act No. 296 
3 of the Public Acts of 7974, being sections 770.44 and 770.54 of 
4 the Compiled Laws of 7970, are amended and sections 77, 73, 75, 
5 76, 77, 79, 87, 83, 85, 87, 89, 97, 93, 95, 97, and 99 are added 
6 to read as follows: 
7 TITLE 
8 An act to revise and consolidate the statutes relating to 
9 the organization and jurisdiction of the probate courts COURT 
70 of this state, 
--
, the powers and duties of such courts COURT, 
71 and the judges and other officers thereof, OF THE PROBAXE 
12 COURT, the statutes of descent and distribution of property, and 
13 the statutes governing the probatin~ of estates of decedents, 
14 disap~eafed persens and wards, change of name of adults, AND 
15 CHILDREN, the adoption of ADULTS AND children, and the jurisdic-
76 tion of the juvenile division of the probate ceurtSr COURT: TO 
77 GOVERN SURROGATE PARENTHOOD; to prescribe the manner and time 
78 within which claims a~aiflst estates and other actions and pro-
19 ceedings may be brought in said courts THE PROBATE COURT; TO 
20 PRESCRIBE pleading, evidence. practice, and procedure in actions 
27 and proceedings in said courts THE PROBATE COURT; TO PROVIDE 
22 FOR appeals from said ceurts THE PROBATE COURT; TO PRESCRIBE 
23 THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF CERTAIN STATE AGENCIES AND OFFICERS; TO 
24 PROVIDE FOR THE EXECUTION, TERMS, CONDITIONS, AND ENFORCEMENT OF 
25 CERTAIN AGREEMENTS ENTERED INTO IN RELATION TO ADOPTION; and to 
26 provide remedies and penalties for the violation of this act. 
02440'87 
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1 CHAPTER X. 
2 Sec. 44. (7) Except as otherwise provided in this section, 
3 the consent required by section 43 OR SECTION 79 shall be by a 
4 separate instrument excecuted before the judge of probate having 
5 jurisdiction or, at the court's direction, before another judge 
6 of probate in this state. In counties having a population of 
7 750,000 inhabitants or more, a consent may be executed before a 
8 referee of the probate court. If the consent of a parent or 
9 guardian is executed before a judge or referee as provided in 
o this subsection, a verbatim record of testimony related to execu-
7 tion of the consent shall be made. 
2 (2) If the person whose consent is required is in any of the 
3 armed services or is in prison, the consent may be executed and 
4 acknowledged before any person authorized by law to administer 
'5 oaths. 
'6 (3) If the child to be adopted is legally a ward of the 
'7 department or of a child placing agency, the consent required to 
'8 be made under section 43 by the duly authorized representative of 
'9 the department or agency may be executed and acknowledged before 
~o a person authorized by law to administer oaths. 
~7 (4) If the consent is executed in another state or country, 
22 the court having jurisdiction over the adoption proceeding in 
23 this state shall determine whether the consent was executed in 
24 accordance with the laws of that state or country and shall not 
25 proceed unless it finds that the consent was so executed. 
26 (5) If a parent's consent to adoption is required under 
27 section 43 OR SECTION 79 or if a guardian's consent is required 
02440'87 
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1 pursuant to section 43(7) (e), the consent shall not be executed 
2 until after such investigation as the court deems proper and 
3 until after the judge, referee, or other person authorized in 
4 subsection (2) has fully explained to the parent or guardian the 
5 legal rights of the parent or guardian and the fact that the 
6 parent or guardian by virtue of the consent voluntarily relin-
7 quishes permanently his or her rights to the child. 
S (6) If the adoptee's consent to adoption is required under 
9 section 43, the consent shall not be executed until after such 
10 investigation as the court deems proper and until after the judge 
11 or referee has fully explained to the adoptee the fact that he or 
72 she is consenting to acquire permanently the adopting parent or 
13 parents as his or her legal parent or parents as though the 
14 adoptee had been born to the adopting parent or parents. 
15 SeC4 54. (7) Except AS PROVIDED IN SUBSECTION (4) AND 
76 EXCEPT for charges and fees approved by the court, a person shall 
17 not offer, give, or receive any money or other consideration or 
18 thing of value in connection with any of the following: -T-
79 (a) The placing of a child for adoption. 
20 (b) The registration, recording, or communication of the 
21 existence of a child available for adoption or the existence of a 
22 person interested in adopting a child. 
23 
24 
25 
26 
(c) A release. 
(d) A consent. 
(e) A petition. 
(2) Before the entry of the final order of adoption, the 
27 petitioner shall file with the court a sworn statement describing 
02440'87 
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7 money or other consideration or thing of value paid to or 
2 exchanged by any party in the adoption proceeding, including 
3 anyone consenting to the adoption or adopting the adoptee, any 
4 relative of a party or of the adoptee, any physician, attorney, 
5 social worker or member of the clergy, and any other person, cor-
5 poration, association, or other organization. The court shall 
7 approve or disappr~ve fees and expenses. Acceptance or retention 
8 of amounts in excess of those approved by the court ceRsittltes 
9 CONSTITUTES a violation of this section. 
o (3) To assure compliance with limitations imposed by this 
1 section -,- AND by section 74 of Act No. 776 of the Public Acts 
2 of 7973, being section 722.724 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, 
3 aR~ by sectieR 4 e€ Act Ne. 263 ef the Public Acts e£ 7973, as 
4 affieR~e~, beiR§ sectie" 337.484 of the Michi§a" Cem~ile~ Laws, 
5 the court may require sworn testimony from persons who were 
6 involved in any way in informing, notifying, exchanging informa-
7 tion, identifying, locating, assisting, or in any other way par-
a ticipating in the contracts or arrangements which, directly or 
9 indirectly, led to placement of the person for adoption. 
o (4) THIS SECTION DOES NOT APPLY TO A PETITION FOR SURROGATE 
ADOPTION FILED PURSUANT TO SECTION 73. 
2 SEC. 71. ( 7) AS USED IN TH IS SECTION AND SECTIONS 73 TO 
3 99: 
4 (A) "ADOPTIVE PARENT" MEANS A NATURAL FATHER'S SPOUSE WHO 
5 PROPOSES TO ADOPT A CHILD TO BE CONCEIVED PURSUANT TO A SURROGATE 
6?RENTHOOD AGREEMENT. 
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6 
7 (B) "NATURAL FATHER" MEANS A MALE OF AT LEAST 78 YEARS OF 
2 AGE WHOSE SEMEN WILL BE USED TO ARTIFICIALLY INSEMINATE A 
3 SURROGATE. 
4 (C) "SURROGATE" MEANS A MARRIED OR SINGLE FEMALE OF AT LEAST 
5 78 YEARS OF AGE WHO AGREES PURSUANT TO A SURROGATE PARENTHOOD 
6 AGREEMENT TO BE ARTIFICIALLY INSEMINATED WITH THE SEMEN OF A NAT-
7 URAL FATHER, AND, IF SHE CONCEIVES AND BEARS A CHILD, TO VOLUN-
8 TARILY RELINQUISH HER PARENTAL RIGHTS TO THE CHILD. 
9 (D) "SURROGATE PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT" MEANS AN AGREEMENT EXE-
10 CUTED AS PROVIDED IN SECTIONS 85 TO 93. 
17 (2) IN ADDITION TO THE WORDS AND PHRASES DEFINED IN SUBSEC-
12 TION (7), SECTION 22 DEFINES WORDS AND PHRASES APPLICABLE TO SEC-
13 TIONS 73 TO 99. 
14 SEC. 73. (7) IF A SPOUSE OF A NATURAL FATHER DESIRES TO 
15 ADOPT A CHILD TO BE CONCEIVED PURSUANT TO A SURROGATE PARENTHOOD 
16 AGREEMENT, THAT PERSON TOGETHER WITH THE NATURAL FATHER SHALL 
17 FILE A PETITION FOR SURROGATE ADOPTION WITH THE PROBATE COURT OF 
78 THE COUNTY IN WHICH THE PETITIONER RESIDES OR IN WHICH THE SURRO-
79 GATE RESIDES. 
20 (2) THE PETITION FOR SURROGATE ADOPTION SHALL BE VERIFIED BY 
27 THE PETITIONER AND THE NATURAL FATHER AND SHALL CONTAIN THE FOL-
22 LOWING INFORMATION: 
23 (A) THE NAME, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, AND PLACE OF RESI-
24 DENCE OF THE PETITIONER, INCLUDING THE MAIDEN NAME OF THE PET I-
25 TIONER AND OF THE NATURAL FATHER. 
26 (B) THE NAME, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, AND PLACE OF 
27 RESIDENCE OF THE SURROGATE. 
, 
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1 (C) A COpy OF THE SURROGATE PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT ENTERED 
2 INTO PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 85 TO 93 BY THE PETITIONER, THE NATURAL 
3 FATHER, THE SURROGATE, AND THE SURROGATE'S HUSBAND, IF THE SURRO-
4 GATE IS MARRIED. 
5 (3) A PETITION FOR SURROGATE ADOPTION FILED PURSUANT TO THIS 
6 SECTION AND ANY REPORT OR DOCUMENT FILED PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 75 
7 TO 99 SHALL BE SUBJECT TO SECTIONS 67 AND 68. 
8 SEC. 75. (7) IN A SURROGATE ADOPTION PROCEEDING INITIATED 
9 PURSUANT TO SECTION 73, THE COURT SHALL DIRECT A FULL INVESTIGA-
10 TION BY AN EMPLOYEE OR AGENT OF THE COURT, A CHILD PLACING 
17 AGENCY, OR THE DEPARTMENT. THE FOLLOWING SHALL BE CONSIDERED IN 
12 THE INVESTIGATION: 
13 (A) THE CAPACITY AND DISPOSITION OF THE PETITIONER TO GIVE 
74 THE CHILD TO BE CONCEIVED PURSUANT TO THE SURROGATE PARENTHOOD 
15 AGREEMENT LOVE, AFFECTION, AND GUIDANCE, AND TO EDUCATE THE 
76 CHILD. 
77 (B) THE CAPACITY AND DISPOSITION OF THE PETITIONER TO PRO-
78 
79 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
VIDE THE CHILD TO BE CONCEIVED PURSUANT TO THE SURROGATE PARENT-
HOOD AGREEMENT WITH FOOD, CLOTHING, EDUCATION, PERMANENCE, MEDI-
CAL CARE OR 
THE LAWS OF 
RIAL NEEDS. 
(C) THE 
HOME. 
(D) THE 
(E) THE 
02440'87 
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1 (F) ANY OTHER FACTOR CONSIDERED BY THE COURT TO BE RELEVANT 
2 TO A PARTICULAR SURROGATE ADOPTION PROCEEDING. 
3 (2) A WRITTEN REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION SHALL BE FILED 
4 WITHIN 60 DAYS OF THE FILING OF A PETITION PURSUANT TO 
5 SECTION 73. 
6 (3) THE JUDGE OF PROBATE SHALL REVIEW THE REPORT PREPARED 
7 AND FILED PURSUANT TO THIS SECTION. IF THE REPORT RECOMMENDS 
8 THAT SURROGATE ADOPTION BE PERMITTED, THE JUDGE, WITHIN 70 DAYS 
9 AFTER RECEIPT OF THE REPORT, SHALL ENTER AN ORDER CERTIFYING THE 
70 SUITABILITY OF THE PETITIONER FOR SURROGATE ADOPTION. IF THE 
17 REPORT RECOMMENDS THAT SURROGATE ADOPTION NOT BE PERMITTED, THE 
72 JUDGE, WITHIN 70 DAYS AFTER RECEIPT OF THE REPORT, SHALL CONDUCT 
13 A HEARING TO REVIEW THE REPORT AND TO TAKE OTHER EVIDENCE REGARD-
74 ING THE SUITABILITY OF THE PETITIONER. IF THE JUDGE IS SATISFIED 
15 AS TO THE SUITABILITY OF THE PETITIONER BASED ON THE EVIDENCE 
76 PRODUCED AT THE HEARING, THE COURT SHALL ENTER AN ORDER CERTIFY-
77 ING THE SUITABILITY OF THE PETITIONER FOR SURROGATE ADOPTION. 
18 SEC. 76. (7) IF A SINGLE NATURAL FATHER HAS ENTERED INTO A 
19 SURROGATE PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT WITH A SURROGATE, THAT NATURAL 
20 FATHER, TOGETHER WITH THE SURROGATE, SHALL FILE A PETITION TO 
21 TERMINATE THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF THE SURROGATE AND TO ESTABLISH 
22 THE PATERNITY OF THE NATURAL FATHER. 
23 (2) A PETITION FILED PURSUANT TO SUBSECTION (7) SHALL BE 
24 VERIFIED BY THE NATURAL FATHER AND THE SURROGATE AND SHALL CON-
25 TAIN THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: 
26 (A) THE NAME, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, AND PLACE OF 
27 RESIDENCE OF THE PETITIONER. 
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7 (B) THE NAME, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, AND PLACE OF 
2 RESIDENCE OF THE SURROGATE. 
3 (C) A COpy OF THE SURROGATE PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT ENTERED 
4 INTO PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 85 TO 93 BY THE PETITIONER, THE SURRO-
5 GATE, AND THE SURROGATE'S HUSBAND, IF THE SURROGATE IS MARRIED. 
6 (3) A PETITION FILED PURSUANT TO THIS SECTION SHALL BE 
7 SUBJECT TO SECTIONS 67 AND 68. 
8 SEC. 77. (7) UPON VERIFICATION OF THE SURROGATE'S PREGNANCY 
9 AS THE RESULT O~ AN ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION, NOTICE OF THE PREG-
'0 NANCY SHALL BE FILED WITH THE COURT. 
'1 (2) UPON VERIFICATION OF THE SURROGATE'S PREGNANCY, THE NAT-
'2 URAL FATHER SHALL JOIN WITH THE SURROGATE AND ACKNOWLEDGE THAT 
'3 THE CHILD TO BE BORN TO THE SURROGATE IS TH~ NATURAL FATHER'S 
r4 CHILD IN A WRITING EXECUTED AND ACKNOWLEDGED BY THEM IN THE SAME 
75 MANNER PROVIDED BY LAW FOR THE EXECUTION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF 
16 DEEDS OF REAL ESTATE. THE ACKNOWLEDGMENT SHALL BE FILED WITH THE 
17 COURT. 
78 (3) UPON RECEIPT OF AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT MADE PURSUANT TO SUB-
19 SECTION (2), THE JUDGE OF PROBATE SHALL ENTER AN ORDER OF FILIA-
20 TION ESTABLISHING THE NATURAL FATHER'S PATERNITY OF THE CHILD TO 
27 BE BORN TO THE SURROGATE. ON THE NEXT BUSINESS DAY AFTER ENTRY 
22 OF THE ORDER OF FILIATION THE COURT SHALL SEND A COpy OF THE 
23 ORDER TO THE VITAL RECORDS DIVISION OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
24 PUBLIC HEALTH. 
25 SEC. 79. (7) SUBJECT TO SECTION 44, CONSENT TO THE 
26 RELINQUISHMENT OF PARENTAL RIGHTS OVER A CHILD CONCEIVED PURSUANT 
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70 
TO A SURROGATE PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT SHALL BE EXECUTED BY THE 
2 SURROGATE AND HER HUSBAND, IF THE SURROGATE IS MARRIED. 
H. 5184 
3 (2) THE CONSENT REQUIRED BY SUBSECTION (7) SHALL BE EXECUTED 
4 BEFORE THE BIRTH OF THE CHILD TO BE EFFECTIVE UPON THE BIRTH OF 
5 THE CHILD. 
6 SEC. 87. AFTER THE RECEIPT OF NOTICE OF THE SURROGATE'S 
7 PREGNANCY AND THE COMPLETION OF THE SURROGATE'S SIXTH MONTH OF 
8 PREGNANCY, THE JUDGE OF PROBATE SHALL ISSUE AN INTERIM ORDER 
9 GRANTING CUSTODY, CARE, AND CONTROL OVER THE CHILD TO THE NATURAL 
70 FATHER AND, IN THE CASE OF A SURROGATE ADOPTION PROCEEDING, THE 
17 PETITIONER. THE INTERIM ORDER SHALL GRANT TO THE NATURAL FATHER 
72 AND, IN THE CASE OF A SURROGATE ADOPTION PROCEEDING, THE PETI-
T3 TIONER THE EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY TO CONSENT TO ALL MEDICAL, SURGI-
74 CAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, EDUCATIONAL, AND RELATED SERVICES FOR THE 
75 CHILD. THE INTERIM ORDER SHALL BE EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY UPON THE 
16 BIRTH OF THE CHILD. 
77 SEC. 83. (7) A SURROGATE ADOPTION IS GOVERNED BY THIS SEC-
18 TION AND NOT BY SECTION 46. 57, OR 52. 
79 (2) FOURTEEN DAYS AFTER THE COURT RECEIVES NOTICE OF THE 
20 BIRTH OF A CHILD CONCEIVED PURSUANT TO A SURROGATE PARENTHOOD 
27 AGREEMENT, THE JUDGE OF PROBATE SHALL ENTER AN ORDER TERMINATING 
22 THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF THE SURROGATE AND ANY CLAIM TO PATERNITY 
23 BY THE SURROGATE'S HUSBAND, IF THE SURROGATE IS MARRIED. 
24 (3) NOT MORE THAN 4 DAYS AFTER THE COURT IS NOTIFIED OF THE 
25 BIRTH OF A CHILD CONCEIVED PURSUANT TO A SURROGATE PARENTHOOD 
26 AGREEMENT, THE SURROGATE AND THE SURROGATE'S HUSBAND, IF THE 
27 SURROGATE IS MARRIED, SHALL BE NOTIFIED OF THE DATE ON WHICH THE 
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1 JUDGE OF PROBATE WILL ENTER AN ORDER TERMINATING THE PARENTAL 
2 RIGHTS OF THE SURROGATE AND ANY CLAIM TO PARENTAL RIGHTS BY THE 
3 SURROGATE'S HUSBAND, IF THE SURROGATE IS MARRIED, AND SHALL BE 
4 ADVISED TO RAISE ANY OBJECTIONS TO THE ENTRY OF THE ORDER BEFORE 
S THAT DATE. 
6 (4) IF THE HUSBAND OF A SURROGATE ASSERTS A CLAIM OF PATER-
7 NITY, THE JUDGE OF PROBATE SHALL STAY THE ENTRY OF THE ORDER AND 
8 SHALL HAVE A HEARING TO DETERMINE THE PATERNITY OF THE CHILD. IF 
9 THE JUDGE FINDS THAT THE SURROGATE'S HUSBAND IS THE FATHER OF THE 
o CHILD, THE PETITION FOR SURROGATE ADOPTION SHALL BE DISMISSED. 
1 IF THE JUDGE FINDS THAT THE HUSBAND OF THE PETITIONER IS THE ~AT-
2~URA~LFATHER OF THE CHILD, THE JUDGE SHALL ENTER AN ORDER OF FILI-
3 ATION ON BEHALF OF THE NATURAL FATHER AND TERMINATING THE CLAIM 
4 OF PATERNITY BY THE SURROGATE'S HUSBAND. 
S (5) IF THE SURROGATE OBJECTS TO THE ENTRY OF THE ORDER TER-
6 MINATING THE SURROGATE'S PARENTAL RIGHTS, AND IF THE SURROGATE'S 
7 HUSBAND IS NOT DETERMINED TO BE THE CHILD'S FATHER UNDER SUBSEC-
8 TION (4), THE JUDGE OF PROBATE SHALL STAY THE ENTRY OF THE ORDER 
'9 AND SHALL HAVE A HEARING TO DETERMINE WHETHER TO TERMINATE THE 
!O PARENTAL RIGHTS OF THE SURROGATE. THE JUDGE SHALL ENFORCE THE 
!1 SURROGATE PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT AND ORDER THE TERMINATION OF THE 
Z2 SURROGATE'S PARENTAL RIGHTS UNLESS TUE SURROGATE DEMONSTRATES BY 
~3 CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE 
24 CHILD ARE NOT SERVED BY THE TERMINATION OF THE SURROGATE'S PAREN-
25 TAL RIGHTS. 
26 (6) IF AN ORDER TERMINATING THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF A 
27 SURROGATE HAS BEEN ENTERED IN A SURROGATE ADOPTION PROCEEDING 
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7 INITIATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 73, THE JUDGE OF PROBATE MAY ENTER 
2 AN ORDER OF ADOPTION AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 56. IF AN ORDER TER-
3 MINATING THE PARENTAL RIGHTS HAS BEEN ENTERED IN A PROCEEDING 
4 INITIATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 76, THE JUDGE OF PROBATE MAY ENTER 
5 AN ORDER OF FILIATION ON BEHALF OF THE NATURAL FATHER. 
6 SEC. 85. (7) A PERSON SHALL NOT BE A PARTY TO AN AGREEMENT 
7 IN WHICH A FEMALE AGREES TO CON~EIVE A CHILD THROUGH ARTIFICIAL 
8 INSEMINATION AND TO VOLUNTARILY RELINQUISH HER PARENTAL RIGHTS TO 
9 THE CHILD UNLESS THAT PERSON, TOGETHER WITH HER OR HIS SPOUSE, IF 
10 MARRIED, EXECUTES A SURROGATE PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT AS PROVIDED IN 
17 SECTIONS 87, 89, AND 97. 
12 (2) THE ATTORNEY WHO REPRESENTS THE PROSPECTIVE NATURAL 
13 FATHER AND HIS SPOUSE, IF MARRIED, SHALL NOT REPRESENT THE SURRO-
14 GATE IN THE EXECUTION OF A SURROGATE PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT. AN 
75 ATTORNEY REPRESENTING A PERSON EXECUTING A SURROGATE PARENTHOOD 
16 AGREEMENT SHALL ALSO SIGN THE AGREEMENT, BUT NOT AS A PARTY. 
77 SEC. 87. A SURROGATE PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT SHALL CONTAIN THE 
18 FOLLOWING TERMS: 
19 (A) THAT THE SURROGATE AGREES TO BE ARTIFICIALLY INSEMINATED 
20 WITH THE SEMEN OF THE NATURAL FATHER BY A LICENSED PHYSICIAN. 
21 (B) THAT THE SURROGATE AGREES NOT TO FORM OR ATTEMPT TO FORM 
22 A PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE INTERIM 
23 ORDER AS PROVIDED FOR IN SECTION 87. OR SUBSEQUENT TO TERMINATION 
24 OF THE SURROGATE'S PARENTAL RIGHTS TO THE CHILD. 
25 (C) THAT THE SURROGATE EXPRESSLY ACKNOWLEDGES THE INTENT AND 
26 PURPOSES OF THE SURROGATE PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT AND AGREES TO 
27 VOLUNTARILY RELINQUISH ALL PARENTAL RIGHTS TO THE CHILD AND UPON 
02440 1 87 
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73 
7 REQUEST OF THE NATURAL FATHER TO EXECUTE A CONSENT TO THE 
2 ADOPTION OF THE CHILD BY THE ADOPTIVE PARENT. 
H. 5184 
3 (D) THAT THE SURROGATE UNDERSTANDS AND AGREES TO ASSUME ALL 
4 RISKS, INCLUDING THE RISK OF DEATH, WHICH ARE INCIDENT TO CONCEP-
5 TION, PREGNANCY, CHILDBIRTH, AND POSTPARTUM COMPLICATIONS. 
6 (E) THAT THE SURROGATE AGREES TO UNDERGO PSYCHIATRIC EVALU-
1 ATION AND TO SUBMIT THE EVALUATIONS TO THE NATURAL FATHER AND THE 
8 ADOPTIVE PARENT, IF THE NATURAL FATHER IS MARRIED, AND THE INSEM-
9 INATING PHYSICIAN, ABSENT ANY INFORMATION WHICH WOULD TEND TO 
10 IDENTIFY THE SURROGATE, AND THAT THE SURROGATE AGREES TO SIGN 
77 MEDICAL RELEASES PRIOR TO THE EVALUATIONS. 
72 (F) THAT THE SURROGATE AGREES TO SUBMIT TO THE INSEMINATING 
13 PHYSICIAN ANY MEDICAL EVALUATIONS RELATING TO THE SURROGATE PAR-
14 ENTHOOD AGREEMENT WHICH ARE NOT MADE BY THE INSEMINATING 
15 PHYSICIAN. 
16 (G) THAT THE SURROGATE AGREES TO ADHERE TO ALL MEDICAL 
17 INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO HER BY THE INSEMINATING PHYSICIAN AS WELL 
18 AS HER PHYSICIAN. 
19 (H) THAT THE SURROGATE AGREES TO FOLLOW A PRE-NATAL MEDICAL 
20 EXAMINATION SCHEDULE TO CONSIST OF AT LEAST 7 VISIT PER MONTH 
21 DURING THE FIRST 7 MONTHS OF PREGNANCY AND AT LEAST 2 VISITS PER 
22 MONTH DURING THE EIGHTH AND NINTH MONTHS OF PREGNANCY. 
23 (I) THAT THE SURROGATE AGREES THAT SHE WILL NOT ABORT THE 
24 CHILD ONCE CONCEIVED UNLESS SHE DESIRES TO DO SO UPON BEING 
25 ADVISED BY THE INSEMINATING PHYSICIAN THAT SUCH ACTION IS 
26 NECESSARY FOR HER PHYSICAL HEALTH. 
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7 (J) THAT THE SURROGATE AGREES TO UNDERGO A COMPREHENSIVE 
2 MEDICAL EVALUATION, UNDER THE DIRECTION AND SUPERVISION OF A 
3 LICENSED PHYSICIAN, TO DETERMINE WHETHER HER PHYSICAL HEALTH IS 
4 SATISFACTORY. THE COMPREHENSIVE MEDICAL EVALUATION SHALL INCLUDE 
5 TESTING FOR VENEREAL DISEASES, SPECIFICALLY INCLUDING SYPHILIS 
6 AND GONORRHEA. THE SURROGATE AGREES TO UNDERGO VENEREAL DISEASE 
7 TESTING BEFORE EACH INSEMINATION. 
8 SEC. 89. IN ADDITION TO THE TERMS REQUIRED BY SECTION 85, A 
9 SURROGATE PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT SHALL CONTAIN THE FOLLOWING 
70 TERMS: 
77 (A) THAT THE NATURAL FATHER AND THE ADOPTIVE PARENT, IF THE 
72 NATURAL FATHER IS MARRIED, AGREE TO DEPOSIT THE SURROGATE'S COM-
73 PENSATION IN AN INTEREST BEARING ESCROW ACCOUNT UPON EXECUTION OF 
14 THE SURROGATE PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT, TO BE PAID TO THE SURROGATE 
75 IN FULL WITH ACCRUED INTEREST UPON BIRTH OF THE CHILD AND TERMI-
76 NATION OF THE SURROGATE'S PARENTAL RIGHTS. 
77 (B) THAT THE NATURAL FATHER AND THE ADOPTIVE PARENT, IF THE 
78 NATURAL FATHER IS MARRIED, AGREE TO PAY THE EXPENSES INCURRED BY 
79 THE SURROGATE AS A RESULT OF HER PREGNANCY, WHICH EXPENSES SHALL 
20 INCLUDE ALL MEDICAL, PSYCHIATRIC, HOSPITALIZATION, PHARMACEUTI-
27 CAL, LABORATORY, AND THERAPY EXPENSES INCURRED IN THE SURROGATE'S 
22 PREGNANCY, NOT COVERED OR ALLOWED BY HER PRESENT HEALTH AND MAJOR 
23 MEDICAL INSURANCE, INCLUDING ANY MEDICAL EXPENSES INCURRED UPON 
24 ORDER OF A LICENSED PHYSICIAN, BUT WHICH EXPENSES SHALL NOT 
25 INCLUDE ANY EXPENSES FOR LOST WAGES OF THE SURROGATE OR OTHER 
26 NONRELATED INCIDENTALS, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ENUMERATED WITHIN THE 
[Ii 27 :::::~::T' 
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7 (C) THAT THE NATURAL FATHER AGREES TO UNDERGO A 
2 COMPREHENSIVE MEDICAL EVALUATION, UNDER THE DIRECTION AND SUPER-
3 VISION OF A LICENSED PHYSICIAN, TO DETERMINE WHETHER HIS PHYSICAL 
4 HEALTH IS SATISFACTORY. THE COMPREHENSIVE MEDICAL EVALUATION 
5 SHALL INCLUDE TESTING FOR VENEREAL DISEASES, SPECIFICALLY INCLUD-
6 ING SYPHILIS AND GONORRHEA. THE NATURAL FATHER AGREES TO SUBMIT 
7 TO VENEREAL DISEASE TESTING BEFORE EACH DONATION OF SEMEN. 
S (D) THAT THE NATURAL FATHER AGREES TO SUBMIT TO THE INSEMI-
9 NATING PHYSICIAN ANY MEDICAL EVALUATIONS WHICH RELATE TO THE SUR-
o ROGATE PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT WHICH ARE NOT MADE BY THE INSEMINAT-
7 ING PHYSICIAN. 
2 SEC. 97. IN ADDITION TO THE TERMS REQUIRED BY SECTIONS 85 
3 AND 87, A SURROGATE PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT SHALL CONTAIN THE FOL-
4 LOWING TERMS: 
5 (A) THAT THE SURROGATE PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT WILL TERMINATE 
6 UPON WRITTEN NOTICE TO THE SURROGATE FROM THE NATURAL FATHER AND 
7 THE ADOPTIVE PARENT, IF THE NATURAL FATHER IS MARRIED, IF THE 
S NATURAL FATHER AND THE ADOPTIVE PARENT, IF THE NATURAL FATHER IS 
9 MARRIED, DETERMINE THAT PREGNANCY HAS NOT OCCURRED WITHIN A REA-
o SONABLE TIME. 
7 (B) THAT THE NATURAL FATHER AGREES TO ASSUME THE LEGAL 
2 RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANY CHILD CONCEIVED PURSUANT TO THE SURROGATE 
3 PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT. 
4 (C) THAT IF THE NATURAL FATHER OR THE ADOPTIVE PARENT, IF 
5 THE NATURAL FATHER IS MARRIED, DIES PRIOR TO TERMINATION OF THE 
6 SURROGATE'S PARENTAL RIGHTS, THE SURROGATE PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT 
7 SHALL REMAIN IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT WITH RESPECT TO THE 
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7 SURVIVING PARTY; THAT IF BOTH THE NATURAL FATHER AND THE ADOPTIVE 
2 PARENT, IF THE NATURAL FATHER IS MARRIED, DIE PRIOR TO TERM INA-
3 TION OF THE SURROGATE'S PARENTAL RIGHTS, THE SURROGATE SHALL BE 
4 ENTITLED TO HER FULL COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES AND MAY ELECT TO 
5 KEEP THE CHILD OR EXECUTE A CONSENT TO THE ADOPTION OF THE CHILD 
6 OR A RELEASE OF THE CHILD FOR ADOPTION. 
7 SEC. 93. A SURROGATE PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT MAY CONTAIN TERMS 
8 AGREED TO BY THE PARTIES IN ADDITION TO THE TERMS REQUIRED BY 
9 SECTIONS 87 TO 97. 
70 SEC. 95. THE DEPARTMENT SHALL ESTABLISH BY A RULE PROMUL-
17 GATED PURSUANT TO ACT NO. 306 OF THE PUBLIC ACTS OF 7969, AS 
72 AMENDED, BEING SECTIONS 24.207 TO 24.375 OF THE MICHIGAN COMPILED 
73 LAWS, A MAXIMUM FEE FOR COMPENSATION OF A SURROGATE. THE MAXIMUM 
74 FEE SHALL BE REVIEWED EVERY 2 YEARS. THE MAXIMUM FEE ESTABLISHED 
75 BY THE DEPARTMENT SHALL NOT BE LESS THAN $70,000.00. 
76 SEC. 97. A PHYSICIAN SHALL NOT ARTIFICIALLY INSEMINATE A 
77 PERSON WHO THE PHYSICIAN KNOWS TO BE A SURROGATE UNLESS THE PHY-
78 SICIAN IS PROFESSIONALLY SATISFIED WITH THE MENTAL AND PHYSICAL 
19 SUITABILITY OF THE SURROGATE AND THE NATURAL FATHER, AND, IF A 
20 PROCEEDING UNDER SECTION 73 IS COMMENCED, UNLESS AN ORDER CERTI-
27 FYING THE SUITABILITY OF THE ADOPTIVE PARENT GRANTED UNDER 
22 SECTION 75 IS PRESENTED. 
23 SEC. 99. NOT MORE THAN 3 DAYS AFTER THE BIRTH OF A CHILD 
24 CONCEIVED PURSUANT TO A SURROGATE PARENTHOOD AGREEMENT, A HUMAN 
25 LEUKOCYTE ANTIGEN TEST SHALL BE PERFORMED ON THE NATURAL FATHER, 
26 THE SURROGATE, AND THE CHILD. THE TEST RESULTS SHALL BE 
27 SUBMITTED TO THE COURT. 
02440 1 87 Fin;:,] Page. 
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